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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
Current economic development law theories and technical assistance practices o f  
international financial institutions emphasise the critical importance for an emerging or 
transitioning economy in moving towards a market orientated system, to have in place a 
modem commercial law infrastructure so that the economy can develop robust credit 
and other financial markets and can attract internal and external capital investments. 
One essential element o f this desired commercial law infrastructure is a legal and 
judicial framework that provides for an efficient and prompt debt recovery process. 
Unfortunately, recent studies indicate that, in most developing countries debt recovery is 
in crisis.
The subject matter o f this volume will be debt recovery in South Asia countries o f  
India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia. These countries have been chosen for different reasons: 
India because it represents one o f  the largest emerging economies; Sri Lanka because its 
relevant legal system is a mix o f  English Common Law and Roman Dutch Law 
concepts; and Malaysia because it has achieved significant economic and financial 
modernisation through a rather special governmental-societal approach. Hopefully such 
a comparative analysis will shed some light on how to improve debt recovery laws in 
emerging economies in a manner conducive to sustainable economic and social 
development.
The ultimate thesis o f  this manuscript is that a suitable debt recovery system for 
an emerging economy requires, not simply suitable laws and judicial remedies, but also 
appropriate financial industry practices as to credit allocation and loan supervision; a 
broad range o f  fair and effective enforcement mechanisms; and an independent, 
commercial trained and responsive judiciary.
The conclusion looks at the present state o f  the development o f  the banking sector 
in the selected three countries, with special attention being given to the apparent 
tensions between the market orientated policies that are being ambitiously pursued and 
the laws that govern credit, security and debt recovery.
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PREFACE
On 12 February 1996 the London School of Economics conducted a seminar for its 
new research students on “How to do your PhD.” We were told:
"...you are required to write a thesis on a chosen topic to a maximum o f 100,000 
words, not a Royal Charter! ”
Described in this manner, the task ahead appeared to be less daunting. Nevertheless, it 
was not an easy one, and I could not have accomplished it without the assistance and support of 
many. I am however, solely responsible for what is written in this thesis.
I have been very fortunate to have my research supervised by Professor Ross Cranston, 
Cassel Professor of Commercial Law at the London School of Economics, (as he then was) one 
of the foremost authorities in Banking Law in the United Kingdom. I am indebted to him for 
his guidance and support throughout my research. He has always been available to discuss 
problems of an academic nature and been understanding and sympathetic where it has been 
more personal. I am particularly grateful to him for continuing to supervise me after entering 
Parliament as a member in 1997 and even after assuming Public Office this year.
The London School of Economics awarded me a studentship of £5000/= every 
academic year, which was used to pay my college fees and expenses incurred during my 
studies. I am grateful to the scholarships committee for awarding me this studentship as it gave 
me the opportunity to become a research student at LSE.
In May 1997,1 travelled to Malaysia to continue my research in that jurisdiction. The 
Central Research Fund of the University of London granted me £495/= towards the cost of my 
airfare and the Law department of the London School of Economics gave me £200/= for my 
expenses. I thank both these institutions for their kind contributions. While I was in Malaysia I 
was introduced to many academics, lawyers, bankers and insolvency practitioners all of whom 
willingly gave me the assistance I sought. It is not possible to thank all of them individually but 
I appreciate the interest they have shown in my work and thank them for the documents they 
have provided.
In February 1996 and April 1997,1 spent time in Sri Lanka to carry out research for my 
thesis. During my research I interviewed several people that were connected to my subject and 
thank them for their assistance. Mr Palitha Gunasekera, Chief Legal Officer of the Peoples’ 
Bank of Sri Lanka in particular was very helpful.
I must also thank Mr M.D. De Silva, Legal Director of Lewis Brown & Co., Ltd., Mr L 
Abeysekera, Retired High Court Judge, Mrs S. Gunaratne of the Central Bank, Mr A.
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Athurupana, Attorney at Law, Mr Nithi Murugesu of Messrs Murugesu and Neelakandan, all in 
Sri Lanka and Miss S. Jamnekar in India for finding information and sending it to me from 
abroad, often at short notice.
Mr Murad Uduman helped me to proof read the thesis and also made useful 
comments on the text. I greatly value the assistance he gave me and thank him for it.
Elizabeth Durrant, Post Graduate Secretary at the Law Department willingly assisted 
me in all my dealings with the college. The library staff at the London School of Economic 
frequently helped me with my queries. Everyone at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
has been very helpful to me throughout my research and I could not single any one out by 
name. Each of them, particularly those with whom I had the pleasure to work for almost two 
years, always took a lot of trouble to assist me with complicated research queries, which arose 
quite frequently. I appreciate the support and encouragement they gave me. I wish the Institute 
continued success.
My husband’s family has shown a continued interest in my work and willingly sent me 
information from Sri Lanka as and when I needed it. I appreciate their kindness.
Less than a year into my Ph.D. research, my son Charith was bom. As every parent 
knows my life changed dramatically. My mother came from Sri Lanka and spent over eighteen 
months with us and helped me to look after Charith. She was a constant source of 
encouragement and willed me to carry on with my work particularly during difficult times. My 
sister and brother enabled my mother to travel by taking care of her affairs in Sri Lanka whilst 
she was away, and continued to encourage me from across the seas.
My husband, Niranjan, and I have had many discussions and disagreements about my 
thesis and I am indebted to him for his guidance and inspiration at every stage. Niranjan also 
sacrificed and endured much so that this thesis may be completed. This thesis is dedicated to 
the three most important people in my life, my mother Priyani, Niranjan, and last but by no 
means least, my young son Charith.
Law Department Sonali Abeyratne
London School of Economics and Political Science
London
19 November 1998
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“If as RABEL hinted there are any natives with arrows lying in wait for 
comparatists who venture into the thickets o f  their law the password is: 
every student serves the truth.”
Zweigert, K., and Kotz, H. Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd Ed., 
(Translated by Tony Wier) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, vi
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE NEW  MARKET ECONOMIES
1.1.1 Foundations fo r  a Sound Market Economy
1.2 MARKET REFORMS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
1.3 THE ABSENCE OF A MARKET FRIENDLY LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
1.3.1 Characteristics o f  a Market Friendly Legal Environment
1.4 DEBT RECOVERY: THE PROBLEMS
1.4.1 D ebt Recovery in India, Sri Lankan and Malaysia
1.5 SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
1.1 THE NEW  MARKET ECONOMIES
During the first part o f  the twentieth century, countries containing one third o f  
the world’s population moved from being largely market economies to centrally planned 
economies. In the early years, the economic and social achievements o f the centrally 
planned economies were considerable,1 but over a period o f  time central planning 
became inefficient, consumer demands were not satisfied, social indicators began to 
worsen, and economic crisis appeared to be inevitable.2 The socialist countries in the
From Plan to Market : World Development Report, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1996, 1
President Gorbachev, explained the short comings of the former Soviet Union’s 
economic system as follows :
“It is above all the lack of inner stimuli for self-development. Indeed, through 
the system of plan indices, the enterprise receives assignments and resources. 
Practically all expenses are covered, sales of products are essentially guaranteed 
and, most importantly, the employees’ incomes do not depend on the end results 
of the collective’s work: the fulfilment of contract commitments, production 
quality and profits. Such an economy is likely to produce medium or even poor 
quality of work, whether we like it or not. How can the economy advance if it 
creates preferential conditions for backward enterprises and penalises the 
foremost ones?”
Gorbachev, M., Perestroika : New Thinking for Our Country and the World, Collins,
10
then Soviet Bloc realised that their experiment with central planning had to be 
abandoned, and that it was necessary once again to adopt liberal economic policies, 
open their economies to the world at large, and encourage local and foreign investors. 
Yergin and Stanislaw observe:
“Nowhere else has the recasting o f the relationship between state and market 
been so extreme as in the former communist world, for the upheaval has set o ff a 
turbulent struggle to establish market systems in the very countries where 
markets had for so long been banished. The communist system claimed to be the 
vanguard o f the future, but it buckled under the pressure o f  its inner decay. The 
machinery o f  central planning and state ownership failed to foster innovation and 
distribute the benefits o f  economic growth - and then it failed to deliver any 
growth at all.”3
Countries, which did not wish to fully embrace the centrally controlled model for 
economic development, settled for a hybrid economic policy, which borrowed practices 
from both types o f  economy. The extent to which countries have adopted policies from 
planned or market economies varied according to the social and economic policies 
followed by each country. The best known is the approach taken by Japan and South 
Korea.4 They are both market systems that promote export trade but maintain strong co­
operation between the government and corporate sector. The governments provide 
“administrative guidance” to businesses so that they may adapt to the world export 
markets.5 Whatever economic policies were followed in the past, the current trend in 
most developing economies is a shift towards a decentralised, free market system
London, 1987, 85
Yergin, D., and Stanislaw, J., The Commanding Heights, Simon and Schuster, New 
York, 1997,263
Gutterman, A., & Brown, R., (Eds) Commercial Laws o f East Asia, Sweet and 
Maxwell, Hong Kong, 1997, 13-14
However, the Japanese recession that began in the early 1990’s has opened the debate 
whether the relationship between the market place and the state must be changed to 
facilitate more deregulation of the economy. The debate is still continuing. See East 
Asian Miracle : Economic Growth and Public Policy, World Bank, Oxford University 
Press, 1993, 101-102; Yergin, D., and Stanislaw, J., The Commanding Heights, Simon
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underpinned with widespread private ownership.
1.1.1 Foundations fo r a Sound Market Economy
A  country that fosters a free market economy must promote a stable economic 
and political environment that is conducive for economic development, a sound legal 
and judicial framework where independent and expeditious dispute resolution is 
possible, and put in place certain regulatory and institutional arrangements that may be 
necessary to have a sound financial system.6
In order to create a stable economic environment in a free market system, it is 
essential that the economy is open to domestic and international competition and any 
barriers o f  entry are removed. The state needs to adopt free trade policies and local 
industries are expected to compete in international markets. The national government 
should not discriminate between production for the domestic market and exports, or 
between purchase o f  domestic and foreign goods. Government subsidies are not made 
available to enterprises and they have to bear the risks o f  market transactions, ensure 
financial discipline and generate profits. Market forces are allowed to determine the 
interest rates and foreign exchange rates, and the state is expected to exert minimum 
influence over such matters.
If a free market economy is to thrive, such a country requires laws that are fair,
clear and known to its people. Law enforcement agencies should maintain law and order
by applying the law when conflicts arise and be impartial. It is vital that the legal system
is independent and is able to resolve disputes within a reasonable time and cost. The
World Bank has recognised that:
“In many countries the inappropriateness o f  laws, uncertainty in their 
application, weak enforcement, arbitrariness o f  discretionary power, inefficient 
court administration, slow procedures, and the subservience o f  judges towards 
the executive branch greatly hinder development, discourage and distort trade
Schuster, New York, 1997, 164
Norton, J., Financial Sector Reform and International Financial Crises : The Legal 
Challenges, Paper Presented at the WG Hart Workshop on Transnational (Corporate) 
Finance and the Challenge to the Law, (Unpublished), 1998
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and investment, raise transaction costs, and foster corruption. Laws may be 
unenforceable because they contradict economic logic, thereby destroying the 
incentive for compliance.”7
In addition to a stable economic environment and a sound legal and judicial 
system, emerging market economies require certain regulatory and institutional 
arrangements that will assist in building a liberalised financial system.8 It is important 
that a market economy avoids pursuing “repressive” financial policies, such as controls 
on deposit and lending rates o f  interest that result in negative real rates, and allocation o f  
credit to specific sectors that distort the credit market. However, the importance o f  
following prudential monetary policies that regulate the markets cannot be undermined. 
Further, the fundamental principle upon which financial institutions operate is that 
‘money that goes out must come back.’ In other words deposit funds may be used to 
give loans but those loans must be recovered. If the process o f  granting loans is not 
carried out in a professional manner and is influenced by political interference, 
malpractice and corruption the obvious result is that banks w ill fail to recover their 
loans. In addition, if  banks neglect to monitor the loans after they have been granted, or 
the accounting rules disguise the poor quality o f bank portfolios it w ill create a climate 
o f self-deception and operational inefficiency. Such an environment will invariably 
threaten the viability o f the banks and impose a burden on a country’s economy.
1.2 MARKET REFORMS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
The primary responsibility o f  a government in a transitioning or developing 
market economy, is to bring about the required changes to the economic, legal and 
financial environment in an orderly and structured manner. Good government is 
therefore important to achieve these economic goals.
There is no universal model for good government against which performance 
can be judged, but it may be said that good government requires competence and 
accountability in the public sector, transparency o f government activities including easy 
access to information, and a proper legal framework that ensures that the rule o f law
Governance : The World Bank’s Experience, World Bank, Washington DC, 1994, 23
Roe, A., Financial Sector Reform in Transitional Socialist Economies, EDI Policy 
Seminar Report No. 29, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1992, Chapter 4
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prevails. Competence in government and an efficient legal system, for example, are o f  
little value if  governments pursue policies that are repressive or dictatorial, and infringe 
on human rights. Conversely, a government, which is well meaning in terms o f  
participation and consent, is o f  little value if  it is incompetent
The concept o f “good government” or “good governance” as it is often 
described eludes precise definition, as there are differences in opinion as to what 
constitutes “good governance.” 9 There are, however, a number o f  common features 
which are identifiable in the lending policy guidelines o f  various governments and 
institutions engaged in the provision o f  financial assistance.
Most developing and transitioning economies that are moving towards a market 
orientated system are dependent on foreign financial assistance to a greater or lesser 
extent. Since the early nineties, international financial institutions, foreign governments 
and aid donors have become increasingly aware that economic development cannot 
proceed without some degree o f  open pluralistic forms o f  government. This has 
prompted aid donors to attach ‘political conditions’ to the granting o f  aid.10 In June 
1990, in a much-publicised speech, the British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd said:
“Governments tending towards pluralism, respect for the rule o f  law, 
human rights and market principles should be supported. But assistance 
should be withheld from Governments rejecting these criteria, or making 
no effort to move towards them.”11
A  year later the Minister for Overseas Development, Lynda Chalker (now 
Baroness Chalker) outlined the elements o f  good government in more detail,
Crawford, G., Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through 
Development Aid : A Comparative Study o f the Policies o f Four Northern Donors, 
University of Leeds Press, Leeds, 1996, 70; For a criticism of the concept, see 
Leftwich, A., Governance, the State and the Politics of Development, (1994) 25 
Development and Change 363, 364; Leftwich, A., Governance, Democracy and 
Development in the Third World, (1993) 14 Third World Quarterly 605, 612
Robinson, M., Governance, Democracy and Conditionality : NGOs and the New 
Policy Agenda in Clayton, A., (Ed) Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: What 
Role for NGOs?, Intrac Publications, Oxford, 35, 47-50; Mosley, P., et al, Aid and 
Power : The World Bank and Policy Based Lending Vol. 1, 2nd Ed, Routledge, 
London, 1995 65-67
The Prospects for Africa in the 1990’s, Transcript of Speech Given at the International 
Conference on African Prospects in the 1990’s, at the Overseas Development Institute, 
London on 6 June 1990, 2; See also Aukomah, B., The Quest for Better Government 
[1990] African Business, 16
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emphasising the introduction o f market forces and the encouragement o f  private sector
activity, the need for competent and accountable government, pluralism and democracy,
and respect for human rights and the rule o f law.12 The Council (Development) o f  the
European Union in its 1991 resolution on ‘Human Rights, Democracy and
Development’ stressed the importance o f  good governance.13 The resolution states, inter
alia, that the creation o f  a market friendly environment for development as well as
respect for the rule o f  law are central to the existing or developing interdependent
relationships.14 In the same year in the United States, the Agency for International
Development (USAID) published a policy paper entitled “Democracy and Governance”
which described its overall policy on aid as being based amongst others on
strengthening democratic representation (expanding free markets is now discussed
under “Democracy”) and promoting ‘lawful governance.’15 USAID promotes ‘lawful
governance’ by supporting the legal and judicial systems o f  a country and government
accountability at state and local levels.
The World Bank, the major player in world development activities, has
recognised that good governance is synonymous with sound development management.
“Good governance is central to creating and sustaining an environment which 
fosters strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to 
sound economic policies.... They establish the rules that make markets work
Good Government and the Aid Programme, Transcript of Speech Given at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Overseas Development administration, London, 1991, 
2-3
This resolution is of great importance. It is the first time a joint resolution between the 
Council and Member States have been made as to a common policy by all the 
European Community Countries on aid granting.
The text of the Resolution is cited in Democracy and Development (1991) 11 Bulletin 
of the European Communities 122-123
Cited in Crawford, G., Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance 
Through Development Aid : A Comparative Study o f the Policies o f Four Northern 
Donors, University of Leeds Press, Leeds, 1996, 21
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efficiently and, more problematically, they correct for market failures.16 
What does the World Bank mean by “good” and “bad” governance? The main 
characteristics o f  “bad” governance is identified as,
•  Failure to make a clear separation between what is public and what is private, 
hence, a tendency to divert public resources for private gain
• Failure to establish a predictable framework o f  law and government 
behaviour conducive to development, or arbitrariness in the application o f  
rules and laws
• Excessive rules, regulations, licensing requirements, and so forth, which 
impede the functioning o f markets and rent seeking
• Priorities inconsistent with development, resulting in a misapplication o f  
resources
• Excessively narrowly based or non transparent decision making17
Good governance must then be the opposite. It may be epitomised as essentially being
non political, “predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued 
with professional ethos; an executive arm o f  government accountable for its actions; and 
a strong civil society participating in public affairs.”18 It is also a system o f  institutional 
checks and balances where rules and institutions “provide a predictable and transparent 
framework for the conduct o f  public and private business.”19
The concept o f  good government or good governance evolved from such policy 
guidelines for financial assistance. Whilst it is clearly difficult to define what good 
governance is, there are, however, at least two common features that can be identified in 
these policy guidelines, namely, adherence to market principles and respect for the rule 
o f law.
16 Governance and Development, World Bank, Washington DC., 1992, 1
17 Ibid. 9
18 Governance: The World Bank’s Experience, World Bank, Washington DC., 1994, vii
16
When a country has a legal system that has sound laws that reflect the economic 
policies it is pursuing, judicial and administrative institutions that implement the 
legislation expeditiously, and a legal system that is sufficiently insulated from the locus 
o f  political influence, it may be said that the rule o f  law prevails in that country.
A  developing a market economy may not have all these criteria and may need to 
be reformed. However, the content and scope o f  improvements that needs to be done 
will largely depend on each country.20 For example, such a country may need reform in 
specialised areas o f law, such as debt recovery, security, capital markets, and 
bankruptcy laws. In some countries a clear framework o f effective laws that are 
enforceable may have to be developed through support for their drafting, and the repeal 
o f  laws and regulations that do not conform to current economic policies.21 
Strengthening the capacity o f  the courts system in both judicial and administrative 
processes may be required to ensure fairness, and to avoid unnecessary delays, by 
assisting the modernisation o f  the courts and improving their administration, as well as 
the skills o f  various personnel attached to the legal system, such as court and fiscal 
officers. Enforcement o f  judgement debts is especially important. This may include 
addressing organisational and policy issues appropriate training such as teaching new 
skills, and the provision o f equipment.
The World Bank considers it has an important role to play in establishing good 
governance in borrower countries. In particular, the World Bank has undertaken to
19 Governance and Development, World Bank, Washington DC., 1992, 3
20 jh e World Bank and Legal Technical Assistance : Initial Lessons, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 1414, World Bank, Washington DC., 1995
21 Waelde, T., and Gunderson, J., Legislative Reforms in Transition Economies : Western 
Transplants - A Short Cut to Social Market Economy Status? (1994) 43 International 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 347
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provide legal technical assistance to borrower countries with the objective o f  creating an 
optimal legal environment for the conduct o f  commercial and financial transactions.22 In 
practice, the focus o f  law reform programmes have been on areas that have a direct link 
to economic development, particularly in the context o f  making markets work more 
effectively.23 Notably, the Bank has assisted law reform programmes that facilitated 
privatisation, introduced or improved appropriate commercial and financial laws, and 
assisted in financial and judicial reforms.24 The reason for this is to develop a modem  
commercial law infrastructure so that the economy can develop robust credit and other 
financial markets which can attract internal and external capital investments.
1.3 THE ABSENCE OF A MARKET FRIENDLY LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
In most countries that are in the process o f  liberalising their economies, the 
focus so far has been on promoting new economic policies. Legal and judicial 
environments in which competitive business organisations exist and commercial 
transactions take place have not been given the same priority. It has been observed that, 
in the Soviet Union:
“The biggest failure-and biggest threat to reform-continues to be the legal 
process, particularly as it relates to property rights, which are still the 
fundament o f  a market system. The legal system functions poorly; courts
Faundez, J., Legal Technical Assistance, in Faundez, J., Good Government and Law : 
Legal and Institutional Development in Developing Countries, Macmillan Press Ltd., 
London, 1997, 1, 8-10 ; The World Bank and Legal Technical Assistance : Initial 
lessons, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1414, World Bank, Washington DC, 1995
McAuslan, P., Law, Governance and Development o f the M arket: Practical Problems 
and Solutions, in Faundez, J., Good Government and Law : Legal and Institutional 
Development in Developing Countries, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1997, 25, 27
For example, in China, the Bank sponsored an economic law reform project, in Kyrgyz 
Republic the Bank established Central legal reform units, in Moldova it assisted to 
prepare and co-ordinate law reform programmes, and in Venezuela the Bank financed 
judicial reform programmes. See Shihata, I., The World Bank in a Changing World, 
Vol. II, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Hague, 1995, 59, 138-139
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are under financed and beholden to local political forces.”25
Sound laws, and independent judicial institutions which can implement those
laws effectively, are therefore vital in any economy. Enacting appropriate laws is
difficult, particularly i f  policy issues underlying the laws are not resolved, political
pressures are intense, and experience in market reforms is limited. Nevertheless, an
attempt should be made to enact laws that are market friendly because failure to do so
imposes costs that go beyond the deficiencies in individual laws, to the integrity o f  the
legal system itself. Laws passed with inconsistencies, omissions, or which contain ways
o f  circumventing them will be mistrusted and not respected by people.
1.3.1 Characteristics o f  a Market Friendly Legal Environment
In order to create a climate o f  confidence conducive to private sector business 
activities appropriate laws that provide the necessary environment is necessary.26 In this 
part the focus is on fundamental areas o f the law which are vital in a legal environment 
that is market friendly. First, the laws should guarantee private property rights, which 
are the cornerstone o f  a market economy.27 It is important that property rights are 
recognised and protected and the transfer o f  such rights is free from legal constraints. 
Title registration must be available and easy to accomplish, as well as the creation o f  
security rights underpinning credit. It is essential that such rights be enforced 
expeditiously.
Second, it is important that parties to a transaction are allowed the freedom to
25 Yergin, D., and Stanislaw, J., The Commanding Heights, Simon and Schuster, New
York, 1997, 292
2b Legal Aspects o f Privatisation in Industry, Economic Commission for Europe, United
Nations, New York, 1992, 15-30
22 From Plan to Market : World Development Report, Oxford University Press, New
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negotiate the terms o f the contract.28 For example, parties may wish to negotiate the 
essential elements o f a contract such as the amount o f  a loan, the credit charges and 
terms o f  repayment, and be free to prescribe rules for dispute resolution, penalties, and 
guarantees which are designed to ensure the performance o f  contracts.
Third, well-defined and enforceable company and bankruptcy laws are essential 
to attract local as well as foreign investors.29 Company law must define the legal 
entities which can transact different business activities, and grant them full legal 
personality. The legal rules that govern the incorporation, management, and operation o f  
companies should be clearly stipulated. They must also set out minimum capital 
requirements, determine the extent o f  shareholders’ liability for company debts, provide 
rules with regard to the sale and transfer o f  shares, and provide guidelines for corporate 
governance.
In addition, a well-designed insolvency law is necessary for the orderly exit o f  
failing enterprises, thus freeing resources for more productive purposes.30 Insolvency 
laws are also necessary provide for the reorganisation o f  enterprises that are in financial 
difficulties but have the potential to be revived. Such laws need to clearly set out the 
criteria for determining insolvency and efficiency enhancing priority rules for example, 
giving secured creditors preference over state claims, methods o f  reorganisation with 
workable voting rules and flexibility in the sale o f  assets in the event o f  a liquidation.
It has been argued that one o f  the most complex functions o f  market friendly
York, 1996, Chapter 3
28 Gutterman, A., and Brown, R., Commercial Laws o f East Asia, Sweet and Maxwell,
Hong Kong, 1997, 28-30
29 ibid. 34-36
20 Balz, M., & Schiffman, H., Insolvency Law Reform for Economies in Transition : A
Comparative Law Perspective (1996) 11 Butterworths Journal of International
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laws is to protect competition, and to create a level playing field in the market place.31 
Competition law needs to be designed to promote fair and effective competition among 
autonomous enterprises and to ensure that the interests o f  consumers are protected 
without the need for direct state involvement. The laws must ensure that enterprise 
mergers do not create barriers to new enterprises, for example credit providers which 
wish to enter the market and protect the consumers from monopoly power and cartel­
like behaviour o f  enterprises. In addition to these fundamental areas o f  law, there are 
numerous other laws that are important for the proper functioning o f  a market 
economy.32
Appropriate legislation alone will not create an environment conducive to 
business activities. Laws are only as good as the institutions that enforce them. It is vital 
therefore that courts are responsible for enforcing laws and resolving disputes 
expeditiously.33 Judges should take an active part in interpreting the law when obvious 
deficiencies in legislation are seen. It is also vital that disputes can be resolved with 
minimum delay and at a reasonable cost and enforcing judgements are smooth and 
effective. The laws may assist in attracting foreign capital by treating both foreigners 
and locals equally. Further, damages awarded by judges that adequately compensate for 
the losses incurred by aggrieved parties. (E.g., Misrepresentation about loans or 
securities) can have a positive effect on foreign investment. In addition, it is important
Banking and Financial Law, 19-26, 65-72
31 Whish, R., Competition Law, 3rd Ed., Butterworths, London, 1993, 12-14
32 Capital markets and securities legislation, intellectual property and technology transfer 
laws, labour, health and environmental laws, tax laws and commercial banking laws are 
some examples.
33 Perdomo, R., Justice in Times o f Globalisation : Challenges and Perspectives for 
Change in the Administration o f Justice in Latin America, in Justice and Development 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, The Inter-American Development Bank,
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that institutions such as securities commissions and anti-monopoly offices contribute to 
the enforcement o f the law by requiring strict compliance with regulations. Equally 
important are the functions o f  institutions such as accounting firms, credit rating 
agencies, and institutions which produce and distribute information, and monitor market 
participants.
If the business laws o f  a country are not market friendly and the law 
enforcement agencies were inefficient, business costs such as transaction costs to 
arrange, monitor and enforce contracts w ill be high.34 Litigation costs will inevitably 
rise. Where inefficiency exists, uncertainty prevails, and in such an environment prudent 
decision making, which is vital to business activities w ill be difficult. De Soto 
observes,
“Basically, what property rights, contracts, and extra contractual liability do is 
reduce uncertainty for people who want to invest their labour or capital in the 
development o f  existing resources...In any country, uncertainty or legal 
instability reduces the volume o f long-term investment and investment in plant 
and equipment. People save less and invest the little they do save in such 
socially unproductive goods as jewellery, gold, or luxury property... The less 
costly the transaction and the more secure the right to enjoy the fruits o f  
investment, the greater the real value o f  an economic activity. A  law that is 
efficient in dealing with these elements w ill encourage people to identify and 
seize existing opportunities and will systematically increase the value o f  
economic activity.35
It is therefore important not only to increase equity in the society and raise productivity, 
but also to ensure that the legal system is efficient and legal costs are moderate. No 
more so is this than in the areas o f  credit allocation and debt recovery. Economic 
development is more likely to occur in such an environment.
Washington DC, 1993, 131, 134-135
Coase, R., The Firm, The Market, and the Law, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1988, 114- 119
De Soto, H., The Other Path, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1989, 181-183
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1.4 DEBT RECOVERY: THE PROBLEMS
An essential element o f this desired commercial infrastructure is a legal and 
judicial framework that provides for an efficient and prompt debt recovery process. 
Poor debt recovery continues to be one o f the key reasons for financial distress in many 
lenders across the globe. In most developing countries, a significant proportion o f loans 
made by banks and other financial institutions are in default. As a result many such 
lending institutions may be technically insolvent.36
Capital and interest receivables are amongst a bank’s primary assets. O f these, 
interest comprises a bank’s principal source o f revenue and therefore profit. 
Accordingly, from a bank’s perspective it is essential that its borrowers keep their 
contractual commitments and pay interest and capital as scheduled. Defaults are 
inevitable, but when they occur a bank should take appropriate remedial action or, 
failing that, recover the outstanding interest and capital promptly. If the bank neglects 
to do so or the recovery process is unduly protracted, the impact on the bank may be 
severe. The bank may end up with a very large outstanding loan portfolio, which in turn 
would affect the bank’s own capital ratios. In such circumstances the bank may find 
itself having to offer higher than average deposit rates to attract more capital. Inevitably 
these higher rates will be reflected in the bank’s lending rate. Higher lending rates may 
in turn adversely affect the average quality o f future lending, forcing the bank to lend to 
high-risk borrowers. If the bank is to lend to the more creditworthy borrowers it may be
36 A bank is insolvent if the value of its assets is less than the value of its liabilities. “Net
worth” is the amount by which assets exceed liabilities. Many banks in developing 
countries are insolvent and unable to earn the large sums needed to regain solvency; the 
negative net worth of some of these banks is many times their capital. A bank is liquid 
as long as it can meet its day to day operating expenses and withdrawals. Thus it is 
possible for a bank to be insolvent yet continue with its banking operations. World 
Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, 73
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forced to cut margins to levels which are insufficient to generate profits.
Brownbridge observes:
“The bank may be trapped in a cycle o f  high deposit and high lending rates 
which lead to high loan default rates, which in turn raises deposit rates 
through its impact on the perceived soundness o f  the bank.”37
In such circumstances the “moral hazard”38 faced by the bank’s managers or owners is 
also exacerbated. As a bank’s capital diminishes, the incentives, which its owners have 
to preserve solvency, are reduced because, with limited liability, they would have to 
bear only a proportion o f  the losses incurred to creditors. If the problem grows out o f  
hand and regulators begin to question a bank’s capital adequacy ratios it may also affect 
that bank’s ability to lend further or even threaten its very existence.
The effect o f  non-performing loans goes beyond its impact on lending 
institutions. Severe financial distress o f lenders has a widespread negative impact on 
economic growth and development. It is particularly costly to developing countries.39 
A recent World Bank study carried out in ninety developing countries has revealed that 
in many countries, losses sustained by governments due to bank insolvencies amounted 
to 10-20% o f Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and occasionally exceeded 50% of  
(GDP).40
Brownbridge, M., The Causes of Financial Distress in Local Banks in Africa and 
Implications For Prudential Policy, UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 132, UNCTAD, 
Geneva, 1998, 8
The “moral hazard” in this context concerns the adverse incentives to a bank’s owners 
to act in ways which are contrary to the bank’s creditors (primarily its depositors) by 
pursuing high risk lending (e.g. lending at high interest rates to high risk borrowers) 
which, if unsuccessful, would jeopardise the solvency of the bank. Ibid, 7; Berger, A., 
et al The Role o f Capital in Financial Institutions (1995) 19 Journal of Banking and 
Finance 393, 398
World Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, 71-73
Caprio, G., and Klingebiel, D., Bank Insolvencies : Cross-country Experience, World 
Bank Policy Research Paper No. 1620, The World Bank, Washington DC., 1996, 
Table 2
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1.4.1 D ebt Recovery in India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia
Recent statistics show that debt recovery in India and Sri Lanka is in crisis. The 
problem in Malaysia is not so grave but it is a cause for concern to lenders. In India, 
during 1996-97, the non-performing loans were 13.75 % o f  the total outstanding loan 
portfolio o f  the banking sector.41 In Sri Lanka, during the years 1996 -1997, non­
performing loans amounted to 15% o f  the outstanding loan assets.42 In Malaysia, the 
figure was less alarming. In 1996, the ratio o f non-performing loans to total loan assets 
was 3.9%.43
In India and Sri Lanka the low collection ratio is primarily due to the inordinate
delays experienced by institutional lenders when recovering debts through the court
process. Because detailed statistics are not kept, it is not possible to state accurately
how many debt recovery suits are pending in the courts, and as a result the amount o f
credit that is locked up in litigation. The Law Commission o f  India observed,
“It is frightening to note that when a case is pending over 10 years in the 
Supreme Court and recalling the fact that even High Court takes sufficiently 
long time to dispose o f  the case since its commencement in the court o f  original 
jurisdiction, must be pending over two decades. I f anyone in search o f  justice 
has to wait for full two decades, that itself is sufficient to confess the failure o f  
the system.”44
In Sri Lanka, the average delay is 6 years. If, however, the matter is referred to 
the superior courts, the delay extends to 10 years or more.45 In Malaysia, a debt recovery
Report on Trend and Progress o f Banking in India, 1996-97, Appendix - Tables 1.1 
(A)-(C)
These figures are not published in the Central Bank’s Annual Report. The Statistics 
were obtained from the Bank Supervision Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
Bank Negara Annual Report, 1996, 92
The Supreme Court: A Fresh Look, 125th Report of The Law Commission of India, 
Government of India, Delhi, 1988, 11
Jayawardena, N., Philosophy o f Debt Recovery Legislation, Paper Presented at the 
Seminar on Debt Recovery Legislation, on 2 September 1989 at Colombo, Sri Lanka
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suit by way o f  summary procedure can be completed in 3-6 months.46 A full trial may 
extend from 1- 1 1/2 years to a maximum o f 3 years. Compared with India and Sri 
Lanka, the Malaysian court procedure is quite effective. However, there is a general 
consensus among bankers and lawyers that the administration o f the court system could 
be more effective, and that there is room for improvement.47
The consequences o f  inordinate delays in recovering debts can be severe. 
Borrowers may be encouraged to disregard their payment obligations, and take 
advantage o f the weakness in the debt recovery process. Willing defaulters may obtain 
loans with the deliberate intention o f  avoiding payment, and may dispose o f  their assets 
beyond the reach o f  lenders because o f  the tedious pace o f  debt recovery suits. In short, 
delays breed a credit culture o f  deliberate non-payment by defaulters.
At the other end o f  the scale, the problems o f recovery may be avoided if  due
care is taken at the stage o f credit allocation and in monitoring repayments. It is a truism
that prudent lending minimises debt defaults. There may, however, be circumstances
where, whether to lend or not is a matter which is beyond the exclusive control o f  the
lender. External political pressures can undermine the quality o f  credit allocation, and
the ability o f  banks to supervise and collect loan instalments aggressively. Kabraji
describes the nature o f this problem in Pakistan as follows:
“A  fundamental political problem is that since the nationalisation o f  the 
banks in 1974 and the ensuing growth o f  public sector financial 
institutions, the provision o f industrial and agricultural credit at the behest 
o f  the government o f the day to its political supporters inside and outside 
the legislature has become a fertile source o f  political patronage. Likewise 
the invocation o f  the initiation and conduct o f  recovery proceedings is a
46 Interview with Mr. M. Ismail, Senior Partner, Ismail & Co., Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 
1997, Interview with Mr. Ng Chih Kaye, Head, Credit Division, May Bank Head 
Quarters, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997.
47 Ibid.
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significant factor in the overall picture... Recoveries against this class are 
therefore fraught with difficulties.”48
The Indian and Sri Lankan experience is no different. The Khusro Committee in 
India has been very critical o f  the political interference in credit allocation and debt 
recovery.49 In Sri Lanka, it is said that as at 1997 the state banks had given Rs. 6-7 
billion as political loans.50
In the absence o f  such political pressures, a lender must nevertheless be able to 
assess the creditworthiness o f  borrowers. The lack o f  sound credit information systems 
that are user friendly, accessible, and comprehensive would no doubt adversely 
influence proper credit appraisal by lenders. Further, bank staff may not be competent in 
administering modem loan transactions, and in solving the complex problems o f  
borrowers. They may also lack training in the dynamics o f  the new credit culture. For 
example, the granting o f  credit to poor borrowers under group schemes which use peer 
pressure to recover debts.51
Bad management in lending institutions also affects debt recovery.52 If internal 
controls are not in force, it will be difficult to hold individual officers responsible for 
either authorising or collecting loans. Bank officers would then lack the incentive to 
pursue debt recovery actively. It is said that bank officers at times waste almost six
Kabraji, K., Pakistan Country Report, Paper Presented at the Regional Symposium on 
Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished) Manila, 1993, 76, 
81
Khusro Committee Report on The Agricultural Credit System in India, Reserve Bank 
of India, Bombay, 211-215
Interview with Dr. U. Herath, Chief Economist, Economic Research Department, 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Bank on 4 June 1997.
World Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, Chapter 8
De Juan, A., From Good Bankers to Bad Bankers : Ineffective Supervision and 
Management as Major Elements in Banking Crisis, (Unpublished) Washington DC, 
1987,4-10
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years before a decision is taken to initiate legal proceedings to recover a debt, and then 
expect judges and lawyers to recover the money within a year.53 Credit review 
procedures adopted by banks may not be o f  a high standard.54 Issues such as the risks 
involved in approving over-optimistic loans, excess risk concentration and inappropriate 
rescheduling may not be given due consideration. The accounting procedures used by 
lending institutions may understate the problem, and a warning o f  possible dangers at an 
early stage may go undetected.
1.5 SCOPE OF THE THESIS
As part o f  the necessary infrastructure the thesis o f  this dissertation is that there 
needs to exist fair and efficient debt recovery laws and procedures. To demonstrate this 
proposition the dissertation examines the law and practice o f  debt recovery in India, Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia in their social and economic contexts. These countries s have been 
chosen for different reasons. India, because it represents one o f  the largest emerging 
economies; Sri Lanka because its relevant legal system is a mix o f  Common law and 
Roman Dutch law concepts; and Malaysia because it has achieved significant economic 
and financial modernisation through rather special governmental-societal approach. 
These countries also have similar economic and social conditions as well as a similar 
historical background. India, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia were British colonies until 1949, 
1948 and 1957 respectively. As British colonies they inherited English legal principles, 
particularly commercial laws which were almost completely transplanted into their legal
Interview with Mr. A. Cooray, Attorney at Law, at Colombo on 28 June 1997
Kothari, S., Filing of Suit (1995) 66 The Indian Journal of the Institute of Bankers 
132, 133
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systems.55 It is also important to note that the national governments o f  all three countries 
are committed to developing strong market economies for sustainable growth. 
Hopefully, such a comparative analysis will shed some light on how to improve debt 
recovery laws in emerging economies in a manner conducive to sustainable economic 
and social development.
Chapter Two undertakes a historical review o f  the financial sectors from the 
time these three countries became independent. For each country, the financial reforms, 
which were considered historical landmarks, will be discussed, taking into account the 
political and economic backgrounds in which the reforms took place. The focus will be 
on banking sector reforms which had a direct impact on lending transactions. Policies 
on interest rates and credit controls will be dealt with in detail. The role o f  the central 
banks in implementing these policies will also be discussed.
In Chapter Three, the main features o f the law and practice o f  credit allocation 
and control will be addressed. This chapter covers five aspects o f  credit allocation. First, 
the important elements o f  credit appraisal that are commonly accepted as good banking 
practice w ill be examined. Thereafter, obtaining credit information by lenders to assess 
a borrower’s credit rating and the related problems will be identified. The importance o f  
having lending agreements that provide adequate credit protection to borrowers, and at 
the same time not make borrowers feel vulnerable towards lenders is also considered. 
Loan supervision w ill be dealt with next. The last part o f  the chapter will look at the role 
o f  informal credit, key aspects o f banking that affect poorer borrowers, and new
55 For example, in India the Negotiable Instruments Act, No 26 of 1881, The Sale of 
Goods Act, No. 3 of 1930; in Sri Lanka, the Civil Law Ordinance states that the law of 
England must be observed in all maritime and commercial matters. Ordinance No. 5 of 
1852, Sections 2&3; In Malaysia, the Bills of Exchange Act, No. 204, 1949 & 
Companies Act, No. 125 of 1965
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approaches to rural lending.
Chapter Four deals with the importance o f  credit and security in lending 
transactions. In each country, the range o f  available security, the enforcement thereof, 
and the problems that are encountered when enforcing security w ill be covered.
In Chapter Five the law and practice o f  debt recovery through the courts will be 
outlined, such as the methods available to a lender to recover its debts by initiating legal 
proceedings. Special attention will be given to the problem o f  delays, and an attempt 
will be made to identify the causes o f  delay and arrears in the courts. Possible solutions 
to overcome these problems will be suggested. In each o f these Chapters the problems 
encountered by lenders will be identified and, where appropriate, possible solutions will 
be suggested.
Chapter Six concludes the thesis. It will look at the present state o f  all three 
banking sectors in their transition to being market economies, and the apparent tensions 
between the free market policies that are being ambitiously pursued, and the laws that 
regulate credit, security and debt recovery.
Finally, it must be mentioned that the high level o f  non performing loans that 
are currently being recorded in Malaysia due to the present East Asian financial crises is 
not necessarily and demonstrably an implication that the debt recovery laws in the 
country are inadequate or ineffective. The present situation lies in the fact that 
borrowers are unable to repay their debts mainly due to drastic currency devaluation and 
that the affected countries were suffering from a series o f  other macro and micro 
economic factors. These financial crises have therefore not been factored into this 
thesis.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
An efficient financial system contributes to positive economic development. A  
financial system in its role as an intermediary performs the important role o f  channelling 
savings to investment. When savings are allocated to projects that are profitable, they 
will result in generating high-return investments. The more investments are productive,
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the higher the rate o f  economic growth.
Empirical evidence world-wide confirms that countries with well developed 
financial systems tend to have better economic performance, while countries with weak 
financial systems are associated with low economic performance.1 Weak financial 
systems have certain characteristics. Interest rates are regulated by the state at negative 
levels and credit is directed by the state to selected sectors o f  the economy at subsidised 
low interest rates, which in turn are responsible to a great extent for the slowing o f  
economic growth.2 By contrast, in strong financial systems interest rates are determined 
by the respective banks without government intervention, and credit allocation depends 
purely on market demand. In other words, these economies have liberalised financial 
systems. Countries with strong financial systems also follow sound economic policies 
that are consistent with liberalisation, and are supported by adequate legislation and 
supervision.3
Transition to a market economy requires a vast reallocation o f funds. The 
success o f  transition therefore depends to a great extent on the health o f  a country’s 
financial system. Most developing countries that are in the process o f  transforming to 
being market economies have weak financial systems and inadequate support from the 
legal system. As a result they will not be in a fit state to assist in the transition process. 
There are no easy solutions to the problems faced by these countries. They have to find 
ways to overcome the old legacy o f  excessive government control, and at the same time
1 From Plan to M arket: World Development Report, World Bank, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1996, 98
2 World Development Report, World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1989, Chapter 4
3 Zahler, R., Financial Sector Reforms and Liberalisation, in Faruqi, S., (Ed) Financial 
Sector Reforms in Asian and Latin American Countries : Lessons of Comparative 
Experience, The World Bank, Washington DC., 1993,43,48-50
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rebuild a new system where financial institutions can function properly without 
government intervention. For example, a matter that w ill need attention is whether a 
government should inject funds and rehabilitate the over indebted state banks and 
possibly run the risk o f these banks expecting government bail outs in the future, or 
whether a government should allow the old banks to go into liquidation and allow new 
banks to start afresh?
India, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia are all in the process o f  rebuilding their 
financial systems to assist in the introduction and carrying out o f  market reforms. When 
the post-colonial governments came into power, the new rulers opted to promote state- 
led, big development schemes rather than small private sector development projects.4 
This was most prominent in India and Sri Lanka. They nationalised the largest 
commercial banks and established new development banks for the purpose o f  disbursing 
credit to the priority sectors.5 Loans to the priority sectors were granted at very low 
interest rates, and the governments directed the non-state banks to allocate a certain 
percentage o f  their total credit to these sectors.
Until 1991, the Indian economy was closely regulated and to a great extent 
uninfluenced by international trade activities.6 However, by the latter part o f the eighties 
and early nineties there was a consensus among the financial and business communities 
in the country that reform was long overdue.7 In July 1991, India was in the middle o f  a
4 This appears to be the position in most countries that became independent. Long, M., 
Financial Reforms : A Global Perspective in Faruqi, S., (Ed) Financial Sector Reforms 
in Asian and Latin American Countries : Lessons of Comparative Experience, The 
World Bank, Washington DC, 59, 61-62
5 These sectors consist of rural people with low incomes.
6 Tarapore S., Financing o f Indian Industry in an Open Economy [1995] Reserve Bank
of India Bulletin 435
7 Venkitaramanan, S., Some Aspects o f Banking in India [1992] Reserve Bank of India
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financial crisis when Narasimha Rao was elected Prime Minister. He turned out to be a 
radical reformer in liberalising the economy.8 Sri Lanka moved from being an open 
market economy to a semi planned one, and then to an inward looking, closed and 
controlled economy. By 1977 the country was in economic and financial crisis. In that 
year President Jayawardena was elected to office, and he introduced a liberalisation 
programme which has progressively continued. The Malaysian economy has also 
undergone profound economic and financial changes. At the time o f  independence in 1957 
it was the world's leading exporter o f tin, rubber and palm oil, which commodities earned 
about 80% o f the total export income.9 It is today, one o f  the most industrialised nations 
in South East Asia. The transformation o f an agricultural based economy to an 
industrialised one obviously required numerous policy changes. Unlike in India and Sri 
Lanka, the economic and financial transformation took place in a phased manner.
This chapter undertakes a historical study o f  the financial sector from the time 
that these three countries became independent. It is not intended to examine all the 
financial reforms that took place. To limit the scope o f  this study, only the reforms which 
had a direct impact on bank lending and debt recovery will be discussed. Emphasis will 
be placed on policies that have affected interest rates, credit allocation and banking 
institutions. Two aspects must be mentioned at the outset. First, the term "financial sector" 
as used here means the banking sector, because banks are the dominant financial 
institutions in these countries. This does not mean that non-banking financial institutions 
are disregarded. The second issue concerns the definition o f "financial liberalisation". The
Bulletin 495
8 The State o f Reform in India, 6th August 1994, The Economist 49
9 Ahmad, M.S., Chartering a Steady Course: The Economic Engineer, 16th March 1995,
Malaysian Business 3
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term is subject to a number o f interpretations. The broad interpretation given by 
McKinnon has been used in this study.10 Accordingly, "financial liberalisation” within the 
banking sectors means abolishing undue reserve requirements and the lessening o f  
government intervention with regard to interest rates and credit allocation. This may either 
mean eliminating state intervention11 or phasing it out.12
2.2 MAJOR FINANCIAL REFORMS IN INDIA - POST INDEPENDENCE YEARS
India celebrated independence in 1947. The new leaders chose to rule the 
country based on a centrally planned development strategy, with the state playing an 
influential role. The government strove towards developing a society based on socialist 
values. This meant that the country’s wealth would be distributed equitably amongst its 
people. The aim however, was to promote these social values through a democratic 
process and without making the country a totalitarian state.
The private and public sector functioned independently. The private sector was 
regulated by a system o f licences, controls and legislative acts, while the public sector, 
which was wholly owned, was directly regulated by government.13 The public sector 
expanded through the nationalisation o f  industries and financial institutions. For 
example, in 1955 the Imperial Bank was nationalised and taken over by the State Bank 
o f  India.
Mckinnon, R., Financial Liberalisation and Economic Development: A Reassessment 
of Interest Rate Policies in Asia and Latin America, International Centre For Economic 
Growth, California, 1980, 8
Examples are Chile, Uruguay and Argentina
Examples are South Korea and Indonesia
Chattopadhyay, M., et al, Planning and Economic Policy in India : Evaluation and 
Lessons For the Future, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1996, 13-14
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2.2.1 Social Controls
At the time the Imperial Bank was nationalised, there were complaints that the
privately owned Indian commercial banks were granting medium and large scale loans
to big businesses to the virtual exclusion o f the small scale borrowers, like farmers and
small industrialists. It was argued that two thirds o f  the population lived in the rural
areas and nearly three-fourths o f  these were below the poverty line, yet only fourteen
percent o f  bank credit o f  the commercial banks was channelled to these sectors.14 In
response to the growing concerns over the lack o f  credit to the priority sectors, the
government imposed controls and restrictions on the private commercial banks, so that
they were compelled to provide credit to the rural sectors as well. It also issued
guidelines to the banks to improve their administration and decision making process.
These additional controls imposed by the government were termed ‘social controls’ and
eventually found their way into legislation. The Banking Regulation Act deals with
“social controls.” The preamble to the Amendment Act No. 58 o f  1968 states,
“An Act further to amend the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, so as to 
provide fo r  the extension o f  social control over banks and fo r  matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto, and also further to amend the 
Reserve Bank o f  India Act 1934, and the State Bank o f  India Act, 1955.” 
(Emphasis added)
‘Social control’ over private banks was imposed in two ways. On 22nd December 1967 
the government set up the National Credit Council (NCC). The NCC was responsible 
for assessing the credit requirements o f  the various sectors o f  the economy, and for 
determining the priorities in channelling available credit. It was also entrusted with the 
task o f  co-ordinating lending and investment policies between commercial banks and
Tarapore, S., (Deputy Governor RBI) Rural Banking at the Cross Roads [1994] 
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin 1073-1074
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co-operative banks and other specialised credit agencies.15 ‘Social control’ was also 
imposed by amending the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 which introduced a number o f  
radical amendments to control the commercial banks.16 The upshot was that the 
government indirectly controlled the private banks and ensured the banks carried out 
their business according to its requirements.
2.2.2 Nationalisation O f Banks - First Banking Revolution
Six months after the second set o f  ‘social controls’ was introduced, the 
government decided that these controls were essentially experimental, and that it should 
not experiment with public funds.17 On 19 July 1969, under the Banking Companies 
(Acquisition and Transfer o f  Undertakings) Act, 1970, fourteen large Indian private 
banks were nationalised.18 This was considered to be the first ‘banking revolution’ in 
independent India.19 This ‘revolution’ is historic not because o f  the change o f  bank 
ownership but because it was seen as an attempt by the government to pursue its 
objective o f  bringing about a socialist society.
It was hoped that the nationalisation o f  banks would effectively decentralise the 
credit granting process and have a favourable effect on the hither to neglected sectors 
such as agriculture and small industries.20 Nationalised banks were required to give
The NCC was dissolved after the nationalisation of the commercial banks.
1  ^ Act No. 58 of 1968, see particularly sections 10A, 10B, 20, 30, 35B, 36(l)d, 36AD,
36AE to 36AJ, and 47A
17 The major banks were operating mostly with the public deposits. Shareholder
contributions were negligible. In 1968 the total deposits were 2,750 crore and the paid 
up capital was only 28.5 crores. [100 Lakhs = 1 Crore (i.e. 10 Million)]
18 Act No. 5 of 1970
19 Six more banks were nationalised in 1980
20 Rangarajan, C., Imperative o f Banking in India [1994] Reserve Bank of India Bulletin
1059
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priority to these sectors when allocating credit, and only use any credit surplus for new 
urban business enterprises. Businesses in the underdeveloped areas were to be given 
priority over urban industries. The state banks were also required to subsidise the 
priority sector by charging interest rates lower than those charged to big businesses.
The government defended its sudden decision to nationalise fourteen banks by 
officially taking the stand that “public ownership o f  the larger banks will help most 
effectively the mobilisation and development o f national resources and its utilisation for 
productive purposes, in accordance with planning and priorities.”21 The title to the 
Nationalisation Act also justifies the nationalisation o f  the banks: “in order to serve 
better the needs o f  development o f  the economy in conformity with the national policy 
objectives”. In other words, the government was advancing its own programme for 
creating a socialist society.22
The nationalisation programme was opposed by many.23 They argued that the 
social controls had been effective for only 168 days and that this was too short a period to 
conclude that its objectives had failed. It was also argued that in response to the social 
controls imposed, the banks had willingly co-operated with the government's objectives by 
increasing credit to the priority sectors. For example, during this period, the twenty major 
banks had increased credit facilities to the agriculture sector from Rs.30 crores to Rs.97 
crores and to small-scale industries from Rs.167 crores to Rs.222 crores.24 Another
See Preamble to The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings 
Act), No. 5 of 1970
Gandhi, I., Why Bank Nationalisation? [Edited version of the Prime Minister’s Speech 
in the Lok Sabha] (1969) 13(16) Yojana 3-4
Santhanan, K Bank Nationalisation : An III Considered Step (1969) 14(7) Swarajya 
13-14; Hazray, M., Bank Nationalisation : Some Misconceptions (1969) 14(11) 9-10; 
Huchappa, G., No Justification Except Ideology (1969) 13(17) Yojana 15-16
Tannan, M., Tannan’s Banking Law and Practice in India, 19th Ed., Vol. 1, India Law
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argument against nationalisation was that a switch over to the public sector was not 
necessary to avoid the evils revealed in the private sector. Moreover, in India public sector 
institutions were well known for their bureaucracy and inefficiency.25 Due to lack o f  
competition from other banks, it was said that state banks would not have the required 
dynamism to achieve targets.26 It was also pointed out that the public sector was more 
open to corruption and nepotism through political influence.
2.2.2.1 Effects o f  the Nationalisation Programme
Despite the wide expansion o f banking facilities in terms o f geographical areas, the 
overall performance o f the nationalised banks was poor. A  decline in productivity, low 
profitability and a high rate o f non-performing loans (i.e. loans in default) threatened their 
viability.27 The main reason for this unsatisfactory situation was the government's policy 
o f introducing excessive central directives to commercial banks in respect o f  investment 
and credit allocations. We see below the adverse impact o f this on debt recovery.
Priority sector lending was a main concern o f the government. A  conscious effort 
made by all the state banks ensured that the priority sectors received adequate resources 
through various credit programmes. In purely qualitative terms, these credit directives 
helped to achieve the government's targets on the re-direction o f  credit. In achieving these 
targets however, the banks were faced with various problems which affected their
House, New Delhi, 1998, 131-132
Ghose, C., “Bureaucratisation ” o f Banks (1969) 24(29) Janata 9-10
Kothak, D., and Venkatachar, J., Problems of Reorganisation (1969) 13(22) Yojana 
21; Huchappa, G., No Justification Except Ideology (1969) 13(17) Yojana 15-16
Rangarajan, C., Inaugural Address at the 18th Bank Economists’ Conference [1995] 
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profitability.28 The policy o f directing credit to specified priority sectors resulted in the 
reduction o f  credit to other sectors. Priority sector lending was costly due to the low 
interest rates that were charged and the high operating costs entailed in processing small 
loans.29 The desire to achieve credit targets also meant that inadequate attention was 
devoted to the qualitative aspects o f lending. Purpose based lending allowed banks a 
certain amount o f  laxity in their procedures and enabled a departure from accepted 
banking practices. The distinction between credit need and credit worthiness was almost 
confused in the minds o f most bankers.30
Serious damage was done to proper credit evaluation by persistent political 
interference. The situation deteriorated to the extent that bank officials virtually ceased 
assessing the proper credit worthiness o f  borrowers, and granted loans to specific 
borrowers designated on lists prepared by government authorities.31 'Loan Melas' (fairs) 
conducted by politicians also had an impact on banks. Usually, loan melas were conducted 
by politicians to attract votes at elections, and entailed either undertaking to give loans at 
comparatively low interest rates, or the writing o ff o f  existing loans.32 This procedure was 
quite contrary to the approved principles o f  professional credit appraisal, and to effective 
post credit supervision. Loan waivers encourage borrowers wilfully to default. As a 
former Governor o f the Reserve Bank observed, “borrowers who are promised these
28 According to the Governor of the RBI, after taking into account, income other than 
interest and allowing for provisions and contingencies, the net profit would have 
worked out to a deficit of one percent of working funds. Rangarajan, C., Imperatives of 
Banking [1994] RBI Bulletin 1059
29 Khusro, M., Report of the Agricultural Credit Review Committee, RBI, Bombay, 1993 
(Reprint), 143
30 Dandekar, V., Limits o f Credit Not Credit Limits [1993] Economic and Political 
Weekly A86,A91
31 Ibid., A91
32 Malhotra, R., Rural Credit: Issues for 1990 [1990] Reserve Bank of India Bulletin 721,
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concessions ‘forget’ to repay their loans, as they feel that the loan is given to them free by 
the “sarkar” (government).33
The increasing number o f default loans caused grave concern to the banks. This 
was mainly due to the shortcomings in credit appraisal, and in supervision subsequent to 
granting o f  loans. Directing credit was considered a means to achieving the government's 
goals on providing credit to the priority sectors, but over the years the means seemed to 
have become ends in themselves.
2.2.3 Financial Sector Reforms in 1991- Second Banking Revolution
In July 1991, the government announced a new economic policy which was 
designed to effect important changes to revive the country's economy. The objective o f the 
entire reform programme was to move towards a free market economy. It was hoped that 
pursuing these new policies would enhance the productivity and efficiency o f the 
economy, and also increase international competitiveness. The public sector was opened 
to private sector participation, foreign investment was encouraged by reducing protective 
barriers such as high tariffs and import controls, and moderate rates o f  taxes were 
introduced.34 In the reform programme, financial reforms were considered essential to 
make the banking sector more viable and efficient.35
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2.2.3.1 Narasimham Committee Report on the Financial System
In August 1991, the government appointed a high powered committee under the 
chairmanship o f  Sri Narasimham, a former Governor o f  the Reserve Bank o f India, to 
examine the existing financial system and suggest reforms that would make the financial 
sector more viable and efficient. The terms o f reference were extensive. The Committee 
was required to examine a wide range o f issues covering efficiency, accountability, 
profitability, modernisation, capital structure, administration and legislation including the 
recovery o f loans. The Committee submitted its final report to the government in 
November 1991. The Narasimham Report was considered a comprehensive reference 
document for the implementation o f the reform programme.36
The Committee was o f  the view that the need for reform in the financial sector 
arose from several reasons. The most important among them was the government’s policy 
where an excessive degree o f state control and direction was used in terms o f investment, 
credit allocation, branch expansion and even the internal management aspects o f  the 
banks. Consequently, Indian banks had virtually ceased being competitive or innovative. 
There had also been political interference which had hindered the commercial judgement 
o f bankers when appraising the creditworthiness o f  borrowers and had adversely 
influenced the internal management o f the banks.37 For the purpose o f this study, attention 
will be focused on some o f the problems that had adverse implications for the commercial 
banks and their lending operations.
The main cause identified by the Committee for the decline in profitability was the
Tarapore, S., Issues in Commercial Banking Reform [1993] Reserve Bank of India 
Bulletin 69
Narasimham Committee Report on the Financial System 1991, Standard Book Co., 
New Delhi, 1992, 3-4 (hereafter Narasimham Report)
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directed credit programmes. The Committee acknowledged that they played a useful role 
in extending credit to the agricultural and other small industrial sectors but was o f the view  
that the pursuit o f  such objectives should use the fiscal instruments rather than the credit 
system. Accordingly, it suggested that the directed credit programmes be phased out. It 
also suggested redefining the priority sector and targeting only 10% o f aggregate credit to 
these sectors.38 The Committee recommended that concessional interest rates to priority 
sectors must also be phased out.39
A significant limitation on the profitability o f  banks was the high level o f  non- 
performing assets. Banks experienced considerable difficulties in recovering overdue 
debts, and the Committee considered that there was an urgent need to bring into being an 
appropriate legal enforcement process through which overdue loans could be recovered. It 
strongly recommended setting up special debt recovery tribunals on the lines proposed by 
the Tiwari Committee.40 The Committee proposed creating a new Asset Reconstruction 
Fund (ARF), through special legislation if  considered necessary. The main objective of 
establishing this Fund was to take-over the bad and doubtful debts o f  banking institutions 
and to subsequently follow up the recovery o f debts from primary borrowers. The ARF 
would have authority to deal with the assets which were in the process o f  being 
recovered.41 The Committee also believed that the balance sheets o f  banks should be made 
more transparent and that disclosures should be made in the balance sheets, as 
recommended by the International Accounting Standards Committee.42 Important policy
38 Narasimham Report, 44; At the time of submitting the report the target was 40%.
39 Narasimham Report, 48
40 Narasimham Report, 60
41 Narasimham Report, 61-64
42 Narasimham Report 59
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changes were also suggested. The Committee proposed that the government should 
indicate that there would be no further nationalisation o f  banks, and that the private and 
public sector banks would be treated alike. This would encourage private banks to expand 
their operations.43
The Narasimham Committee recommendations were not only sweeping but if  
implemented by the government would make dramatic changes from the trends o f the past 
two decades. The suggested reforms have been characterised as the ‘second banking 
revolution’ besides the first revolution ushered by the nationalisation programme in 
1969.44 The overall changes that were recommended were for greater competition and 
interplay o f  market forces in the banking sector.
While the recommendations o f the Narasimham Committee were well received by 
the government and banking sector, concerns were raised about the likely impact o f  
certain recommendations. Some authors have referred to the report as a "product o f a 
professional approach which lacks any social commitment and idealism".45 Kumar argued 
that banks played an important role in the social and rural transformation efforts and are 
considered one o f the more effective agencies for poverty removal. With the 
commercialisation o f the banking industry the social content o f  banking operations would 
be removed. He also argued that the Committee had failed to trace the causes which led to 
the nationalisation o f banks and to the changes that had been made to credit policy two 
decades previously.
The Committee’s recommendation on phasing out directed credit and lowering the
43 Narasimham Report 72-73
44 Rangaraj an, C., Imperatives of Banking [ 1994] Reserve Bank of India Bulletin 1059
43 Kumar, V., Narasimham Report: A Commercial Approach [1992] Southern Economist
8, 10
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credit target to 10% o f  the aggregated credit was also criticised. Kumar states that 
directing credit to the desired sectors is a universally accepted responsibility o f  
government, and that even in capitalist countries, subtle instruments o f credit control were 
used. Further, if  the credit target to the priority sector were reduced to 10%, significant 
changes would have to be made to the existing credit delivery programmes and it would 
be unlikely that the government would implement this recommendation because o f its 
political implications. Finally, he questions whether the existing process could be totally 
reversed by reforms, and also questions whether the rural economy had reached the stage 
o f  self-sustainable growth.
It is submitted that, i f  the policy o f  extending credit to priority sectors at a 
concessional interest rate could render these sectors more viable economically, three 
decades o f  such preferred credit would be a sufficiently long enough period to establish its 
efficacy. Other than the expansion o f credit in geographical terms, there is no evidence to 
show that directed credit programmes on their own have been successful in creating 
sustainable growth in the priority sectors. The high rate o f  non-performing loans itself is a 
good indication o f their failure. Any benefits to the priority sectors arising from directed 
credit programmes should also be weighed against the resultant disadvantages caused to 
the general banking sector. Among a number o f reasons, one important contributory factor 
to the diminution in profits in banks was the concessional interest rates that were charged 
to priority sector borrowers. It is important to understand that in a developing economy, 
the main purpose o f  credit is not necessarily poverty alleviation, and that the primary role 
o f  banks is not to act as organisations distributing low cost credit for poverty reduction. In 
particular, rural credit must be clearly distinguished from specific poverty alleviation 
programmes. As the India Agricultural Credit Review Committee has pointed out:
45
"In a poverty ridden economy, financial institutions do have a responsibility 
towards weaker sections, but it is essential to recognise the limitations o f  
credit as the principal instrument o f  poverty alleviation."46
The Narasimham Committee has also confirmed this view when it opines that: “the 
pursuit o f distributive justice should use the instrumentality o f the fiscal rather than the 
credit system.”47
2.2,4 Salient Features o f  Financial Reforms in the Banking Sector - Post 1991
The overall policy thrust o f  the financial sector reforms after 1991 has been to 
create an environment in which banks have been compelled to improve productivity and 
reduce costs, so that they can act as autonomous business units fully responsible for their 
performance.48 It is important to realise however that these policy changes alone were not 
sufficient to improve productivity. They were only a necessary prerequisite. Banks, 
therefore, had to respond to the changes that were introduced in an appropriate manner. 
Among the main variables affecting the profitability and efficiency o f  the banks were 
external constraints such as the administered structure o f interest rates and credit allocation 
to priority sectors. Easing o f these external constraints has been an important part o f the 
reform programme.
Khusro, M., Report of the Agricultural Credit Review Committee, RBI, Bombay, 1993 
(Reprint), 979
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More specifically, financial sector reforms sought to remove the external constraints that 
reduce the profitability of banks such as administered interest rates, improve the financial 
health of the banks, build the financial infrastructure relating to supervision, audit, 
technology and the legal framework and upgrade the internal management of banks by 
reviewing policies relating to recruitment and training.
46
2.2.4.1 Interest Rate Policy
The interest rate regime in India has undergone a rapid transformation.49 Before the 
changes were introduced interest rates were heavily regulated,50 but after September 1991, 
the administered structure o f interest rates has been gradually simplified.51 In October
1995, the Reserve Bank o f India, (Central Bank) abolished the minimum lending rate and 
directed the banks to determine their own lending rates. On the deposit side, since July
1996, the Reserve Bank has prescribed only a maximum rate for deposits up to one year.52
The interest rate policy for small loans given to the rural sector (i.e. Rs.200,000 or 
less) has not changed.53 The government has not accepted the recommendations made by 
the Narasimham Committee to phase out concessional interest rates. The government 
appears to be o f  the view that the majority o f  the borrowers in the priority sectors would 
require small loans and should benefit from the concessional interest rates. If these 
borrowers required larger loans, then the general interest rates fixed by the respective 
banks should apply.54 In other words, lending rates are determined according to the size o f 
the loan.
49 Survey of Asian Finance: The Luck o f the Bankers, 12 November 1994, The Economist 
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50 Rangarajan, C., Imperatives of Banking in India [1994] Reserve Bank of India Bulletin 
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It is submitted that the deregulation o f interest rates should be extended to rural
lending. When loans are granted at concessional interest rates, the practice o f  cross
subsidisation automatically gets built into the lending operations. This means lending
institutions recover the losses incurred by granting loans at concessional interest rates to
certain borrowers, by charging higher interest rates to non-concessional borrowers. The
Indian government considers this practice acceptable.55 It is doubtful whether the practice
o f cross subsidisation will be effective when concessional loans are granted to priority
sectors. At least two reasons may be suggested. First, the main providers o f  credit to the
priority sectors are the regional rural banks (RRB) and co-operative banks, and these
banks operate primarily in rural areas where the majority o f  people are poor. The number
o f borrowers that would fall into the non-priority sector would be very small, thus the
opportunity to charge normal interest rates is veiy small. Second, cross subsidisation is
also possible if  priority sector borrowers apply for large loans. In practice, it is very
unlikely that priority sector borrowers will apply for large loans, and even if  they did, the
banks may not consider them creditworthy.
Another problem faced by the RRB’s and co-operatives is that when interest rates
are fixed, particularly concessional lending rates, the difference between the lending and
deposit rates are hardly adequate to cover their operational costs. The Deputy Governor o f
the Reserve Bank o f India voiced his concern when he said:
"It is unbelievable that co-operatives and the RRB's, which had operations 
essentially in rural areas, were expected at one time to undertake the bulk 
o f  their lending at 10% while the maximum deposit rate was fixed at 13%.
No Indian rope trick will enable a bank to be viable if  the administered 
interest rate structure is fixed in this manner.... The upshot o f this was that 
the operations o f the RRB's and the co-operatives came to a grinding halt 
and institutions which remained dedicated to their principle mandate o f
55 Ibid., 41,43-44
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lending to the rural sector incurred huge losses."56
It is a misconception to say that credit orientated to social ends must be at low 
cost. Lending at concessional interest rates is a case of misplaced emphasis. Research has 
shown that if credit were available in adequate supply, and could easily be accessed by the 
borrower when required, that would be more beneficial than its comparative cheapness.57 
Rural borrowers obtain loans from private moneylenders, even at exorbitant interest rates, 
because it is easier to secure credit from this source. There are no bureaucratic procedures 
to follow, and this means the private moneylenders are able to provide credit whenever 
borrowers need it.58 It is paradoxical that the government is not allowing banks to charge 
normal interest rates to priority sector borrowers, yet the alternative o f borrowing from 
private moneylenders at higher interest rates does not deter such borrowers.
2.2.4.2 Directed Credit
In 1990, the Khusro Committee issued a comprehensive report on agricultural 
credit. The report dealt with a broad range of issues including strengthening the 
agricultural system, over-dues on agricultural loans, risks in lending, critical issues in the 
credit delivery system and credit linked poverty alleviation programmes. The Committee 
noted that mandatory lending to the priority sectors must be within limits which cross­
subsidisation permits, so that the viability of the lending institutions would not be
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adversely affected.59
The Narasimham Committee was o f  the same view but went further and said that 
the directed credit target for the priority sectors should be reduced to 10%. The 
government, however, did not accept this recommendation. Directed credit continues to 
play a significant role in the main poverty alleviation programmes. The Reserve Bank has 
laid down that 40% o f net bank credit should be given to the priority sectors such as 
agriculture, small-scale industries, and small businesses. According to the latest figures 
that are available, public sector banks lent 41.7% o f their net credit to the priority sectors, 
an excess o f  1.7% o f the prescribed target.60 To assist directed lending, the government 
has introduced a Rural Infrastructure and Development Fund (RDIF) and the Khadi and 
Village Industries Commission to disburse credit.61
2.2.4.3 Institutional Strengthening
The financial reforms also aimed at strengthening banking institutions, 
particularly, the public sector banks. The Government and the Reserve Bank jointly 
launched an aggressive reform package which primarily dealt with re-capitalisation, 
improving the quality o f loan portfolios, instilling a greater element o f  competition, and 
strengthening the supervisory process.
During the last three years the government has injected about Rs. 12,000 crore to 
the public sector banks. An important element o f  the restructuring programme was to 
reduce non-performing assets. In fact, capital allocations have been made conditional on
59 Khusro, M., Report o f the Agricultural Credit Review Committee, RBI, Bombay, 
1993, (Reprint) 1072
60 Reserve Bank of India Annual Report, 1996, 12
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the banks drawing up business restructuring plans aimed at achieving viability over the 
next 2-3 years.
In 1995, the Reserve Bank announced the Banking Ombudsman Scheme under the 
provisions o f  the Banking Regulations Act, 1949. The scheme is designed to deal 
effectively with the grievances o f customers in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. 
The scheme covers all commercial banks except rural regional banks and co-operatives. 
Three banking ombudsman centres have been established and five more centres were 
announced in 1995.62 The use o f  technology has also been introduced and steps have been 
taken to have some branches fully automated.
Following the recommendations o f the Narasimham Committee, the Reserve Bank 
has taken steps to supervise the banks more effectively. To do this, the Bank has set up a 
separate Board for Financial Supervision (BFS) which concentrates on compliance with 
regulations and guidelines in the areas o f credit management, asset classification, income 
recognition, capital adequacy, provisioning o f bad and doubtful debts and treasury 
options.63
So far, the reform process in India has achieved positive results. The overall 
performance o f  banks has improved significantly and is clearly reflected in the balance 
sheets o f  the banks. The reason for its success has been the cautious and phased 
introduction o f  the reforms and their collective enforcement. In the year 1992-93 the 
non-performing assets amounted to 23.2% o f  total loan assets. After the restructuring 
programme was initiated the figure had come down to 13.5 in 1996-97. These figures
Relevance [1997] Reserve Bank of India Bulletin 41,48
62 Reserve Bank of India Trend and Progress of Banking in India 1994-1995, RBI,
Bombay, 1996, 13
63 Ibid., 8-9
51
show that the reforms that were introduced are yielding results. However, it must not be 
forgotten that only 86.5% o f the assets portfolio are generating a return income. It is o f  
paramount importance that banks endeavour to reduce the non-performing assets to at 
least 10% in the immediate future. Ideally this figure should be no more than 5%. 
Although statistical data show that the performance o f  the banks has improved, there are 
a number o f  areas in which weaknesses still persist. There is scope for the internal 
operations o f  the banks to be further improved, as well as customer services. More 
resources should be allocated to technological upgrading, and credit appraisal should 
become more professional.
2.3 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REFORMS IN SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka became independent in 1948. The independence movement was free 
from controversy, and the transfer o f  power was peaceful. The economy was stable and 
the standard o f living o f  the people was well above that o f  its neighbouring countries.64 A  
widely held view was that o f  all post-colonial nations, Sri Lanka would prove "the best bet 
in Asia".65
Even before independence, Sri Lanka had been committed to maintaining a 
welfare state. The economic depression in the 1930's had prompted the British 
administration to introduce a series o f  social welfare measures to assist the worst effects o f  
the depression. This move became an established welfare system that was continued after 
independence. Sri Lankans were provided with food subsidies, free health care and free
64 Bruton, H. J., The Political Economy o f Poverty, Equity and Growth : Malaysia and Sri
Lanka, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992,329
65 Jiggins, J., Dismantling Welfarism in Sri Lanka [1976] Overseas Development Institute
Review 2
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education up to university level.66 The welfare system was an integral part o f Sri Lanka's 
economy, and any attempt to reduce or remove subsidies was met with a public outcry. 
The issue o f food subsidies was always an important concern during general elections, and 
the political parties exploited it to win elections. It is therefore prudent to explain the 
important role the social welfare system played in economic and financial reforms. 
Compared with the systems prevalent in India and Malaysia, the welfare system in Sri 
Lanka, although based on social needs was also tempered by political and financial 
exigencies.
2.3.1 An Open Market Economy: 1948-1956
During this period, the country followed a free enterprise liberal framework with 
little or no government control in economic activities. Inflation was kept under control, 
and foreign investment was encouraged. There was minimum state intervention in foreign 
trade, and in exchange control.67 Direct state involvement to expand the manufacturing 
industries was not a priority and a number o f  unprofitable industries were closed down. 
Privatisation was very much on the agenda.68
During this period, foreign banks dominated the commercial banking sector. 
These banks were primarily concerned with financing the plantation sector which was 
totally private. The two indigenous banks played a veiy low key in financial activities, and
66 UNICEF, Sri Lanka: The Social Impact o f Economic Policies During the Last Decade
in Comia, G., et al, Adjustment With a Human Face, Vol. 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1989, 238
61 Karunasena, A., Monetary Policy in Sri Lanka: An Update in Talib, A., Monetary
Policy in SEACEN Countries, SEACEN Research and Training Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 
1993, 443
68 As a first move towards privatisation, the government passed legislation that allowed
government-owned industries to be converted into public corporations. Athukorala, P., 
and Jayasuriya, S., Macroeconomic Policies, Crises and Growth in Sri Lanka 1969-
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as a result the informal moneylenders thrived.69
Although the government followed these liberal policies welfare expenditure was 
increasing the fiscal deficit. The government decided, consequently, to raise the price o f  
rice as well as public utility charges. Free meals for school children were also abolished. 
As a direct result o f  these welfare cuts, the ruling United National Party (UNP) suffered a 
landslide defeat at the next general election.
2.3.2 Shift Towards a Planned Economy: 1956-1965
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which was socialist, formed the new 
government. It nationalised all foreign-owned plantations and took control o f key 
industries in the manufacturing sector.70 The bus services and the cargo handling section in 
the port o f  Colombo were also taken under government control. Banking and insurance 
companies were not spared either.
In 1961 two important reforms were introduced to the financial sector. One was 
the nationalisation o f the Bank o f Ceylon, the largest domestic bank, and the second was 
the opening o f a new state owned bank called the Peoples’ Bank.71 The main objective o f 
these reforms was to increase credit to the priority sectors and also provide better banking 
services to rural areas. The government directed both the state banks to lend at 
concessional interest rates, and these rates were fixed for specific sectors o f  the population. 
There was also a drive to expand banking services to the rural areas. Between 1960-1965,
1990, World Bank, Washington DC, 1994, 9-10
69 Tilakaratna, W., Agricultural Credit in a Developing Country - Ceylon, Central Bank
of Ceylon, Colombo, 1963, 100-120
^0 State Industrial Corporation Act, No. 49 of 1957, Legislative Enactment’s of Sri Lanka
(Revised 1980) Cap. 208
71 Act No. 29 of 1961
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the number o f branch offices in the two state banks increased from 45 to 97, and by the 
end o f 1965 the two state banks held two thirds o f all bank deposits. In both countries, 
India and Sri Lanka, the government's policy on nationalisation was similar. In terms o f  
branch expansion, the overall results were favourable in both countries.
By the end o f 1965, the people o f Sri Lanka had experienced economic 
difficulties under both governments that had been elected after independence. While the 
UNP had been responsible for cuts in the welfare system, the SLFP embarked upon a 
policy o f  drastic import restrictions to foster local industries. In the ensuing election, in 
1965, neither party won an overall majority and the UNP formed a coalition with another 
party.
2.3.3 Semi-Planned Economy: 1965-1970
Once again, the government took steps to liberalise the economy, but this time 
more cautiously. The government was hesitant to take steps that would achieve a full-scale 
liberalisation because it was aware o f  the anti-government feeling that would be aroused if  
consumer subsidies were cut. The economic climate improved, and the government’s 
ambitious plans for food production appeared to be realistic. Once again, the UNP reduced 
the amount o f rice available at a subsidised price. The voters did not forgive the 
government for this move, so the UNP was defeated at the next general election. The 
defeated UNP leader is known to have commented that by tampering with the rice subsidy 
for the second time in his political career, he had paid the penalty for "disturbing the most 
cherished o f  Sri Lanka’s sacred cows."72
72 De Silva, K., A History o f Sri Lanka, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1981, 539
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2.3.4 Inward-Looking, Closed, Controlled Economy: 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 7
The new United Front Government (UF) consisted o f three parties. The Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) was committed to state controls and the Lanka Sama 
Samaja Party (LSSP) and Communist Party (CP) gave high priority to equity issues and 
were against large-scale foreign borrowing that involved conditionality. Party leaders did 
not want to be dictated to by the IMF and the World Bank. The UF's objective was to “lay 
the foundation for the building up o f a socialist society.”73 The focus o f  economic policy 
was very much the same as before. Most o f  the plantation sector was taken over by the 
state under the Land Reform Act.74 The government also acquired any business 
undertaking under the Business Undertakings Acquisition Act, if  it were considered to be 
in the "national interest."75 More exchange controls were imposed by the Exchange 
Control Act. The Act also prohibited Sri Lankans from opening or maintaining foreign 
bank accounts, and remitting money abroad without prior permission from the exchange 
control authorities.
On the welfare front, despite election pledges to the contrary, the government 
was forced to cut down the subsidies and the rice ration was reduced. Essential imports 
also rose in price, as well as the cost o f public utilities. By 1975 the economic hardships 
faced by the people were tremendous and mass opposition to the government was 
growing.76 It was in this environment that the UNP campaigned for a fully liberalised
73 Perera, N., (Minister of Finance) Budget Speech, Department of Finance, Colombo, 
1970, 3
74 Under the Land Reform Act, 1972 (as amended in 1975), 63% of the tea plantations, 
32% of the area planted with rubber and 10% of the area cultivated with coconut were 
nationalised.
75 Act No. 35 of 1971, Legislative Enactments of Sri Lanka (Revised), 1980, Cap. 184; By 
1977, 26 businesses had been acquired by the government under this Act.
76 The author recalls some of the hardships. A family of five was allowed to buy two
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economy, and argued that lifting the trade restrictions would end the existing shortages 
and hardships. It dared not, however, remove food subsidies but instead promised to 
introduce a food stamp programme by which the poor people would be given stamps that 
entitled them to food and kerosene to the value o f the stamps. The message appealed to the 
voters, and in 1977 the UNP won the general elections with a two-thirds majority in 
parliament.
2.3.5 Outward-Looking Economy with a Heavy Market Orientation : 1977-
The new government introduced a wide-ranging programme o f reforms that 
represented a significant reorientation o f economic policy.77 Essentially, the new policies 
were aimed at transforming the Sri Lankan economy away from an inward-looking, closed 
and controlled economy to an outward-looking, open market economy.78
The system o f quotas, licences and controls was removed and a more realistic 
system o f tariffs was introduced. Price controls were abolished and food subsidies were 
replaced by ’food stamps' for about half the country's population. State sector monopolies 
were also removed.79 Foreign exchange controls were abolished and replaced with a
pounds of bread a day. Rice could be eaten only three days of the week (usually rice is 
eaten every day). A person was allowed a pound of sugar for the month and special 
coupons were provided to buy cloth.
De Mel, R., (Minister of Finance) Budget Speech 1978, Minister of Finance, Colombo, 
1977, 1-10
These policy reforms have been the subject of substantial research. See Rajapathirana, 
S., Foreign Trade and Economic Development : The Case o f Sri Lanka, (1988) 16 
World Development 43-57; Athukorala, A., and Rajapathirana, S., The Domestic 
Financial Market and the Trade Liberalisation Outcome: The Evidence from Sri 
Lanka, World Bank Policy, Research and External Affairs Working Papers (WPS590), 
World Bank, Washington DC, 1990 ; Cuthbertson, A., & Athukorala, P., Sri Lanka in 
Papageorgiou, D., Michaely, M., and Choksi, A., (Eds.) Liberalising Foreign Trade: 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990
UNICEF, Sri Lanka: The Social Impact of Economic Policies During the Last Decade 
in Comia, G., Adjustment with a Human Face, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, 238
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floating exchange rate system. The government called for private sector participation in 
the economic development o f the country and removed the fears o f  further nationalisation. 
These open market policies encouraged foreign investment. The Western powers and 
international agencies also showed their approval o f the sweeping reforms being 
implemented by granting an unprecedented flow o f aid.80
2.3.5.1 Financial Sector Reforms
The objective o f financial sector reforms was to create an efficient, dynamic 
financial system in accordance with financial sector developments in the rest o f  the world. 
The government removed all restrictions that hampered the development o f  the financial 
system. Foreign banks o f good repute were invited to open branches in Sri Lanka and 
consequently, twelve foreign banks established branches in the country. The new banks 
brought with them innovative techniques and practices in banking and advanced 
information technology. By the end o f 1982, fourteen new foreign banks had established 
branches in the country and by 1990 had captured more than 10% o f the market share. The 
banks were also allowed to open branches in the outstations and as a result, the average 
number o f  customers with any one bank decreased from 30,000 in 1980 to 23,000 in 
1990.81
In addition to these deregulatory measures, the reforms included liberalisation o f  
interest rates and credit allocation, the strengthening o f  the legal, accounting, regulatory 
and administrative frameworks o f financial institutions and monetary management based
80 Levy, B., Economic Aid in the Making o f Economic Policy in Sri Lanka, World Bank, 
Washington DC, 1995
81 Karunasena, A., Monetary Policy in Sri Lanka : An Update in Talib, A., Monetary 
Policy in the SEACEN Countries : An Update, SEACEN Research and Training 
Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 1993, 450
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on market-orientated policies.82 No doubt, all these reforms are important to create a 
liberal financial system but in this study, as mentioned before, emphasis would be on 
interest rate liberalisation, credit allocation and the administration o f  banking institutions.
2.3.5.2 Liberalisation o f  Interest Rates
This was perhaps, one o f the most important reforms that were introduced. The 
new policy allowed interest rates to be determined by market conditions, but its 
effectiveness was limited in the early stages o f the reform process. In an attempt to 
liberalise interest rates, in January 1982, interest rates on priority sector loans were 
increased from 15% to 18% and then to 20% in November the same year. Due to the 
increase in interest rates there was a dramatic decline in the number o f loan applications 
from borrowers in these sectors and in 1983, the government decided to revise the interest 
rate down to 14%. Government decisions like this show that at the beginning, only a half­
hearted attempt at liberalising the interest rates was made.
In 1988, a more positive move was taken by the government when it introduced a 
new policy to determine the interest rate on small and medium loans, whereby a variable 
interest rate was charged based on the “prevailing average weighted prime rate” (PWPR). 
Accordingly, the interest rate that was charged reflected both the cost o f funds and the 
risk element. A  project that reflected a high risk was charged a high interest rate and 
conversely, a lower rate was charged for a low risk project.83 The application o f  this policy 
was more in line with market-determined interest rates and does not distort the liberalised 
interest rate structure. The Presidential Commission on Finance and Banking endorsed this
82 ibid., 449
82 Amarakoon Bandara, A., Financing for SMI’s in Sri Lanka, in Junggun Oh, Financing
for Small and Medium Scale Industries in the SEACEN Countries, SEACEN Research
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policy when it stated:
“Rates o f interest computed on the basis o f risk and the high overhead costs 
o f small enterprise lending are bound to be higher than for large scale 
lending. It is suggested that credit be made available to small borrowers at 
market rates which makes such lending a viable proposition for banks.”84
However, it must be noted that the government provides an interest rate subsidy for 
agricultural loans under the New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme.
Although market conditions are required to determine the level and structure o f  
interest rates, in practice the Central Bank continues to signal changes in the interest rates 
charged by commercial banks. This is done in a number o f ways. The government’s own 
securities are treasury bills, and the rate on these is usually fixed by the Central Bank. The 
treasury bill rate represents the lower end o f the range o f  what the Central Bank considers 
to be the desired interest rate. Further the National Savings Bank85 fixes its deposit rates 
under the guidance o f  the Central Bank. The same practice is followed by other state 
owned banks.86 Clearly, the state banks operate under the guidance o f the Central Bank 
and as a result the interest rates that are being charged are within the range the Central 
Bank and the government prefers.87
2.3.5.3 Credit Allocation
Prior to 1977, there were a number o f  credit schemes that were designed to direct
and Training Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 1994, 325
Report o f the Presidential Commission on Finance and Banking, Vol. 1, Department of 
Government Printing, Colombo, 1992, 128
This bank was established by the State to co-ordinate and develop savings in the 
country.
Jayamaha, R., and Wilson, P., Development Banking in Sri Lanka: Coercion or Moral 
Suasion? (1991) 9 International Journal of Development Banking 3, 6
Yoon-Je Cho and Deena Khatkhate, Lessons o f Financial Liberalisation in Asia, A 
Comparative Study, World Bank Discussion Papers, World Bank, Washington DC, 
1989,44, 50
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credit to certain sectors o f the population. Until 1980 the Central Bank prepared a 
"National Credit Plan" in consultation with the commercial banks which was put into 
operation every year.88 The Central Bank also operated a number o f  refinancing schemes 
to encourage banks to lend to specific sectors that were starved o f  institutional credit.89 If 
there were loan defaults, the Central Bank had a scheme known as the "Credit Guarantee 
Scheme" where a percentage o f the defaulted money was reimbursed to the banks. The 
reason only a percentage was given was because if  the entire amount was recoverable by 
the guarantee scheme, then there would be no incentive for banks to make an all out effort 
to recover the unpaid loans.
Clearly, these schemes were inconsistent with the new market orientated 
economic and financial policies the government was pursuing. Further, refinancing 
schemes increased the money supply which undoubtedly allowed inflation to rise. It was 
also felt by the Central Bank that refinancing was in fact a form o f  subsidy, which was not 
acknowledged as a subsidy and therefore did not encourage transparency o f the Bank’s 
operations. By 1990, the “National Credit Plans” as well as the refinancing schemes were 
discontinued by the Central Bank.90
Although the Central Bank took these steps, the government was keen to find out
Interview with Dr U., Hearth, Senior Economist, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the 
Central Bank Head Quarters, Colombo, on 4 June 1997.
Refinance schemes were operated when the Central Bank was of the view that a 
certain sector needed additional credit facilities. It provided the banks with a certain 
percentage of the funds to be lent by the banks to the identified sector. The banks had 
to put the balance funds.
The Presidential Commission on Finance and Banking suggested to revive the 
‘National Credit Plan’ as an indicative credit programme rather than a mandatory 
method of credit allocation. Second Interim Report on Allocating Resources to Priority 
or Weaker Sectors and Channelling Credit to the Poor, Department of Government 
Printing, Colombo, 1992, 58; Ninth Interim Report on The Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka, 1992, 48
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i f  mandatory credit allocation in favour o f the weaker sectors could be continued.91 In 
1991, the President appointed a commission to study and report on the matter. The 
Commission advised the government against mandatory allocation o f  credit and 
government directed credit programmes. A  number o f  reasons were given in support o f  
their view.92 First, it was o f the view that mandatory credit allocation can be successful in 
reaching lending targets but not in maintaining adequate rates o f  loan recovery. The Indian 
experience was given as an example. Second, mandatory credit allocation would 
inevitably reduce the supply o f credit to more productive sectors which have to bear 
higher borrowing costs. Third, the realisation o f  other objectives such as competitiveness, 
efficiency and internationalisation o f banking operations may be rendered difficult. 
Fourth, a mandatory approach may adversely affect the viability o f banking institutions 
and finally, the true degree o f compliance with mandatory allocation was difficult to 
monitor. It was also noted that the Central Bank considered moral suasion was more 
appropriate than a mandatory approach.93
The Commission also proposed, inter alia, setting up a "credit co-ordinating and 
monitoring committee” to assist in the disbursement o f  credit to the weaker sectors. The 
Committee would consist o f representatives from all the institutions that were involved in 
lending to the poor.94 This Committee was set up by the government.
91 During the period 1989-1993, there was tension between efforts to pursue a 
stabilisation and liberalisation programme and the politicians perception of what 
liberalisation should provide in terms of government support and distribution gains. 
See - Durham, D., and Kelegama, S., Economic Reform and Governance: The Second 
Wave o f Liberalisation in Sri Lanka, 1989-1993, Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, 
1995, 19
92 Second Interim Report on Finance and Banking: Allocating Resources to Priority or
Weaker Sectors and Channelling Credit to the Poor, Department of Government
Printing, Colombo, 1991,43-44
93 Ibid., 42
94 Final Report o f The Presidential Commission on Finance and Banking, Vol.l,
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The current position on credit allocation is that banks are left to create their own 
schemes to provide credit without central bank intervention. The state banks disburse 
credit through a number o f credit schemes. The Praja Naya Niyamakas, (Peoples’ Loan 
Scheme -  PNN) lending with the assistance o f  non-governmental organisations, lending 
through the National Youth Services Council (NYSCO), and the Janasaviya programme, 
(strength o f the people) are some examples.95
2 3 .5 .4  Institutional Strengthening
The new financial reforms, which were introduced in Sri Lanka, also 
concentrated on improving the efficiency o f  lending institutions, particularly, the state- 
owned banks. Research showed that a considerable amount o f  work had been done to find 
out the underlying problems, and numerous efforts were made to improve the performance 
o f the banks ranging from financial restructuring to managerial reforms. In 1991, the 
Presidential Commission on Finance and Banking in its Seventh Interim Report, studied 
the problems faced by commercial banks and other deposit taking institutions and made 
several recommendations. Some o f the reforms related to the boards o f directors and 
management, administration, lending operations, legal proceedings and accountability and 
audit requirements.96 The Commission suggested that as an institutional arrangement for 
debt recovery, a separate institution or institutions be entrusted to deal with the task o f  
collecting debts and, where possible, the rehabilitation o f  debtors. The Commission 
justified their recommendation by stating that past experience indicated that the two state
Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka, 1992, 123
95 Sanderatne, N., Banking for the Poor, (1991) 17 Economic Review 2, 4; Watawala, 
L., Financial Innovations for the Rural Poor: The Asian Experience, (1991) 17 
Economic Review 5, 6-8, 15
96 Seventh Interim Report on Finance and Banking on Commercial Banks and Other
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banks have not been able to collect bad debts in an effective manner due to external 
interference and laxity within the banks.97 The government did not accept this 
recommendation.
The Commission also recommended that banks must be free o f  government 
control and is allowed to act independently in all financial and administrative matters.98 If 
the government requested the granting o f loans which the bank considered to be non- 
viable, or lending at interest rates below the market rates to particular groups o f borrowers, 
then the government must compensate the banks for the notional loss o f  income. The 
government accepted both these recommendations.99
Over a period o f  time, the quality o f service provided by the state banks appears 
to have deteriorated. A  number o f reasons may be suggested. The lending policies 
adopted by these banks are rather bureaucratic and cumbersome, which delays the 
processing o f  loan applications. The administration o f the banks appears to be lethargic 
and the staff lack motivation. The quality o f management is also weak.100 Officers 
involved in credit processing do not have clearly defined responsibilities and are not held 
accountable for their decisions. Inadequacy o f  trained staff is a problem. The reason for 
this is the resignation o f  trained staff to join foreign and private banks and other financial 
institutions. Their age also makes it difficult to train some staff officers in new skills.101 
With a view to developing manpower skills in the banking sector, the Presidential
Deposit Taking Institutions, Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka, 1992
97 Ibid., 29-34
98 Ibid., 42
99 Treasury circular dated 22 April 1992 provides for a relaxation of government controls
on the management and operations of the state banks. It also agrees to subsidise
guarantee loans that have been granted under its direction.
100 Ibid., foot note 96, 43
101 Nanayakkara, R., Commercial Banking Views [1994] Economic Review 24
64
Commission suggested that the Central Bank should attempt to strengthen the Institute o f  
Bankers o f  Sri Lanka or if  that was not possible, it should explore the feasibility o f  setting 
up a new Bankers Training Institute.102
The Monetary Act provides the Central Bank with powers, functions and 
responsibilities necessary for the administration and regulation o f all banking institutions 
in the country. The Department o f Bank Supervision in the Central Bank was established 
under the Monetary Act for this purpose.103 Although a statutory framework is available 
to regulate banking operations the Central Bank has failed to carry out its supervisory role 
effectively, once again due to the loss o f trained bank supervisors to foreign banks.104
The Presidential Commission was o f  the view that bank customers with 
grievances must be given the opportunity to have their complaints dealt with expeditiously 
outside the normal judicial system. It therefore suggested the establishment o f a scheme 
for a banking ombudsman similar to the one in the United Kingdom.105 In addition, it 
suggested drafting a ‘Code o f  Conduct’ for banks, and the enactment o f  a ‘fair banking 
practice law’106 and an ‘unfair contracts law.’107
102 Seventh Interim Report on Commercial Banks and Other Deposit Taking Institutions, 
Department of Government Printing, Colombo, 1992, xvii
103 Sections 28-31, Monetary Law Act No 33 of 1954 (as amended) ; The Legislative 
Enactment’s o f Ceylon, (Revised 1980) Cap 422 ; See generally De Juan, A., From 
Good Bankers to Bad Bankers : Ineffective Supervision and Management Deterioration 
as Major Elements in Banking Crises, World Bank, Washington DC, 1987
104 Ninth Interim Report on the Central Bank o f Sri Lanka, Department of Government 
Printing, Colombo, 1992, 75
105 Seventh Interim Report on Commercial Banks and Other Deposit Taking Institutions, 
Department of Government Printing, Colombo, 1992, 92-93 ; Third Interim Report on 
Debt Recovery Legislation, Department of Government Printing, Colombo, 1992, 26- 
27
106 jn the United Kingdom, a voluntary code known as “Good Banking” came into force 
in 1992. The Code is reviewed periodically. The need for such a code was raised in the 
U.K. by a committee reviewing the banking services; Report, Jack, R., Banking 
Services : Law & Practice. CM622, HMSO, 1989, 377-383 ; Jack, R., Report of The 
Review Committee, Cml026, HMSO, London, 1990, 7-13 ; The same issue was
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Eighteen years after the new financial policies were introduced and three years
after the Presidential Commission made numerous recommendations to improve the
financial sector, the World Bank in one o f its research reports observed:
“The main constraint that remains is the dominance o f  inefficient state- 
owned banks... The resultant lack o f competitive pressure has reduced both 
the level and quality o f  financial intermediation. Quality has suffered due to 
two reasons. First they have been used as instruments o f government policy 
to direct credit to politically determined beneficiaries, often without regard to 
financial or economic viability. Second, these banks have played the role o f  
the market makers in determining domestic lending rates. Consequently, 
while inefficiency resulting from over-staffing and bad portfolio has raised 
the cost o f doing business the effect o f these inefficiencies have often been 
passed on the borrowers in terms o f higher loan rates.”108
The problems noted in the World Bank report are still continuing. A question 
that must be raised is whether privatising the state banks would increase the profitability 
and dynamism o f the state banks.109 The World Bank favours this option.110 The Banking 
and Finance Commission considered this matter generally and was o f  the view that 
privatisation is not a practical option at present.111 It is submitted that the option o f  
privatising the two state banks must be seriously considered. So far, the remedies that have 
been suggested to overcome the financial difficulties faced by these banks have not been 
successful. The reason for this is that the main cause for the financial difficulties faced by
considered by a committee in Australia as well; Martin, S., A pocket Full of Change : 
Banking and Deregulation, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 
1991,381-390
107 Seventh Interim Report on Commercial Banks and Other Deposit Taking Institutions, 
Department of Government Printing, Colombo, 1992, 92
108 Ahamed, S., Ranjan, P., Promoting Growth in Sri Lanka, World Bank, Washington 
DC, 1995, 28
109 Interview with Mr. M. Fernando, Manager, Credit Department of the Peoples’ Bank, at 
the bank’s Head Quarters, on 14 may 1997; Interview with Dr U. Herath, Chief 
Economist, Central bank of Sri Lanka, at the Central Bank, on 4 June 1997
HO Ahamed, S., Ranjan, P., Promoting Growth in Sri Lanka, World Bank, Washington 
DC, 1995, 28
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the banks, i.e. the non viable and non recoverable loans that are being granted have so far 
not been given serious consideration, possibly, because it is politically sensitive. If the 
banks are privatised, this problem may be resolved because it is unlikely that shareholders 
will tolerate government intervention o f this nature. Examples may be taken from other 
private banks operating in the country. These banks are efficient, competitive and operate 
profitably. The consequences o f an important reform such as privatisation would affect the 
entire banking industry, because the state banks account for over 68% o f  the banking 
operations in the country. It is therefore vital that a committee o f  experts carefully 
considers this option before the government considers its implementation.
2.4 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REFORMS IN  MALAYSIA
Malaysia became an independent state in 1957. The colonial experience was 
reasonably amicable and independence was implemented quite harmoniously. Malaysian 
nationals had been in government before independence and as a result, the new leaders 
were familiar with the British approach towards handling economic activities.112
At the time o f  independence, Malaysia was the world’s leading exporter o f tin, 
rubber and palm oil, which commodities accounted for about 80% o f the country’s foreign 
earnings. Over the years the manufacturing sector expanded rapidly, and now it accounts 
for 70% o f  export earnings. The nation’s dependence on tin and rubber had shrunk to a 
mere 2% o f  total exports by the end o f 1994.113 The transformation o f  the agricultural 
based economy to an industrialised one required numerous policy changes. The changes
Department of Government Printing, 1992, 21
112 Bruton, H., The Political Economy o f Poverty, Equity and Growth, Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia, World Bank, Washington DC., 1991, 329
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took place gradually and as a result, the economic and financial transformation was 
relatively smooth. On the other hand, there were dramatic changes which indirectly 
affected the economic and financial activities o f  the country.
After independence, economic development was given priority and the 
government concentrated on improving the economy o f the country. Little attention was 
given to the growing disenchantment o f the Malay population.114 Evidence showed that 
the economic position o f  Malays was significantly inferior to that o f non-Malays. More 
than half the population was o f Malay origin, but almost 80% o f  Malays worked in the 
rural areas. In the urban areas non-Malays held 75% o f  the jobs and the Malays were very 
poorly represented in managerial and supervisory positions. In the corporate sector, the 
proportion o f share capital o f limited companies held by Malays was only 2%. The 
Chinese community held about one third o f  the share capital and the balance was held by 
foreigners. The Chinese land holdings were also on average, twice the size o f Malay land 
holdings. The frustrations o f Malays broke out during the elections in May 1969 when the 
candidates campaigning for the interests o f the non-Malays performed better. Riots rocked 
the capital and Parliament was suspended. The army and police restored civil order.115
Malaysian political leaders were forced to recognise the dangers inherent in a 
multiracial society when ethnic prejudices were exacerbated by economic disparities.116 
The rules for governance had to change. First, the new government officially identified the 
Malays as the "Bumiputeras" (sons o f  the soil). Then, it introduced the “New Economic
114 Malaysia has a multiracial society. It consists of those of Malay (i.e. the indigenous 
people), Chinese and Indian decent.
Rasiah, R., Class, Ethnicity and Economic Development in Malaysia, in Rodan, G., 
(Eds.) et al, The Political Economy o f South-East Asia, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1997, 121, 122
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Policy” which established long term targets to reduce poverty and to increase Malay 
participation in economic activities.117 Since 1970, economic and financial policies have 
always taken a special interest in the Bumiputera community. The position remains the 
same today.118 Extending such special considerations to a particular group o f people as a 
matter o f  state policy is a peculiar feature o f  Malaysia. During my visit to the country, it 
was clear to me that there was considerable hostility among the minority groups towards 
the special privileges that are afforded to the Bumiputeras but minority groups have come 
to accept it.
The emergence o f the industrial sector introduced policies which were market 
orientated and outward looking. Compared with Sri Lanka, policy implementation in 
Malaysia was relatively trouble free. The most obvious reason that can be given is that 
since independence, the country had been governed by a single coalition party now known 
as the National Front. The dominant party is the United Malay National Organisation 
(UMNO) but there are almost a dozen other parties. Compared with various Sri Lankan 
governments that ruled the country until 1977, the Malaysian government did not have to 
worry about losing elections. However, the fact that a single party had a firm hold on the 
government did not necessarily simplify the implementation o f important policy 
changes.119 To achieve consensus among the majority o f  the coalition party was extremely 
difficult because it represented a diversity o f  interests and ideas.
Rasiah, R., Class, Ethnicity and Economic Development in Malaysia, in Rodan, G., 
(Eds.) et al, The Political Economy o f South-East Asia, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1997, 121, 126-127; Faaland, J., et al., Growth and Ethnic Inequality, 
Malaysia’s New Economic Policy, Hurst and Co., London, 1990, 8-15
11  ^ The Bumiputera Industrial Fund, The ASB- Loan Scheme for Bumiputera Hard-core 
Poor, New Entrepreneurs Fund are all administered by the Central Bank to promote 
economic development in the Bumiputera community. These are only a few examples.
11  ^ Bruton, H., The Political Economy o f Poverty, Equity and Growth : Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia, World Bank, Washington DC, 1991, 348
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Towards the end o f 1978, the government decided to liberalise the financial 
system. Unlike India and Sri Lanka, the decision was taken at a time when the Malaysian 
economy was quite stable.120 Prior to liberalisation, the government had imposed strict 
interest rate restrictions, domestic credit controls, and maintained high reserve 
requirements.
2.4.1 Interest Rate Reforms
Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia’s Central Bank) has the power to make 
recommendations to banking and other financial institutions regarding the interest rates 
that may be charged or paid by them.121 Prior to October 1978, the Bank in consultation 
with the Association o f Banks determined the minimum lending rate122 and a maximum 
deposit rate. Late in 1981 however, Bank Negara changed its policy on interest rates and 
introduced a new interest rate regime, based on the bank-lending rate (BLR).123 The 
introduction o f  the BLR reduced greatly interest rate regulation by the Central Bank.
During the mid 1980's Malaysia experienced a severe recession124 Free market 
interest rates were suspended, and the Central Bank maintained tight control o f interest 
rates. The country recovered from the economic depression in early 1990, and interest rate 
regulation other than in the priority sectors was completely freed from the administrative
120 Mansoor, D., (Minister of Finance) Budget Speech for 1980, Government Publishers, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1979, 3-5
121 Section 37(1) b Central Bank Of Malaysia Act, 1958, (Revised 1994) Laws Of 
Malaysia, Vol. 28, Act No 519
122 There were two rates, “Prime” rate was applicable to the bank’s best customers and the 
“Preferential” rate was applied to loans granted to federal and state governments.
123 Money and Banking in Malaysia, 4th Ed., Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 
1994, 131
124 Sheng, A., Restructuring in Malaysia, 1985-1988, Working Paper, World Bank, 
Washington DC, 1989, 8-13
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control o f the Central Bank with effect from February 1991. The Central Bank, however, 
continues to monitor closely sectoral lending by banking institutions, and controls the 
ceiling on interest rates for these loans. Bumiputeras requiring loans o f  RM 500,000/- or 
less for small-scale enterprises and housing are charged a concessional interest rate. As at 
March 1996, interest rates on loans granted to the Bumiputera borrowers under the New  
Principal Guarantee Scheme o f the Credit Guarantee Corporation, were fixed at 2 
percentage points above the base-lending rate o f the individual bank. For housing loans 
1.75 percentage points above the base lending rate o f  the individual banks or 9%  per 
annum, whichever was lower.125
2.4.2 Credit Controls
Bank Negara Malaysia has the power to direct banking institutions on matters 
relating to the granting o f loans and the extension o f  credit facilities, including the class o f  
purposes for which advances may or may not be made.126 The Central Bank may impose 
credit controls in two ways. One is to set targets or ceilings on the quantum o f credit a 
banking institution may lend to specific groups o f borrowers. The second is through moral 
suasion, which is an informal method o f getting the required response from the financial 
system.127
Bank Negara issues guidelines on credit targets every year. Over the years only 
the directed sector has changed. If a bank is unable to lend the prescribed percentage o f 
loans to the specified sector, then the Central Bank requires the bank to deposit the
125 [j 996] Annual Report of Bank Negara Malaysia 194-195
126 Section 37 (1) a, Central Bank Of Malaysia Act, 1958, (Revised 1994) Laws Of 
Malaysia, Vol. 28, Act No. 519
127 Lee Hock Lock, Central Banking In Malaysia, Butterworths, Singapore, 1987, 31-32
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remaining money with it. No interest is paid. The Central Bank will then take upon itself 
the task o f finding a bank that will lend the money to the directed sector.128 The upshot is 
that once a credit target is fixed, banks are almost compelled to achieve the target. 
According to the latest lending guidelines that are available, the Central Bank has directed 
banks to increase loans to the Bumiputera community from 20% o f the loan base to 30% 
o f the total loan base.129 Commercial banks were also required to lend a total o f  RM 1 
billion to small-scale enterprises under the New Principal Credit Guarantee Scheme o f  the 
Credit Guarantee Corporation.130 In addition it directed that 50% o f  the allocated quota had 
to be loaned to Bumiputera borrowers.131 The bank also controls credit by imposing 
ceilings on the amount that can be loaned to specified sectors. In May 1997, there was a 
ceiling o f  15% on share financing and 20% on property financing, which apparently was 
not welcomed by the banking community and the government.132 Moral suasion does not 
appear to be effective in Malaysia because Bank Negara continues to issue lending 
guidelines which the banks are compelled to follow.
2.4.3 Institutional Strengthening
The Malaysian banking sector operates in an extremely competitive environment.
128 Interview with Mr. Gopal Sundaram, Head of the Legal Department, Bank Negara 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997.
129 [1996] Annual Report of Bank Negara Malaysia 194
130 The Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGE) was established in 1975 to provide guarantees 
for small and medium scale industries. The guarantee cover is extended under three 
schemes, namely, the New Principal Guarantee Scheme (NPGS), The Loan Fund for 
Hawkers and Petty Traders and the Association For Special Loan Schemes. In addition, it 
also provides guarantee cover under the New Entrepreneurs Fund to Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs through fourteen participating banks.
131 [1996] Annual Report of Bank Negara Malaysia 194
132 Interview with Mr. Gopal Sundaram, Head of the Legal Department, Bank Negara 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997.
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The banking sector is dominated by 37 commercial banks, o f  which fourteen are foreign 
owned. There are only three state owned banks. The government in its bid to promote a 
stronger banking sector is planning to privatise at least in part, these state-owned banks 
over the next four years.133
Two decades ago, the banking sector was not so advanced in its banking 
operations and Bank Negara was concerned at a number o f  trends that were developing. 
One problem was the deterioration in the integrity and competence o f  management in 
some commercial banks. They also lacked professionalism. Political interference in 
banking operations was common and lenders were often required to give loans to 
borrowers who were not creditworthy. Corruption was also rife to the extent that a fraud 
involving RM 22 Million was discovered in Bank Negara Malaysia. The situation was so 
grave that political interference and corruption nearly triggered the collapse o f  Bank 
Bumiputera and the government was forced to intervene and rescue the bank from its 
financial crisis.
Now the practice o f  granting politically motivated loans is very controlled. The 
government realised from past experience that, when banks get into financial difficulties 
as a result o f  granting these loans, it had to bail the banks out. For the government, the 
adverse political and economic consequences are a high price to pay.134
During the late 1980s, the government realised that the banking sector was not 
efficient enough to respond to the needs o f modem banking techniques. It therefore 
introduced a range o f  reforms which were designed to improve a banks' liquidity and to 
strengthen the institutional structure. In October 1989, The Banking and Financial
133 Malaysia 2020: Euromoney Publications, London, 1997,39
134 Interview with Mr Gopal Sundaram, Head of Legal Department, Bank Negara
Malaysia, at the Bank, Kuala Lumpur, on 30th May 1997
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Institutions Act135 (BAFIA) came into force, replacing the Banking Act 1973 and the 
Finance Companies Act 1969. The Act modernised and streamlined the laws governing 
banking and other financial institutions and provided the Central Bank with extensive 
powers o f  supervision and control over banking and financial institutions.136 The Central 
Bank also has powers o f  investigation and where necessary can prosecute persons who 
have fraudulently induced illegal deposit taking.137
At present, the overall performance in the banking sector is satisfactory. Due to 
the advent o f financial liberalisation, the exposure to high competition and rapid 
developments in technology, the banks provide a full range o f  banking services. Customer 
satisfaction is given priority and is considered important for their success.138 Credit 
appraisal is carried out to a high standard and default loans appear to be under control. To 
improve customer service and bank operations further, it was suggested providing 
adequate training to staff, so that they could act in the best interests o f  the banks in the 
long term. Information technology is quite advanced in the banking sector, but resources 
must be allocated continuously to keep abreast with international standards.139
2.4.4 Islamic Banking
An important point in the financial history o f Malaysia is the establishment o f  
Bank Islam Malaysia in 1983. The Islamic Bank provides "interest free banking" and
135 Laws o f Malaysia, Vol. 20, Act 372
136 Ibid., Sections 69-81
137 Ibid., Sections 25-28
138 During my visit to Malaysia I enquired from a number of sources about the efficiency of 
the banking system and the levels of services that were being offered to customers. The 
overall view was that customers were satisfied with the banking services that were being 
provided Visit to Malaysia from 30th May 1997 to 7th June 1997.
139 Interview with Mr Ng Chih Kaye, Head of Credit Department, May Bank, at the Bank
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carries out its banking business in accordance with the principles o f  Islam.
A fundamental principle in Islam is that money cannot be lent for interest.140 
Therefore all lending transactions are based on a concept o f  buying and selling.141 If a 
borrower requires a loan o f  RM 20,000 to buy a house, the bank will purchase the house 
and re-sell the house to the borrower for RM 22,000. The difference is the profit margin 
kept by the bank. All other aspects such as debt recovery are similar to conventional 
banking. Under Islamic banking "buying and selling" is not considered a transaction. It is 
considered a ’product' offered by banks to customers. At present, banks offer over forty 
’different products'.
Islamic banking continues to remain a much-debated issue in Malaysia. A
malaysian legal academic has observed that trying to join religion and commercial
transactions is difficult, particularly in dispute resolution. Since Islamic banking is still 
new, even judges are not familiar with how to solve complex disputes.142
Despite these difficulties, Islamic banking is becoming increasingly popular in 
Malaysia. At present over forty banks and financial institutions offer Islamic banking 
services. It has proved to be very effective alongside conventional banking, and several 
countries are interested in making it a role model in implementing their own Islamic 
banking system.143 Malaysia's Prime Minister is also convinced that linking Islam with 
economic development is possible. The government has established the Malaysia Institute
Headquarters , Kuala Lumpur, on 30th May 1997.
140 Islamic Banking Practice, Published by Bank Islam Berhad, 1992, 7-23 ; Haron, S.,
Islamic Banking: Rules and Regulations, Pelanduk Publishers, Kuala Lumpur, 1997, 7
141 Interview with Mr Mahayuddin Ismail, Senior General Manager-Retail Operations, Bank 
Islam, at Bank Islam Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997.
142 Interview with Mrs. Badariah Sahamid, Lecturer in Banking Law, University of 
Malaya, at the University on 2 June 1997.
143 Lim, P., A Role Model to Emulate, 16 January 1997, Malaysia Business- Supplement
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o f  Islamic Understanding (IKIM) to educate people about Islam and its role in economic 
activities. To Muslims, Islamic banking is presented as a practical application o f  their 
religious teachings. For non-Muslims, it is presented as an extension o f  choice in money- 
management. A politician described it more bluntly: "The only difference is whether the 
man behind the counter is wearing a religious hat or a bow tie."144
2.5 THE CENTRAL BANKS AND THEIR ROLE
A central bank plays the most influential role in a country’s economic and 
financial development. Generally, the primary role o f  a central bank is the same in all 
countries. It acts as banker and financial advisor to the government and as the nation’s 
monetary authority, and is responsible to the government for promoting monetary stability 
in the country. To improve the stability o f the financial system further, a central bank will 
act as a banker to the banking and other financial institutions in the country.145 A central 
bank can influence the lending policy o f  commercial banks and thus debt recovery.
In 1935, The Reserve Bank o f India was established to secure monetary stability 
in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system o f the country to its 
advantage.146 In 1950, the Central Bank o f Sri Lanka was established to be responsible for 
the administration and regulation o f the monetary and banking system o f  the country.147
14
1^4 p or q oci  and GDP, 7th August 1993, Economist 57, 58
145 Cranston, R., Principles o f Banking Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, 117-133
146 See preamble to The Reserve Bank of India, Act No. 2 of 1934
147 Section 5, Monetary Law Act in Legislative Enactments of Sri Lanka, (Revised 1980), 
Cap. 422; The statutory basis is vested with the Monetary Board of the Central Bank and 
not with the Bank itself. A significant lacuna in the Monetary Act is the absence of any 
specific reference to the Bank’s objective of ensuring the soundness and efficiency of the 
financial system. The Act however, specifically provides for the establishment of two 
departments for economic research and bank supervision and has set out the powers and 
functions of these departments.
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Bank Negara Malaysia was established in 1959 for the purpose o f  issuing currency, to 
keep reserves to safeguard the value o f the currency, to act as a bank and financial 
advisor/agent to the government, to promote stability and a sound financial structure, and 
to influence the credit situation to the advantage o f  the country.148
All three banks act as the apex institution in their respective banking systems and 
are authorised to perform numerous functions to achieve the multiple objectives for which 
they were established. One o f  the objectives is to regulate the credit system. This may be 
done by managing the volume o f credit available from banking institutions as well as 
directing the available credit from these institutions to specific sectors.
2.5.1 Monetary Instruments
It is the task o f  a central bank to promote the economic objectives o f a country by 
implementing the appropriate monetary policies. To make economic objectives 
meaningful, values or targets must be fixed for such objectives, for example, targets on 
inflation and economic growth. Central banks would then attain these objectives through 
use o f  monetary instruments.149
There are two types o f monetary instruments, namely, general or quantitative and 
selective or qualitative. General monetary instruments include the central bank lending 
rates, statutory reserve requirements imposed on banks, adjustments in liquidity ratios and 
open market operations. Selective monetary instruments direct credit to a particular sector 
or to a particular a type o f  lending. These include priority sector lending guidelines, credit 
ceilings imposed on banks, credit planning and other forms o f  direct regulation. The aim
148 Section 4, Central Bank of Malaysia Act, 1958, (Revised 1994) Laws o f Malaysia, 
Vol. 28, Act 519
149 Fernando, G., Money, Credit and the Conduct of Monetary Policy [1994] Economic
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o f  these instruments is to influence the cost and availability o f  credit. For example if  the 
interest rate fixed by the central bank were increased, it raises the cost o f  borrowing to 
banking institutions which in turn is borne by the borrowers. This would reduce the credit 
granted by banks and consequently reduce the level o f economic activity. A  reduction in 
interest rates would have the opposite outcome.
The monetary instruments used by central banks are generally standard. 
However, the degree o f dependence on any instrument may vary in each country. The 
position is the same in India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia. All three central banks control the 
volume o f  available credit in the market by general as well as selective monetary 
instruments. The general controls used by the Reserve Bank o f India include the bank 
rate, open market operations and variable reserve requirements.150 The Central Bank o f Sri 
Lanka and Bank Negara Malaysia also use the same instruments.151 Compared to a decade 
ago, the use o f selective instruments have considerably decreased in the three countries, 
but they are still being used as effective monetary instruments, particularly when lending 
to the priority sectors. The Reserve Bank o f India and Bank Negara Malaysia continue to 
set lending targets for specific groups o f borrowers which the commercial banks have to 
meet. The Central Bank o f Sri Lanka used to impose credit targets in the past but after the 
market-orientated reforms were introduced in 1977, the practice was gradually 
discontinued. The Central Banks in Sri Lanka and Malaysia continue to set interest rate
Review 18, 21
Tannan, M., Tannan’s Banking Law and Practice in India, 19th Ed., India Law House, 
New Delhi, 1998, 62-63
Fernando, G., Money, Credit and Monetary Policy, [1994] Economic Review 18, 21- 
22; Money and Banking in Malaysia, 4th Ed., Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 
1994, 118
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ceilings on loans given to specific sectors.152 In India, interest rates for loans below Rs. 
200,000/= are determined by the Reserve Bank. Interest rates for loans above this amount 
are determined by market rates.153
2.6 CONCLUSION
Two decades ago, the policy o f 'social control' played an important role in the
Indian banking sectors and resulted in the nationalisation o f fourteen large commercial
banks in 1969. The effect o f nationalisation on the Indian banking system was marked. A
significant result was the territorial spread o f  banking due to the increase o f branches in
the rural and semi-rural areas. In June 1969, there were 8262 branches in the country and
within two years o f nationalisation the number increased to 12013. Out o f  the 3751 new
branches that were opened, as many as 2480 branches (i.e. 66%) were opened in areas that
did not have banks. The proportion o f bank branches in rural areas increased from 22.4%
as at end June 1969 to 35.6% by June 1971. Consequently, the average number o f
customers per bank had also reduced from 65,000 to 46,000 per office.154 The overall
results were very encouraging to the governments. As one leading banker commented:
“The post-nationalisation period had witnessed a complete re-orientation o f  
India's banking from "class" banking to "mass" banking from, "asset base" 
lending to "production oriented" lending and from, "elite" banking to "social" 
banking. There has in fact been a change in the very concept, precept and 
outlook o f  banking.”155
After the banks were nationalised, they were required to take an active role in
152 [1995] Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual Report 127 ; [1996] Bank Negara Malaysia 
Annual Report 194
153 [i 996] The Reserve Bank of India Annual Report 168
154 Reserve Bank of India Annual Report and Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 
RBI, Bombay, 71-74, and Tables 34-37
155 Ghose, B., Bank Nationalisation : Promises and Performance (1987) 58 Journal of the 
Indian Institute of Bankers 126
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social reconstruction and poverty alleviation programmes. During this period a number o f  
committees, commissions and study groups were set up to look at various aspects o f  the 
banking industry so that the policy o f  the governments could be implemented effectively. 
The important bodies include the Nayak Committee, Banking Commission, Marathe 
Committee, Tandon Committee, Chore Study Group and Khusro Committee.156 The 
Narasimham Report was the latest o f such studies. This report envisaged a radical change 
from the established policy and structure o f the financial sector. The recommendations 
were aimed at reforming the financial sector to complement the new market orientated 
economic policies, which had been introduced by the new government.
The changes in government in Sri Lanka prior to 1977, suggest that its people were 
unsure o f  what they want from government policy. Every government making cuts in food 
subsidies was defeated at the next general election. Consequently, all governments were 
extremely responsive to the wishes o f the electorate, and that made the implementation 
sound economic policy difficult. In 1994, the government that introduced historic reforms 
to the economic and financial systems was defeated at polls. After being governed by one 
party for seventeen years the people wanted a change. The new government is known to 
be leftist and was initially hostile towards the market-orientated policies the country was 
pursuing. Then the government appeared to have changed its views on market reforms.157
156 Nayak Committee reported on adequacy of institutional credit to the small scale 
industries and related aspects (1993), Tandon Committee reported on framing 
guidelines for follow up of bank credit (1988), Marathe Committee reported on the 
working of the Credit Authorisation Scheme (1988), Chore study Group reviewed the 
system of cash credit (1988) and the Khusro Committee reported on the agricultural 
credit system in India (1989).
157 The Economist reported,
“Embracing market reforms is a climb down for President Kumaranatunga. In opposition 
she said rude things about the market. But it may be that, sooner or later, she had no 
option but to continue the reforms started by Junious Jayawardena in 1977. These had 
developed a momentum it would have been difficult to reverse. The surprise is that Mrs
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Malaysia is no longer dependent on commodities, and has pursued 
industrialisation with speed and vigour. With a dominant manufacturing sector and a 
regional leader in high technology, Malaysia has been a success story in the South East 
Asian region. The Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, has been the driving force 
behind the last twenty years o f development, and plans to ensure that the country reaches 
fully developed status by the year 2020.158 The economic and financial reforms have 
involved privatisation.159 The programme on privatisation involved not only the transfer o f  
government ownership to the private sector but also the liberalisation o f market forces.160
India and Sri Lanka are moving away from being planned economies with a 
socialist bias towards becoming market orientated economies. The Malaysian economy 
never had a socialist bias and continues with privatisation and export promotion policies. 
The banking communities welcomed the financial sector reforms which were introduced
Kumaranatunga appears to be moving faster than the reformers of the previous
government [h]er plans have been meekly accepted by her cabinet, which includes a
number of Marxists. The United National Party , which ruled the country is sitting tight, 
watching with smug satisfaction the governments adoption of market policies it has 
advocated.” Privatisation, Yes, Peace No, 22 July 1995, The Economist 66-67
Hamid, A., (Ed) Malaysia’s Vision 2020 : Understanding the Concept, Implications 
and Challenges, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1993
Bhaskar, V., Privatisation and the Developing Countries : The Issues and the Evidence, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion Paper No.47, 
UNCTAD, Geneva, 1992, 1
According to Mr Omar, Head of the task force on privatisation in the Prime Minister’s 
Department in Malaysia, the objectives of privatisation include:
a) relieving the financial and administrative burden of the government
b) reducing the size and presence of the public sector
c) raising efficiency and productivity and promoting competition
d) accelerating growth
e) meeting targets of the New Economic policy
Omar, Haji Mohd, Privatisation Policy: Issues and Problems in Buang, A., (Ed) The 
Malaysian Economy in Transition, National Institute of Public Administration, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1990, 49
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in all three countries. Some authors however, have criticised financial sector reforms 
based on free market principles. Joseph Stiglitz, a trenchant critic o f  financial sector 
reforms has argued that financial markets are vulnerable to ‘market failures’ more than 
any other markets and therefore, government intervention in financial markets would 
make these markets function better.161 He favours government intervention by way o f  
directed credit and maintaining low interest rates.162
Liberalisation o f the financial sector does not mean that it will function without 
any intervention from the government or the monetary authority. It is internationally 
accepted that deregulation o f a financial sector is always accompanied by a rigorous set o f  
prudential standards that have to be followed by the financial institutions. As John Crow, 
former Governor o f  the Bank o f  Canada said "deregulation does not mean de- 
supervision".163 In this context the argument o f  Stiglitz can be accepted, but more intrusive 
intervention which includes directed credit and artificially maintaining low interest rates is 
a different matter.
The general attitude o f favouring financial liberalisation must also be questioned. 
In the late 1970’s attempted financial liberalisation in several Southern Cone countries in 
Latin America, like Argentina, Chile and Uruguay ended in failure. Liberalised interest 
rates rose to a very high level and as a result discouraged investment and led to 
widespread corporate insolvencies.164 Non-performing loans soared165 and the monetary
161 Stiglitz, J., The Role of the State in Financial Markets, Proceedings of the World Bank 
Annual Conference on Development Economics, World Bank, Washington DC, 
1994, 19, 20
162 Ibid., 39,42-44
163 Crow, J., Central Banks, Monetary Policy and the Financial System [1993] RBI 
Bulletin 1373, 1379
164 Corbo, V., & De Melo, J., Liberalisation With Stabilisation in the Southern Cone of
Latin America : Overview and Summary (1985) 13 World Development (Special Issue)
82
authorities were forced to take a series o f measures to bring the crisis under control. Of 
course, prior to liberalisation, these countries had very unstable economic conditions 
which were made worse by inconsistencies in policy implementation. There may, 
however, be lessons to learn from the experiences o f these Latin American countries.
In India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia interest rates have not been deregulated fully. 
Market forces have been allowed to have greater influence over the level o f  interest rates 
but government intervention continued in respect o f  loans given to priority sectors. 
Directing credit to priority sectors through various credit schemes are operated in all three 
countries. In addition to directing credit the monetary authorities in India and Malaysia 
still set credit targets, which the commercial banks must meet. This practice has now been 
stopped in Sri Lanka.
The motive o f  imposing credit targets and interest rate controls was to help 
finance borrowers from sectors deemed to have higher economic priority. The 
experiences o f most countries around the world has shown that directed credit schemes 
and granting loans with subsidised interest rates have been a failure. These controls have 
increased the cost o f  loan funds to non-preferential borrowers, and prompted low 
repayment rates. Among preferential borrowers, funds have been known to be misused 
for non-priority purposes.166 Despite these problems, there are some bankers who believe 
that these borrowers are a viable and bankable group.167 Poor borrowers have shown that
863
In Chile the loan defaults as a proportion of total financial assets increased from 1.4% 
to 19% by 1983. In Argentina, bad and doubtful debts as a ratio of total bank loans 
accelerated from 1.95% in 1974 to 9.13% in 1980.
166 Honohan, P., & Vittas, D., Bank Regulation and the Network Paradigm:Policy 
Implications for Developing and Transition Economies, World Bank Policy Research 
Paper No. 1631, World Bank, Washington DC, 1996, 11-12
167 Kabeer, N., and Murthy, K., Compensating for Institutional Exclusion?: Lessons From
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they are able to use credit profitably, repay loans promptly and are willing to borrow at 
market rates o f  interest.168 Debt repayment, particularly among women borrowers, has 
proved to be extremely high.169 Women have demonstrated an outstanding ability to apply 
credit to useful projects and it is the lack o f  credit that has left these groups in poverty, 
rather than a lack o f  skill or motivation on their part.170
In most market economies, the present trend is to move away from direct
monetary instruments.171 In India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia despite their commitment to
market reforms, ceilings on interest rates and credit direction are in force. Further, in India
and Malaysia, the Central Banks continue to prescribe credit targets as effective forms o f
monetary instruments. The reason is that in these countries the majority o f the population
are poor, and the governments consider it a social obligation to protect the interests o f  the
weaker sections during the process o f economic change. A  past Governor o f  the Reserve
Bank o f India commented,
“It is only appropriate that, where markets distort, we have to take care o f  
those who are disadvantaged. It is gratifying that experts in mature 
economies are also now coming around this view that markets alone cannot 
always decide. Indeed, recent events seem to cast doubts on the dominant 
conventional wisdom “leave it to the markets and all will be well.” We have 
our reservations on this. So long as we do not attempt to outguess the market
Indian Government and Non-Government Credit Interventions For The Poor, EDS 
Discussion Paper No. 356, 1996, University of Sussex, Brighton, 1996
Amarakoon Bandara, A., Financing for SMI’s in Sri Lanka, in Junggun Oh, Financing 
for Small and Medium Scale Industries in the SEACEN Countries, SEACEN Training 
and Research Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 1994, 339
Walker, T., and Boulton, L., Micro-Lending Offers Power to World’s Poor, Financial 
Times of 5 September 1995
Kuper, S., Safe Bets and Entrepreneurs, Financial Times of 21. 11. 1995; In India 
under the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) 40% of the beneficiaries 
are women, In Bangladesh 75% of the loan recipients from the Grameen Bank are 
women. In Indonesia, under the Bandan Kredit Kacamatan Scheme loans are mostly 
given to middle aged peasant women. See Issues in Informal Finance, World 
Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, 117-120
Cranston, R., Principles o f Banking Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, 128
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but set right the distortions, we can preserve our social goal o f  growth and 
equity”172
The disadvantaged are the people in the priority sectors. The concept o f  priority lending 
has a noble objective, but whether the objectives can be achieved without distorting the 
overall cost o f  lending in the banks must be addressed. Banks lend money that belongs 
to the depositors, and to take that money and lend it to specific sectors at subsidised 
interest rates and at the direction o f the government is bound to create distortions in the 
cash flow o f  the banks. Unless the State is willing to bear the cost o f  the deficit, 
directed lending will distort the markets, presumably, this is what the Governor was 
suggesting when he said that distortions must be set right.
In Malaysia lending guidelines continue to be issued by Bank Negara. It was 
referred to as ‘rather a primitive method’ but was justified on the grounds that it was 
necessary because o f ‘certain socio-economic considerations that cannot be ignored.’173
Research has shown that a diminishing degree o f government intervention can 
assist financial liberalisation.174 For the transition towards a market-orientated economy to 
be effective, the state must work to establish an environment which is conducive for
Venkitaramanan, S., Current Status o f Economic Reforms in India [1992] Reserve 
Bank of India Bulletin 1673, 1676
The disadvantaged are the people in the priority sectors. The concept of priority 
lending has a noble objective, but whether the objectives can be achieved without 
distorting the overall cost of lending in the banks must be addressed. Banks lend money 
that belongs to the depositors and to take that money and lend it to specific sectors at 
subsidised interest rates at the direction of the government is bound to create 
distortions in the cash flow of the banks. Unless the State is willing to bear the cost of 
the deficit, directed lending will distort the markets, presumably, this is what the 
Governor was suggesting when he said that distortions must be set right.
Interview with Mr. Gopal Sundaram, Head of Legal Department, Bank Negara 
Malaysia, at the Bank, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997
Yoon-Je Cho and Deena Khatkhate, Lessons o f Financial Liberalisation in Asia : A 
Comparative Study, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 50, World Bank, Washington 
DC, 1989, 106
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changes to be implemented.175 There must be a well-planned financial infrastructure where 
there is provision for a flow o f information. The legal and accounting systems must be 
able to deal with problems that may arise, and at the same time monitor events 
continuously. The upshot is that unless the key areas that are necessary for market 
operations to be effective are adequately developed, financial liberalisation would have a 
limited effect, and would fall short o f its objective to be more efficient, competitive and 
effective. In countries like Japan and South Korea, the governments played an active role 
in the early stages o f reforms when the institutional framework for a market economy was 
not complete.176 The governments liberalised their financial systems only when they were 
certain the infrastructure was adequately developed to cope with the changes.177
It is not necessary to make a choice between the “market” and the “state.” 
Integral elements o f both the state and the market could be combined to attain high 
economic development.178 In less developed counties like India and Sri Lanka, the 
fundamental criteria are still in the process o f being developed, and government 
intervention is therefore necessary. Malaysia is more advanced in the reform process, but 
during the initial stages the government had exerted a great deal o f  influence to steer the 
reforms in the direction it desired.
175 The State in a Changing World: World Development Report, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1997, 2-15
Khatkhate, D., & Dalla, I., Regulated Deregulation of the Financial System in Korea, 
World Bank Discussion Paper No. 292, World Bank, Washington DC., 1995
177 Yoon-Je Cho and Deena Khatkhate, Lessons of Financial Liberalisation in Asia : A 
Comparative Study, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 50, World Bank, Washington 
DC, 1989, 106
178 Gutterman, A., & Brown, R., (Eds.) Commercial Laws o f East Asia, Sweet & Maxwell 
Asia, Hong Kong, 1997, 13-18; Markets and States: Against Minimalism and 
Dichotomy, Fourth Lecture in Raffaele Mattioli Lecture Series in Streeten, P., Thinking 
About Development, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995, 200-202
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Government intervention does not always have to be viewed as market 
destroying. State intervention could be accommodated to build a market-orientated 
economy, provided the degree o f state intervention and the means it employs are 
acceptable. Eventually the State would step aside and permit the free development o f  
markets.
87
CHAPTER THREE
CREDIT ALLOCATION AND LOAN SUPERVISION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 CREDIT APPRAISAL
3.2.1 Five ‘C ’s in Credit Appraisal
3.2.2 Credit Appraisal In India, Sri Lanka And Malaysia
3.3 CREDIT INFORMA TION
3.3.1 Information Provided by Banks
3.3.2 Information Provided by Credit Reference Agencies
3.4 LENDING AGREEMENTS
3.4.1 Usury and Money Lending Legislation in India
3.4.2 Usury and Money Lending Legislation in Sri Lanka
3.4.3 Money Lending Legislation in Malaysia
3.4.4 Terms o f  a Loan
3.4.5 Documentation
3.5 LOAN SUPER VISION
3.6 INFORMAL CREDIT
3.6.1 Role o f  Informal Credit and Institutional Credit
3.6.2 Banking fo r  the Poor
3.6.3 New Approach to Rural Lending
3.7 CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Credit plays a fundamental role in the economic development o f a free market 
economy. For the expansion o f  new business activities the increased provision o f credit 
is essential. It supplements capital, income and profits on which businesses rely for 
current operations and expansion. Credit must be easily accessible and promptly 
available to creditworthy borrowers when it is needed. Notwithstanding the 
creditworthiness o f  a borrower, a lender is always exposed to the risk o f default. In the 
event o f  default, a lender must have the assurance that the principal sum lent together with 
interest earned can be recovered without delay. Its ability to do so is an important factor to 
be considered in assessing the credit risk. The traditional legal approach to debt recovery
has been through court-driven procedures, but so far it has not proved effective due to 
the delays experienced in the courts.1 On the other hand, prudent lending would help to 
prevent and minimise debt recovery problems. Prudent lending primarily involves 
effective processing o f  the entire loan transaction. Proper evaluation o f  the credit risk, 
accurate documentation o f  the loan and security agreements, and systematic monitoring 
o f the progress o f  the loans will help to minimise loan defaults.
“Prevention is better than cure”: this was an issue that was widely debated in the 
Regional Symposium on Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security in Manila, 
in 1993. It was agreed that by the time a loan goes bad it is often too late, and lenders 
are then faced with focusing on symptoms rather than the causes o f  default.2 When 
exploring the disputes between lenders and borrowers, it becomes clear that one o f  the 
causes o f  loan default is the lender’s failure to process the loan properly.
Lenders in developing countries find it difficult to gather information about 
borrowers that w ill assist them in assessing a borrower’s creditworthiness. The available 
information is often not extensive, prompt or accurate.3 Lenders, particularly banks, 
informally exchange information about borrowers between themselves. Where a 
potential borrower is new to a bank, a formal credit reference from the borrower’s bank 
may be sought. The information provided, however, may be vague and consequently not 
very helpful. It is also a common practice for banks providing such references to 
disclaim any liability for the information they provide.4
1 For more details - See Chapter 5, 222-236
2 Murgatroyd, P. Legal Management Aspects o f Debt Recovery : Lessons to be Drawn
and Where Do We Go From Here? Paper Presented at the Symposium on Legal Issues 
in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security (Unpublished), Manila, 1993,4
3 Ibid., 1
4 Cranston, R., Credit, Security and Debt Recovery: Law’s Role in Reform in Asia and
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Land registries are also a useful source o f  information to lenders. A bank can 
check whether the property is encumbered and i f  the title to the property is clear. 
Another advantage is that, despite subsequent dealings, lenders can obtain priority for 
their security by registering it. Registration o f security is also a form o f  public notice 
and lenders find it useful when assessing a potential borrower’s creditworthiness.5 The 
problem, however, is that these registries are known to be inefficient. Long delays in 
the registries also make way for fraudulent borrowers to provide encumbered security to 
banks, and as a result banks lose their priority they would otherwise have received.6
In state owned banks, autocratic attitudes and bureaucratic procedures still tend 
to thwart excellence in customer service.7 As a result potential borrowers, particularly 
corporations, access private banks for their credit requirements. Even amongst small 
scale borrowers institutional borrowing has proved to be unpopular because o f  the long 
and cumbersome procedures that have to be followed to secure loans.8 Conversely, 
private moneylenders provide credit easily without fuss and at short notice. Therefore, 
despite the exploitative nature o f  private money lending rural borrowers continue to use 
these sources for their credit needs.9
External, particularly political pressures also undermine the quality o f  assessing
the Pacific, in Norton, J., and Andenas, M., Emerging Financial Markets and Secured 
Transactions, Kluwer Law International, London, 1997, 219,233
Pillai, P., Company Law and Securities Regulation in Singapore and Malaysia, 
Butterworths, Singapore 1987, 101-107; Thomas T., Securities: Creation o f Fixed and 
Floating Charges [1988] 3 MLJ cxxv, cxxv-cxxvi
Nanayakkara, R., Commercial Banking - Views [1994] Economic Review 24 
Ibid., 24
Munasinghe, C., Banking for the Poor; Policies, Problems and Prospects, Paper 
Presented at the Seminar on Banking for the Poor (Unpublished), in Colombo, on 9 
October 1990, 5
Singha, S.K. Recovery o f Loans from Farmers, Deep and Deep Publications, New 
Delhi, 1992, .207; Sarap, K., Interlinked Agrarian Markets in Rural India, Sage
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credit risks and the ability to satisfactorily supervise loan accounts and their regular
recovery. Politicians often promise credit facilities to borrowers, and thereby create
situations where wrong procedures have to be followed when loans are being granted.10
There is a class o f  persons who, because o f  their political connections, have succeeded
in obtaining large loans from state banks even though their capacity for repayment
would be doubtful to prudent lenders. It is well known that among these debtors, the
default rate is high but once again political influence is used to forestall the institution o f
recovery proceedings. As Kailas Sarap observes:
“[I]t appears that the large farmers, because o f  their political connection 
and dominance in formal credit institutions (especially in co-operatives) 
have managed to postpone repayment o f loans for a long period....[T]he 
large farmers not only have obtained a lion’s share o f  loans but also have 
a higher percentage o f  debt, to the extent that the piece o f  credit in 
regulated market is very low.... it is a sort o f  income transfer to the large 
farmers.”11
The obvious result o f this interference is that it encourages borrowers to default 
because it generates a psychology o f  non-repayment. 12 It also gives the wrong 
impression to borrowers to think that banks are “Welfare Organisations.”13 In the long 
term the financial interests o f lending institutions are put in jeopardy.14
This chapter will discuss the key features o f  the law and practice o f  credit
Publications, New Delhi, 1991, 63
Rama, A.S. “How Can Consessional Finance Help the Poor? ” [1984- May] Yojana, 1- 
15; Shari, I., Rural Development and Rural Banking in Malaysia, in Ariffin, J., (Ed), 
Poverty Amidst Plenty, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1994, 32
Transactions in Rural Credit Markets in Western Orissa, India (1987) 15 Journal of 
Peasant Studies 83, 90
Khusro Committee Report on the Agricultural Credit System in India, Reserve Bank of 
India, Bombay, 1993 (Reprint) 211-215
Interview with Dr U., Herath, Senior Economist, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the 
Central Bank, on 4 June 1997
Satya Sundaran, I., Institutional Credit in Service of Weaker Sections in Pandey, P., 
and Jalal, R., (Eds.) Rural Development in India: Issues and Policies, Vol. 1, Anmol
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allocation. Emphasis w ill be given to credit appraisal, lending agreements and the 
monitoring o f  the borrower. An attempt will be made to identify the problems i f  any. 
Possible solutions will be suggested.
3.2 CREDIT APPRAISAL
A  bank “lends” money and does not give it away. The borrower is required to
repay the loan with interest to the bank at a future date.15 The essence o f  a loan lies in
the obligation to repay, which may be expressed or implied. The lender, therefore, must
be satisfied as to the borrower’s integrity and ability to repay the loan on the agreed
terms. There would always be some risk that the borrower will default, and it is in
assessing this risk that the lender needs to demonstrate both skill and judgement.16
“...it is a sine qua non o f  good lending never to afford any facility to a 
borrower upon whom the bank cannot rely, however strong may be the 
security. It is common knowledge that a good banker should know his 
customer and be able to judge not only his integrity but his ability to use 
the bank money to advantage and repay it within an acceptable 
period...”17
In countries like the United Kingdom, bankers use “credit scoring” as part o f  
their credit assessment procedure.18 Credit scoring, measures the statistical probability 
o f  loan default. It is based on statistical techniques that predict the future performance o f
Publications, New Delhi, 1991, 71, 74
A loan of money is a contract between the lender and the borrower whereby the lender 
pays or agrees to pay a sum of money to the borrower in consideration of a promise to 
repay on demand or at some future time. Poh Kim Kang Co. and Ors v Ishak Bin 
Lambik and Another [1971] 2 MLJ 25. The position is fundamentally different in 
Islamic banking where charging of interest (riba) is prohibited.
Some authors describe lending as an “art, rather than science” - See Rouse, C.N., 
Bankers Lending Techniques, Institute of Bankers Publications, London, 1989 but 
some describe it as an “art as well as a science.” See Weerasooria, W., Banking Law 
and the Financial System in Australia, 3rd Ed., Butterworths, Sydney, 1993, 553-554
Mather, L., The Lending Banker, 3rd Ed., Waterlow & Sons Ltd, London, 1966, 12
Guide to Credit Scoring, Office of Fair Trading, London, 1993
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a particular group o f  borrowers, from the past performance o f  a similar group with 
similar characteristics. It is considered one o f  the most consistent, accurate and fair 
forms o f  credit assessment. For practical and economic reasons lenders in developing 
countries may not be able to use credit-scoring techniques. However, to assess the 
creditworthiness o f  a borrower, a lending bank would primarily look into five aspects 
commonly known as the ‘five C’s in credit assessment. They are Character, Capacity, 
Capital, Conditions and Collateral.19
3.2.1 ‘Five C ’s in Credit Appraisal
‘Character’ o f  a borrower plays an important role in the credit assessment 
process. A  lending bank will look to a borrower’s past record, its banking operations, 
integrity and reputation to establish his character. In the case o f  corporate borrowers 
close scrutiny will be made o f  the management team to ascertain if  they possess the 
required management and business skills to run the enterprise effectively.
‘Capacity’ o f  a borrower requires two aspects to be assessed. First, the 
borrower must have legal capacity to borrow. For example, banks will not lend to 
minors.20 In the case o f  partnerships unless specifically prohibited in the partnership 
agreement, partners have the legal capacity to borrow money on behalf o f  the 
partnership. Limited companies will have the capacity to borrow if  the articles o f  
association o f  a company empower its board o f  directors to do so .21 Lending banks will
19 Grier, W., The Asiamoney Guide to Credit Analysis in Emerging Markets, Asia Law 
and Practice, Hong Kong, 1995, 1-7; It must be noted that there are more modem 
methods of credit analysis, but in many developing countries including India, Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia this traditional method continues to be used.
20 Guest, A., (Ed), Chitty on Contracts, 27th Ed, Vol. 1, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
1994,443
21 Gower, L., Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law, 5th Ed, Sweet and Maxwell,
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always inspect the articles to ensure that the directors can borrow and also mortgage a 
company’s assets for the purpose o f  giving security. It w ill also check whether the 
Directors’ powers to borrow are restrictive or not. An assessment o f  the ‘financial 
capacity’ o f  a borrower is relevant in ascertaining the repayment ability o f  a borrower. 
Individual borrowers would be asked to submit a statement o f  income and expenditure, 
and o f  their assets and liabilities. In the case o f  corporate borrowers, lenders would 
insist on inspecting the profit and loss accounts and the balance sheets o f  the business 
and other financial information such as cash flow statements, management accounts and 
final projections.22
The ‘capital’ base o f  a corporate borrower is also an indication to a lender o f  
the borrower’s financial stability. The equity o f  a company is an important factor to 
consider i f  the potential borrower is small and also new to the bank, or where the 
business is relatively new. In the first few years o f  a small business it w ill usually have 
little or no retained earnings, and very little external financial help. It would, therefore, 
have to rely on its own capital in the event o f externally imposed challenges such as 
interest rate fluctuations, inflation and changes in market conditions.
‘Collateral’ is not mandatory in the securing o f  a loan. Lenders, however, will
favour the availability o f  security, if, in the bank’s view, there is an element o f  doubt as
to the repayment capacity o f a borrower. The amount o f  collateral that is taken must
reflect that element o f  doubt. As Weerasooria writes:
“Many customers believe that the primary requirement for obtaining a 
loan from a bank is the availability o f  satisfactory security, but this is a 
misconception. No doubt banks are concerned with the security that a
London, 1992, 15-17
Berry A. Faulkner, S., Hughes, M., and Jarvis, R., Bank Lending: Beyond the Theory, 
Chapman and Hall, London, 1993, Chapters 4 and 5
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customer can offer for a loan but this ought not to be the first, or only 
consideration”23
‘Market conditions’ as well as social and economic conditions, affect a potential 
borrower’s business activities. It is quite possible that a borrower may satisfy all the 
other elements o f credit assessment but i f  the potential borrower were engaged in a 
business that has an uncertain market, lenders would be reluctant to advance the money. 
For example, banks may be reluctant to lend for property development during a 
recession or where the property prices are reducing. A prudent lender will always 
closely study the prevailing conditions in a country before granting a loan.
3.2.2 Credit Appraisal in India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia
In India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia the lenders take into account the basic criteria 
that have already been mentioned. In each jurisdiction however, emphasis may be given 
to a different aspect o f  the credit assessment process.
In India a borrower’s creditworthiness is analysed to determine his capacity to 
abide by the terms and conditions o f  the loan agreement. In 1974 the Reserve Bank o f  
India appointed a committee under the chairmanship o f  Shri P.C. Tandon to frame 
guidelines on bank credit.24 In 1979 another committee was appointed by the Reserve 
Bank under the chairmanship o f  Shri K.B. Chore to examine the prevailing system o f  
bank credit and the effectiveness o f  monitoring and follow up systems adopted by 
banks.25 Both Committees recommended guidelines on various aspects o f  bank lending
23 Weerasooria W., Banking Law and the Financial Systems in Australia, 3rd Ed, 
Butterworths, Sydney, 1993, 554
24 Tandon, P., Report o f The Study Group to Frame Guidelines for Follow-up o f Bank 
Credit, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, 1988 (Reprint)
25 Chore, K., Report o f The Study Group to Review the System o f Cash Credit, Reserve 
Bank of India, Bombay, 1988 (Reprint)
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which bankers still continue to follow .26 The availability o f  security is fundamental 
when loan applications are being assessed. Lenders insist on security i f  a loan is to be 
granted. Unsecured loans are granted in special circumstances to reputed customers and 
if  it is supported by a guarantee.27
In Sri Lanka, an attempt is made to follow British banking practices, although 
they may not strictly followed.28 When a potential borrower is an existing customer o f  a 
bank, emphasis would be given to the banker - customer relationship. In order to 
determine the repayment capacity o f  a borrower, the type o f  account maintained by the 
customer, the facilities the bank have already granted, the manner in which the account 
is being operated, and the assets that has been declared to the bank are all considered. 
As in India, security must be furnished by a potential borrower even if  he is an existing 
customer o f  the bank and irrespective o f  the type o f  loan that is required.
It is an apparent puzzle why banks in India and Sri Lanka insist on security to 
grant credit because in the event o f default by a borrower, realising the security is a long 
and arduous process. The objective o f  taking security is to ensure that in the event o f  
some untoward and unexpected development which jeopardises the loan, the security 
provided by the borrower would offset the loss.29 In countries like India and Sri Lanka 
quick realisation o f  security is not effective because lenders rely on court driven 
procedures to realise security.
26 Tripathi, A.R., Bank Financing o f Industries in India, Tiwari Publications, New Delhi,
1991, 124, Appendices A and B
27 Ibid., 125
28 Interview with Mr Martin Fernando, Deputy General Manager, Credit Division,
Peoples’ Bank Head Quarters , at The Bank, on 14th May 1997.
29 For a very good discussion on when security should be taken by lenders see Rouse,
C.N., Bankers Lending Techniques, Chartered Institute of Bankers Publications, 1989, 
31-33
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The position in Malaysia is very different to that in India and Sri Lanka. Credit 
assessment appears to be very thorough and all the criteria identified earlier as the five 
‘Cs’ are looked at in detail. 30 All the elements are considered important but to consider 
a potential borrower creditworthy, it need not satisfy all five criteria. Each borrower will 
be assessed on an individual basis. The ‘Character’ o f  a borrower is closely looked at, 
not only at the time o f  credit assessment but also at the stage when a borrower defaults, 
and a bank is considering the option o f  rehabilitation.31 Collateral is looked at as a form 
o f  insurance and is not considered essential to grant small loans. For larger loans it is a 
mandatory requirement under the law that security must be taken.32 Banks prefer to take 
collateral that can be enforced by means o f  ‘self help’ remedies because it removes the 
cost and delay o f  instituting debt recovery suits.33
3.3 CREDIT INFORMATION
Assessing the credit rating o f a potential borrower is a specialised function o f  a 
lender. Whilst there are lending guidelines, each loan application must be treated on its 
merits. Lenders must gather all the available information and then attempt to reach an
Interview with Mr. Ng Chih Kaye, Head of Special Credits, Credit Control Division, 
May Bank Head Quarters, at the Bank, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997.
When a borrower defaults, the bank reassesses the borrower’s credit rating and the 
criteria stated in the five ‘Cs’ are once again looked at. This helps a bank to decide if 
the bank should exit from the loan, or rehabilitate it.
Section 60 (1) of Banking and Financial Institutions Act, No 372, 1989, states that 
subject to an order made by the Bank (i.e. the Central Bank) under (2), no licensed 
institution shall give to any person any credit facility without security.
Section 60(2) states that; the Bank may by order published in the Gazette permit any 
particular licensed institution, or any class, category or description of licensed 
institutions, to give to any person any credit facility without security which, together 
with any other credit facility without earlier given to him, does not exceed an aggregate 
amount set out in the order. At present, the limit is RM10,000/=.
Chen Kah Leng, Country Report for Malaysia, Presented at the Symposium on Legal 
Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security(Unpublished), Manila, 1993, 135
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objective decision. Experienced bankers no doubt have developed considerable 
expertise in this field. Nevertheless, for assessing fairly accurately the credit rating o f  
both big and small customers, adequate and reliable information is essential. Most o f  the 
information is provided by the customer himself, whilst some information can be 
obtained from external sources such as specialised agencies or other banks.34
3.3.1 Information Provided by Banks
Credit inquiries between banks may be formal or informal. Where one bank 
requests a credit reference from another bank, two problems arise. On the one hand, 
banks are inhibited in providing information because o f  their obligation to the customer 
to maintain secrecy about his financial affairs. On the other hand, banks are concerned 
with the possibility o f  being held responsible to the other party who may act upon the 
information provided by them.
According to the common law on bank confidentiality, (bank secrecy) the 
disclosure o f  information about customers to other banks or specialised credit agencies 
may be unlawful.35 The much cited decision o f Tournier v National Provincial and 
Union Bank o f  India, established that a bank is under an obligation to keep its 
customers affairs confidential, but the obligation imposed on banks were not absolute. 
Bankes LJ stated:
“At the present day I think it may be asserted with confidence that the duty
is a legal one arising out o f  contract, and that the duty is not absolute but
qualified. It is not possible to frame any exhaustive definition o f  the duty.
The most that can be done is to classify the qualification, and to indicate its
limits On principle I think the qualifications can be classified under four
heads:
i.. where disclosure is under compulsion by law
34 Berry A., et al, Bank Lending Beyond the Theory, Chapman & Hall, London, 1993, 37
35 Cranston, R., Principles o f Banking Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, Chapter 6
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ii where the interests o f  the bank require disclosure
ii where there is a duty to the public to disclose
iii where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent o f the 
customer.”36
According to the fourth qualification the customer can waive the duty o f  confidentiality, 
and it is quite possible that banks will make this a condition o f  being considered for 
credit.37 The basis on which bankers may exchange credit information should not be left 
to rest on a contractual basis. If banks providing credit information can be protected by 
legislation the matter will be beyond legal challenge.38 For example, in South Korea, the 
law clearly provides legal protection for institutions which have disclosed confidential 
information relating to financial transactions. The objective o f  this law is to allow 
financial institutions to share information to determine the creditworthiness o f  their 
customers.39 By contrast, in Singapore, i f  a banker breaches his duty o f  confidentiality, 
he is guilty o f  a criminal offence.40
In India, if  one bank requests a reference from another, information is generally 
given as a “common courtesy.” Bankers however take great care in wording the 
reference disclosing no more than a general position so that their duty o f  confidentiality
36 [1924] 1KB 461, at 472-473
37 In the United Kingdom, The Review Committee on Banking services observed that the 
exceptions stated in the Toumier case had to be revised and legislated. The government 
did not accept these recommendations. Jack, R., Report o f the Review Committee on 
Banking Services : Law and Practice, Cmnd 622, HMSO, London, 1989, Para 5.38- 
5.47 ; Government White Paper on Banking Services : Law and Practice, Cm. 1026, 
HMSO, London, 1990, 16; Howells, G., Data Protection, Confidentiality, Unfair 
Contract Terms, Consumer Protection and Credit Reference Agencies [1995] JBL 343, 
345-350
3& Campbell, D., International Bank Secrecy, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1992, 626
39 Young Moo Kim and Soo Man Park, "South Korea” in Campbell, D., International 
Bank Secrecy, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1992, 626
40 Section 47, Banking Act, Statutes of The Republic of Singapore, 1994 (Revised), Cap. 
19; Poh Chu Chai, Law of Banking : Banker and Customer, Vol. 1, Longman 
Singapore Publishers, Singapore, 1995, 386-387
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to the customer is preserved at all times.41 In addition, banks safeguard themselves by 
adding the words “without responsibility” to the credit reference provided by them.42 
Naturally, such references are likely to be vague and may not be very helpful. Although 
bank secrecy is considered integral to a banker - customer relationship, an Indian banker 
has an obligation to disclose information i f  compelled to do so by court or by statute. 
For example, in the case o f  Shankarlal Agarwall v State Bank o f  India43 a customer 
deposited with the bank a large sum o f  money in currency notes with a declaration form 
under the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Act 1978 and the bank 
handed the form to the Income Tax department. The court held that, although the bank 
had breached confidentiality, which gives rise to a claim for damages, the bank was 
under an obligation to provide the information under a number o f  statutes and the case 
fell within an exception. The Banking Laws Commission, while identifying the 
problem, took the view that national banks occupy a special position in that they are all 
state owned and therefore the state banks should include a statutory provision governing 
each bank allowing “full and frank communication o f  credit information between 
them.”44 So far this recommendation has not been given effect to.
Bankers in Sri Lanka also request references from other banks particularly if  
the customers are new. Some banks do provide information but it is very general. A  
typical credit reference provided by one bank to another would only indicate whether a 
customer’s account is “satisfactory, ordinary or good”. The issue o f breaching 
confidentiality therefore does not arise and, bankers hardly have occasion to be
41 Tannan, M., Tannan's Banking Law & Practice in India, 19th Ed, India Law House, 
New Delhi, 1998,202
42 Report o f the Banking Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 1972, 537
43 [1987] AIR (Cal) 29
100
challenged by customers.45 The Banking Act provides that every director, manager, 
officer or employee o f  a licensed commercial bank should sign a declaration pledging 
him self to observe strict secrecy in respect o f  all transactions relating to the bank, its 
customers and the state o f the accounts o f  any customer which may come to his 
knowledge in the discharge o f his duty except
(a) when required to do so by
(i) a court o f Law
(ii) by the person to whom such matters relates;
(b) in the performance o f  his duties; and
(c) in order to comply with any o f the provisions o f  the Act or any other law”46 
Whether sub clause (b) will be interpreted widely enough to safeguard a bank in the
event confidential information is disclosed to another person is uncertain. Thus, a Sri
Lankan banker will be able to disclose information only i f  the customer expressly gives
his consent.
In Malaysia, the law o f bank secrecy is governed by the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act, 1989. Banks are prohibited from disclosing any information or 
document relating to the affairs or account o f its customers.47 There are, however, 
exceptions to this general prohibition. If information were required by a party to a bona 
fide commercial transaction, or for a prospective bona fide commercial transaction to 
which the customer is also a party to, then information may be provided to assess the 
creditworthiness o f  the customer. The information given will be general in nature and
Report o f the Banking Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 1972, 537
Interview with Mr Martin Fernando, Deputy General Manager, Credit Division, 
Peoples’ Bank Head Quarters, Colombo, at the Bank, on 14 May 1997
Section 77 - Banking Act, No 30 of 1988 as amended by section 32 of the Banking 
(Amendment) Act, No 33 of 1995
Section 97
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will not include details o f  the customer’s account or affairs48.
It is clear that in all three jurisdictions the banks have a duty to their customers 
to maintain confidentiality. The degree o f confidentiality however appears to vary. In 
India and Sri Lanka the general prohibition is lifted only if  this is required by a court o f  
law or a statute, but in Malaysia it is relaxed in providing information o f a general 
nature to a bona fide party to a commercial transaction. Compared with India and Sri 
Lanka bankers in Malaysia have more freedom to disclose information but whether the 
provided information would be useful due to its general nature is questionable.
3. 3.2 Information Provided by Credit Reference Agencies
In countries like the United Kingdom and United States o f America, 
commercial banks use information provided by private credit rating agencies, which 
specialise in collecting and disseminating credit information about individual as well as 
corporate borrowers. These agencies collect information from a number o f  sources such 
as court judgements, press reports and information lodged with public record offices. In 
India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia private credit reference agencies have not been 
established. Banks collect information from credit applicants themselves or from other 
banks. I f more information were required, it would be acquired through third parties, or 
by reference to credit intelligence bureaux set up by the respective governments.
The Indian Banking Commission felt there was a need for outside agencies to 
furnish banks with information but it recognised the difficulties o f  establishing such 
agencies under prevailing Indian conditions and suggested that these agencies should be
Section 99 of BAFIA, 1989
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set up by legislation as separate statutory bodies.49 The Saraiya Commission also 
recommended the establishment by legislation o f specialised credit agencies, but these 
recommendations by both Commissions remain unimplemented50.
The Reserve Bank o f India has provided a credit information service to banks 
since 1962. The Reserve Bank o f  India Act, 1934, was amended51 incorporating Chapter 
IILA which empowered the Reserve Bank to collect credit information from individual 
banks on borrowers who have obtained secured credit facilities o f  Rs 500,000/= and 
above and unsecured facilities for Rs 100,000/= or more. The Reserve Bank is 
authorised to collect credit information which it might consider to be relevant for the 
systematic regulation o f credit and credit policy .52 Section 45E o f  the Act provides 
protection to banks and the Reserve Bank by permitting the disclosure or publication o f  
any credit information in accordance with the practice and usage customary among 
bankers or by law.
In Sri Lanka, there are no private credit reference agencies but the government 
has established a credit information bureau.53 This statutory body was established in 
1990 along the lines recommended by the Committee appointed to examine the 
formation o f  a data bank on loan defaulters and a credit information bureau.54 State
Report o f the Banking Commission, Government of India, Delhi, 1972, 248-249, 538- 
539
Shroff, C. S., India Country Report, Presented at the Symposium on Legal Issues in 
Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished) Manila, 1993, 64
Act No. 1 of 1962
Sections 45C & 45D
Credit Information Bureau of Sri Lanka Act, No. 18 of 1990 as amended by Credit 
Information Bureau Act of Sri Lanka (Amendment) Act, No. 8 of 1995.
Report o f the Committee on the Formation of a Data Bank on Loan Defaulters and a 
Credit Information Bureau, 1987. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has confirmed to me 
that this report was destroyed during the bomb explosion 1996.
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banks, commercial banks and finance houses are permitted to become members o f  the 
Bureau. The Bureau has the power to request a lending institution to furnish it with any 
information it may require. It shall be the duty o f the lending institution to furnish the 
Bureau with the information it requested “not withstanding anything to the contrary, in 
any law establishing such lending institution or other law or in any agreement entered 
into between such lending institutions and borrower.55 The principal functions o f  the 
Bureau are collecting credit information, developing the database on borrowers and 
supplying credit reports on borrowers. Members are required to provide information to 
the Bureau o f  overdue accounts that are Rs 100,000/= and above, and o f  regular 
accounts that are Rs 500,000/= and above. Since the Credit Information Bureau was 
established, there has been an increased interest by lending institutions to utilise the 
credit information service and the overall performance o f  the Bureau is satisfactory. In 
1995 the Bureau supplied 98,282 credit reports. In 1994, it responded to 71,623 
requests for credit reports as against 58,657 in 1993.56
Rating Agency Malaysia Berhad (RAM) is the only credit rating agency in 
Malaysia. In 1990, Bank Negara Malaysia as part o f  its continuing effort to develop the 
private debt securities market, incorporated RAM as a public limited company. The 
main function o f  RAM is to rate all issues o f bonds and commercial paper and to 
provide information to potential investors in both the primary and secondary issues o f  
private debt securities. RAM also provides a professional judgement o f  a corporation’s 
creditworthiness.57 However, under the provisions o f  section 97(1) o f  BAFIA, 1989,
55 Section 21 (2)
56 [1995] Annual Report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 127
57 Money and Banking in Malaysia: 1959-1994, 35th Ed., Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala
Lumpur, 1994,400
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RAM is prohibited from obtaining information regarding individual customer accounts, 
and from making reference to any customer name in its published reports. Such 
information may be used in the form o f  aggregate figures, so that the banks providing 
the information to RAM would not contravene the provisions against disclosure in the 
Act.
It was mentioned earlier that in all three countries, private credit reference 
agencies do not exist. A  question that arises is whether the establishment o f  such 
agencies would make credit appraisal more effective and efficient. I f private credit 
reference agencies were to be established, there are a number o f  safeguards that must be 
observed to protect the interests o f  borrowers as well as o f  lenders. The rating agencies 
must be licensed and be accountable to the government or the central bank. The 
procedures followed by these agencies to report credit information must be fair as well 
as accurate. Guidance could be sought from the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 1970 o f the 
United States o f  America, which requires credit reporting agencies to exercise their 
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to 
privacy.58 It also requires these agencies to adopt reasonable procedures “in a manner 
which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, 
relevancy and proper utilisation o f such information.59 It is equally important that the 
customer about whom credit information is reported is given the opportunity to correct 
any errors in the report. In the United Kingdom, the Crowther Committee reporting on 
consumer credit also suggested the adoption o f  just and equitable credit reporting 
procedures, the debtor being given the right to obtain details o f  filed information and the
58 Section 1681(a)(4) in United States Code Annotated, Title 15, West Group, St Paul, 
1998
59 Section 1681(b), Ibid.
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opportunity to correct any discrepancy.60
There are inherent difficulties in the effective running o f  private rating agencies 
in these countries. Collecting information is not an easy task. The public record offices, 
which are primary sources o f  information, are not up to date and in some instances 
information is non existent. For example, the author visited the Registrar o f Companies 
in Colombo and requested to see the complete record o f any company that had been 
wound up by court in the recent past, but such a file could not be located despite a 
number o f  companies having been the subject o f  winding up proceedings.61 Generally, 
the public record offices are slow in recording information and are known to be 
inefficient. Further, banks will not disclose information about customers to private 
credit reference agencies without statutory direction.
LENDING AGREEMENTS
A  loan agreement must be just and equitable to lenders as well as borrowers. 
Bankers must feel confident that the provisions in the loan agreement will afford them 
adequate credit protection and give them power to exert influence over borrowers, or 
control over a loan i f  necessary. For example, i f  the bank were in an unsecured position 
it would insist on including restrictive covenants into the loan agreement to protect 
itself. I f a bank were aware that a corporate borrower has had a doubtful past record or 
there are material doubts related to the loan, it may want the right to control the loan 
tightly. On the other hand, a borrower company may consider this an unwanted 
intrusion into the management’s freedom to run the company. Nevertheless, it is the
60 Lord Crowther, Report o f the Committee on Consumer Credit, Cmnd. 4596, HMSO,
London, 1971, 374-376; See now section 159 of the Consumer Credit Act, 1974
61 Visit to the Registrar of Companies, Colombo, on 13 May 1997
price to pay to obtain a loan.
Borrowers must not feel vulnerable because o f  their inability to stop lenders 
from doing what they want. In developed systems o f law, there are a number o f  ways in 
which transactions that are unreasonable may be nullified.62 Judges have ruled that if  a 
contract is unconscionable, or that it has been entered into under duress or undue 
influence, such a contract is void .63 A  security taken by a bank may become 
unenforceable if  it can be shown that there was an inequality o f  bargaining power 
between the bank and the borrower, or that independent advice had not been available to 
the borrower before the security documents were signed, or that the bank officer had 
acted in an unconscionable manner when dealing with the security transaction, or that 
all the circumstances to the transaction had not been fair, just and equitable.64 In various 
countries legislation has also been enacted to protect contracting parties. According to 
the provisions o f  the United Kingdom Unfair Contracts Act, 1977, even though the 
parties enter into certain contracts which appear absolutely proper and enforceable, a 
court nevertheless, has jurisdiction to treat it as unenforceable, on the ground that they 
were unreasonable. Schedule 2 to the Act sets out a number o f  criteria which a court 
must take into account when enforcing certain contracts between parties. One such 
criterion is the respective bargaining power o f the parties. The Council o f  the European 
Communities has issued a Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts.65 A  
notable provision in the directive is that the consumer should be given an opportunity to
62 Cranston, R., Principles o f Banking Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, 221-T il
63 Barclays Bank v OBrien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL); Shotter v Wespec Banking Group 
[1988] 2NZLR316; Geffen v Goodman Estate (1991) 81 DLR(4th)211 (SCC)
64 Barclays Bank v O ’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL); National Westminster Bank v Morgan 
[1985] 1 AC 686; Cornish v Midland Bank Pic [1985] 3 All ER 513
65 Council Directive 93/13/EEC in Official Journal of the European Community No. L
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examine all the terms o f  the contract and, in the event any terms proves ambiguous the 
construction most favourable to the consumer should prevail.
In India and Malaysia, loan agreements are governed by English legal 
principles. Judges will not enforce loan agreements that are harsh and unconscionable.66 
In Sri Lanka, Roman Dutch Law recognises the doctrine o f  “laesio enormis”. A  court 
cannot enforce a contract between parties if  it were grossly inequitable, even i f  prima 
facie there is no duress, fraud or other nullifying circumstances.67 Not only in countries 
that have developed systems o f  law, countries that have a laissez- fa ire  system o f  law 
w ill neither recognise nor enforce an agreement that would be inequitable.68 However, in 
these countries there is no legislation striking at unfair contract terms, except the usury 
laws.
3.4.1 Usury and Money Lending Legislation in India
In India the Usurious Loans Act 1918 gives power to a court to prevent 
enforcing a contract that is unconscionable and usurious. I f a court has reason to believe 
that the amount payable on a loan transaction is high or unfair due to a high interest rate 
that is being charged, the Act empowers the court to re-open the transaction and relieve 
the debtor o f  all liability in respect o f  any excessive interest.69 The expression
95/29 of 21-4-1993.
66 Abichandani, R., (Ed) Pollock and Mulla on Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts 
11th Ed., Vol. 1, N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1994, 234-236; Dato Visu 
Sinnadurai, The Law o f Contract in Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd Ed, Butterworths, 
Singapore, 1987, 215-217
67 The doctrine of Laesio Enormis has been abolished by statute in many of the provinces 
of South Africa, the other major Roman Dutch jurisdiction in the world.
68 Farnsworth E.A., An Introduction to the Legal System o f the United States, 3rd Ed., 
Oceana Publications, New York, 1996, 124
69 Section 3(1)
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‘excessive’ has been interpreted to mean, in excess o f  that which court deems to be 
reasonable having regard to the risk incurred as it appeared, or must be deemed to have 
appeared to the creditor at the date o f  the loan.70
In 1984, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 was amended71 by inserting section 
21A which provided that, notwithstanding the provisions o f  the Usurious Loans Act and 
comparable state legislation, a court was prohibited from re-opening transactions 
between a bank and its debtor on the ground that the interest charged was excessive. 
This amendment has caused much controversy in the High Courts, and its scope and 
application has been interpreted differently, giving borrowers a useful defence in such 
cases.72 Money lending legislation enacted at state level provides for the registration o f  
moneylenders, maintenance o f accounts in a particular form, exemption to specific 
lenders or types o f  transactions etc. In practice, moneylenders’ legislation is not a 
problem to banks because most o f  the laws are confined to transactions involving small 
amounts and does not apply to banks.73
3.4.2 Usury and Money Lending Legislation In Sri Lanka
Parties to a loan agreement are free to fix the rate o f  interest, but there are some 
controls on particular types o f  money lending transactions. The Money Lending 
Ordinance74 allows a court to re-open a money lending transaction, if  the interest rate is 
such that the amount payable is excessive, or i f  the transaction is harsh and
70 Section 3(2)a; See the explanatory notes and case examples in Chitaley, D., and Appu 
Rao, S., TheA.I.R. Manual, Vol. 21, All India Reporter, Nagpur, 1978, 514-516
71 Banking Law (Amendment) Act of 1983
72 Shroff, C., India Country Report, Presented at the Symposium on Debt Recovery,
Credit and Security, (Unpublished) 1993, Manila, 23-24
73 Krishna Reddy v Canara Bank, Bangalore [1985] AIR (Karnataka) 228
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unconscionable, substantially unfair or fraudulent. In exercising this power “the court 
shall observe the rule that no interest shall at any one time be recoverable to an amount 
in excess o f the sum then due as principal.”75 The effect o f  this rule is that if  the interest 
exceeds the capital a creditor cannot claim the interest. In Fernando v Sillappen76 the 
Supreme Court held that interest claimed up to the date o f  filing the action cannot 
exceed the principal. However, at any one time the creditor is entitled to recover a sum 
equal to the principal as interest.77 As in India, the Money Lending Ordinance does not 
apply to statutory banks or to other duly incorporated banks or banking companies.78
A  question that must be raised is whether this peculiar rule should continue to 
be in force? If a debtor deliberately avoids repaying a debt there will come a stage 
where the quantum o f accumulated interest exceeds the value o f  the capital. At this 
point, the Money Lending Ordinance protects the debtor’s interests which is grossly 
unreasonable. The effect o f this law is that it allows a debtor to derive a substantial 
benefit from his own delay, possibly from his own fraudulent intentions. This rule will 
also discourage lenders from giving loans to industrial borrowers for development 
projects. Usually project loans are given for a very long period and invariably the 
amount payable by way o f interest will be greater than the capital. This may be the 
reason for exempting the application o f the Money Lending Ordinance to statutes like 
the State Mortgage and Investment Bank Law79 and the National Development Bank o f
74 Section 2(1), Legislative Enactments o f Sri Lanka (Revised) 1980, Chapter 90
75 Section 5
76 (1918) 5 CWR 301
77 Pereira, J., The Laws of Ceylon Vol. 2, Government Printer, Colombo 1904, 546
78 Section 7 (d) & (e)
79 Section 67, Legislative Enactments of Sri Lanka (Revised), 1980, Cap. 306
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Sri Lanka.80
The Wimalaratne Committee reporting on the law and practice on debt 
recovery, also observed that the Money Lending Ordinance and the Debt Conciliation 
Ordinance were both enacted at a time when the banking and financial system o f Sri 
Lanka was not developed, and that the rationale for their applicability no longer exists in 
relation to approved credit agencies.81 The only justification for this rule to continue in 
force is, as an inducement to the lender not to delay too long to institute recovery 
proceedings when default occurs, but whether this reason is a strong enough ground to 
allow this provision to be in force is doubtful. It is submitted that it is no longer 
appropriate as a general rule and the law must accordingly be amended.
3.4.3 Money Lending Legislation In Malaysia
The Money Lenders Act82 has the same statutory provisions as its counterparts 
in India and Sri Lanka. A  money lending transaction is considered harsh and 
unconscionable if  the interest rate charged by the lender is “excessive”. Both in India 
and Sri Lanka the expression “excessive” means in excess o f  that which a court deems 
to be reasonable83 but in Malaysia it is defined in the statute itself. The Money Lenders 
Act prescribes a maximum o f 12% for a secured loan and 18% for an unsecured loan 
and if  the loan transaction exceeds these rates it is considered excessive.84 The Act
Section 65, Legislative Enactments of Sri Lanka (Revised), 1980, Cap. 308
Report o f the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Debt Recovery, Under the 
Chairmanship of Late Justice Wimalaratne, Vishva Lekha, Ratmalana, 1985, 14
Act No. 400 of 1951
India - Section 3(2)a of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918; Sri Lanka - Section 4 of the 
Money Lending Ordinance
Section 22
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prohibits the charging o f  compound interest and default interest.85
The Act also protects the borrower’s interests by requiring money lenders to be 
licensed. 86 It also requires a money lender to provide the borrower with a written 
memorandum setting out the main terms and conditions o f  the loan agreement before 
granting the money.87 As in India and Sri Lanka, the Act does not apply to banks, 
merchant banks, finance companies and institutions that have obtained specific 
exemptions from the Minister o f  Finance.88
Compared with India and Sri Lanka, an aspect o f  lending that is peculiar to 
Malaysia is Islamic banking that operates parallel with conventional banking. Lending 
is allowed in Islam but it must be without interest89 (riba) because charging o f  interest is 
forbidden under Islamic law. Therefore, i f  a lending contract is governed by Islamic 
law issues relating to interest will not arise and no legal controls w ill be necessary to 
protect borrowers from unconscionable contracts due to excessive interest rates. Usury 
law is thus not known to Islamic banking law.
3.4.4 Terms o f  a Loan
When a loan agreement is being drafted, the covenants must be designed to 
achieve at least three objectives for the lenders. First, in addition to repaying the loan, a 
bank must commit the borrower to obligations such as providing financial information 
regularly to the bank, undertake not to dispose o f its assets, or change its business
85 Sections 22(4) & (5)
86 Section 15
87 Section 19
88 Section 19
89 Haran, S., Islamic Banking : Rules & Regulations, Pelanduk Publications, Selangor,
1997, 7
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activities. Second, the covenants must put the lender in a strong position in the event o f  
default. The bank must have the right to terminate the agreement, and where relevant, be 
released from providing further loans that were agreed. Third, they must enable lenders to 
recover the money when default occurs without difficulty, preferably without recourse to 
court. From a borrower’s stand point, agreeing to these covenants may be regarded as the 
price he has to pay to secure a loan at a reasonable interest rate. The borrower’s concern, 
however, will be to minimise the intrusiveness o f  a bank into the freedom o f  how it 
conducts its affairs.
A  bank will want the covenants to provide adequate credit protection and to give 
it influence over the borrower and control over the loan. When a loan is not supported 
with security, or bank guarantees are not available, strict covenants in the loan agreement 
are vital to maintain credit protection for the bank. Similarly, i f  the borrower's past record 
has been questionable or the bank is o f  the view that a tight control must be kept over the 
loan, very restrictive covenants will be included in the agreement. In practice however, 
banks consider the primary role o f  covenants as being to restrict management discretion 
and control the loan.90
Covenants serve as a useful tool to provide an early warning signal o f problems 
when borrowers are in financial difficulties.91 In such an event covenants can be the basis 
on which negotiations may be initiated with the borrower. Once negotiations are opened, 
covenants provide lenders with flexibility and allow banks time to negotiate a satisfactory 
deal. A bank does not rely on covenants alone to get repaid. All they will do is give the
90 Day, J., and Taylor, P., Bankers' Perspectives on the Role o f Covenants in Debt Contracts 
(1996) 11 JIBL 203
91 Day, J., and Taylor, P., Loan Documentation in the Market of U.K, Corporate Debt: 
Current Practice and Future Prospects (1997) 12 JIBL 7
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bank a negotiating position that it would other wise not have, and provide leverage and 
flexibility in the negotiations. In summary, covenants provide the means to apply pressure 
and to seek repayment or provide assistance by way o f advice and support to the borrower 
through difficult times. It is important to note however that, covenants alone cannot 
automatically provide early warning signals. Careful monitoring and constant contact with 
the borrower is essential if  covenants are to be fully effective.
3.4.5 Documentation
It is fundamentally important that loan agreements are carefully drafted and 
documentation for security properly prepared.92 Loan documentation becomes most 
important at the time when steps are being taken to recover overdue debts, particularly if  
legal action has to be initiated. In such an event, the loan documents must be capable o f  
being admitted as evidence in a court o f law. When a borrower defaults and disputes arise, 
the defects at the outset o f a loan are often used by borrowers to defend legal actions filed 
against them by the banks. Loopholes, and defects in documentation offer strong defences 
to borrowers and consideration o f these at trials are often very time consuming, resulting 
in long delays in litigation. If the documents were defective, the very purpose o f obtaining 
documents at the stage o f  granting the loan would be defeated. It is therefore essential that 
due care is taken when loan documents are prepared, and the required procedure is 
followed.
If documentation is to be in order there are a number o f  aspects that must be 
checked carefully, ideally, by a lawyer. Diligent enquiries must be made by the lender to
92 For a detailed discussion on layout and content of a loan agreement, debenture and 
guarantee, See Rabinowitz, G., and Beattie-Jones, V., Loan and Security Documents, 
Jordon Publishing Ltd., Bristol, 1996
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determine if  a corporate borrower is validly incorporated, that it can legally own property,
carry on its business and enter into contractual obligations.93 Where secured transactions
are concerned, lenders must refer to the relative registries, and ascertain that the security is
free o f prior encumbrances, and there are no hens or claims filed or registered against the
borrower or the property. In countries like India, the problems relating to the investigation
o f  title are complex,94 nevertheless, it must be carried out. A classic example is the case o f
Commonwealth Bank o f  Australia v Friedrich95 where senior bank staff was deceived into
giving A$100 million against non-existent and fictitious securities. The case has been
highlighted as the tragicomedy o f bank lending.96 John Frederic, a conman, secured loans
from several banks on the security o f  containers supposed to contain safety equipment
valued at A$250,000, which were in reality empty. Tadgell J observed:
"The evidence indicates that at no stage, either before granting the facilities 
or until the company’s collapse, did the State Bank o f  Victoria make any 
useful investigations to ascertain the existence o f  value o f  the containerised 
safety equipment or o f the debtors over which it assumed it held security.
The fact was that these securities were practically worthless having regard 
to the enormous debt that they were intended to secure. "97(emphasis added)
Attention must also be given to the loan agreement. In particular, the interest rate 
provisions o f a loan agreement must be carefully analysed to determine whether they 
comply with the law and can be enforced. Lenders must also ensure that, the loan 
agreement does not contain any provision that may be construed by a court as a penalty. 
Usually, such a provision will take the form o f an additional charge by way o f  an increase
Estey, W. M., Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, Butterworths, Toronto, 1990,
147
Narula, R. K., Bank Documentation and Execution, UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1982, 219 
(1991)5 ACSR 115
Weerasooria, W., Banking Law and the Financial System in Australia, 3rd Ed, 1993, 
Butterworths, Sydney, 568
(1991)5 ACSR 115, 165
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in the interest rate in the event o f  default. Where a floating or fixed charge is being 
obtained the debenture creating the charge must be valid, binding and legally enforceable 
in respect o f the property covered by the charge. If a bank takes a guarantee, its 
enforceability must be considered.98 The liability o f  a guarantor will exist when there is 
default by the principal debtor, but sometimes guarantees will have a clause included 
requiring a specific act like sending a letter o f demand before any suit can be instituted. In 
such a situation, unless the specific act is carried out, the guarantee will not be enforceable 
against the guarantor.99 Another aspect to consider is whether the guarantee could be 
regarded as a fraudulent conveyance or as a preference.
A  common complaint from lawyers in South Asia is that they are not involved in 
finalising loan documentation and as a result lawyers find the terms o f  a contract difficult 
to enforce.100 Bank officials undertake this task by using standard forms which are often 
subject to dispute. Sometimes, loan documents are poorly drafted because bankers do not 
have the required skill and training to draft such documents. 101 The documents are often 
completed under pressure, and as a result are fraught with mistakes.102 Some common
98 Nariman Bt Mohd. Sulaiman., Principal - Debtor Clause and the Letter of Demand 
[1995] MCLJ clix
99 Section 81 of the Malaysian Contracts Act, 1950, MokHin Wah & Ors v UMBC [1987] 2 
MLJ 610
1^9 Cranston, R., Credit, Security and Debt Recovery: Law's Role in Reform in Asia and the
Pacific in Norton, J., and Andenas, M., Emerging Financial Markets and Secured 
Transactions, Kluwer Law International, London, 219,237
101 This appears to be a common problem in most countries. Apparently in Australia, it is not 
unusual for bankers to use the wrong security form, pay insufficient attention to 
completion of details such as signing, dating and witnessing or fail to attend to prompt 
registration of security. See Weaver, P. M., Banking and Lending Practice, 3rd Ed, 
Serendip Publications, Sydney, 1994, 236
102 Ashim Barande, Documents for Bank Advances, Business Book Publishing House, 
Bombay, 1991, 249-253. The appendix to this book lists 26 mistakes committed in bank 
documentation, in India; Memorandum on Debt Recovery, Presented by the Federation of 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka, (Unpublished) 1991, 8-9
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mistakes in bank documentation include, documents signed in blank, for example a 
hypothecation with a blank schedule o f goods charged, documents signed after stamping, 
partners or directors executing documents on different dates or directors o f a company 
witnessing the common seal o f a company on different dates, and documents written in 
English and signed in the vernacular. Sometimes, letters o f guarantees are signed in blank 
or are signed at the place o f the guarantors, which allows a defendant to raise claims o f  
undue influence or unconscionableness. These defences can also be raised when a spouse 
is required to execute a guarantee without an independent person being present.
In India and Sri Lanka bankers generally complete loan documentation.103 
Standard printed forms are frequently used, although the type o f form may vary according 
to the type o f  facility or bank. National banks follow a similar format and foreign banks 
have their own documentation in accordance with international practices. Similarly in 
Malaysia, lawyers have no role in preparing loan documents except to check whether the 
security offered by a borrower is legally enforceable.104 Lawyers become involved in loan 
documentation only where housing loans are granted and the land is offered as security, or 
where loans are supported by land as security, or a pledge o f  shares or where a debenture 
is given by a borrower.
There is no common solution to the problems related to loan documentation. It is 
a matter that needs to be addressed by individual banks taking into account the availability 
o f  in house lawyers, trained banking officials, and the operational procedures within
1^3 Sardesai, V., Essentials of Documentation, (1995) 66 Journal of the Indian Institute of 
Bankers 99 ; Interview with Mr. P. Gunasekera, Chief Legal Officer, Peoples’ Bank Head 
Quarters, at the Bank, on 14 May 1997 ; Shroff, C., Country Report for India, Presented 
at the Regional Symposium on Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security 
(Unpublished), Manila, 1993, 20
104 Chen Kah Leng, Country Report for Malaysia, Presented at the Regional Symposium on 
Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security (Unpublished), Manila, 1993,23-24
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banks. Staff training and making available manuals o f  instructions may be o f  some 
assistance but these measures alone will not be adequate to eliminate the problems 
associated with documentation. Increased use o f  lawyers in the preparation o f  loan 
documentation would assist in reducing the amount o f  legal disputes that arise out o f  
mistakes in documents that are badly drafted. No doubt, this would involve an additional 
expense to banks but it is likely to yield far more effective results in the long term, 
compared to the high litigation costs that may have to be borne if  the matter is referred to a 
court o f law.
Another aspect that must be looked at is the various disincentives in the law that 
prevents proper documentation. The problem revolves around minimising high stamp duty 
and registration fees when loan agreements are signed and security is taken. In India, an 
English mortgage105 is subject to heavy stamp duty. The advantage to a bank o f taking this 
type o f mortgage is that in the event o f  default, the security can be enforced by way o f  
extra-judicial sale106 but banks tend to ignore this advantage because o f  the high cost 
involved in stamp duty. Bank’s, prefer to take mortgages by way o f a deposit o f title deeds 
simply because they are not subject to stamp duty, even though to realise the security a 
court order is required.107 It is doubtful whether high stamp duty needs to deter banks from 
taking proper security. Inevitably, these charges will be passed on to the borrower and if  it 
can be spread over the loan period the burden will not be prohibitive. The Supreme Court 
o f India has also ruled that such costs and charges are allowable deductions for the
105 Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines a mortgage. It is a mortgage
where the mortgagor transfers the mortgaged property absolutely to the mortgagee
subject to the condition that it will be re-transferred to him when the mortgage debt is 
settled. See Goyle, L., Transfer o f Property Act, Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1991,206
106 Section 69, Transfer of Property Act, 1882
107 Section 67, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, See also Biswas, A. R., Rashbehary Ghose,
On Law of Mortgage, 6th Ed, Calcutta, Kamal Law House, 1988,293
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purpose o f income tax.108 If the tax deduction is taken into account, the argument that 
taking legal mortgages are expensive is considerably weakened.
This problem is seen in Malaysia as well. Loan agreements as well as security 
instruments are subject to a 0.05% stamp duty on the entire value o f the loan. Invariably, 
borrowers have to bear this cost. If the bank considers the borrower to be a good customer, 
loans are granted without entering into a proper loan agreement or taking security. Instead 
o f  a loan agreement a promissory note may be taken or banks may rely on their offer letter 
and the signed acceptance by the borrower as proof o f the loan.109
3.5 LOAN SUPERVISION
The objective o f  supervising a loan is to verify, first, whether the basis on which 
the lending decision was taken continues to hold good,110and second, whether the loan 
funds are being properly utilised for the purpose they were granted.111 To satisfy these 
objectives banks must see whether the character o f the borrower, its capacity to repay the 
loan, capital contribution, prevailing market conditions and the value o f  the collateral that 
was taken continues to remain the same.
A  bank may monitor a borrower in one or two ways. First, a bank can follow up 
the financial stability o f a borrower by periodically scrutinising the operations o f  the 
accounts, verifying the value o f security and examining the stock statements. Second, 
bank officials can personally visit the borrower periodically to determine the progress o f
108 77je India Cements Ltd., v The Commissioner of Income Tax [1966] A IR  (SC) 1053
109 Cheng Kah Leng, Country Report for Malaysia, Presented at the Regional Symposium on 
Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished) Manila, 1993, 28-29
HO See the Recommendations of the Tandon Committee reproduced in Tannan's Banking 
Law and Practice in India, 19th Ed, India Law House, New Delhi, 1998,1034
HI Report of the Banking Commission, Government of India, Delhi, 1972, 50
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the borrower company’s business activities and where necessary giving advice to resolve 
any problems. A  bank official may sometimes be appointed to the board o f  directors o f a 
company that has been granted a loan. Banks however eschew this practice, either because 
they do not have adequate officials who are capable o f undertaking the task, or because 
they may be held legally responsible in the event o f a borrower becoming insolvent.112 It is 
clear that effective credit monitoring involves looking into various operations o f  the 
company including the operation o f the loan, and checking whether the company is 
properly managed and the environment in which the company is carrying out its business 
is satisfactory. In summary, operations, management and environment are the key features 
o f  credit monitoring.
In India, a genuine attempt has been made to evolve an effective credit 
monitoring system throughout banks. The first step in this direction was taken in 1965 
when the Credit Authorisation Scheme was introduced. Thereafter, several credit 
monitoring schemes were implemented following the recommendations o f various study 
groups and working committees. The Tandon Committee, Chore Committee, Marathe 
Committee and Pendharkar Working Group have all made various recommendations. The 
greater part o f these recommendations were on new lending norms, effective follow up 
systems and management information services (MIS) for monitoring o f  loans and the 
parameters for financing sick units.113
The Pendharkar Working Group suggested that a uniform and comprehensive 
information system should be started in all the banks, and as a direct result the "Health
112 Wood, P., Lender Liability Under English Law, in Cranston, R., (Ed) Banks, Liability and 
Risk, 2nd Ed, Lloyds of London, 1995, 86-89; Douglas-Hamilton, M., Creditor Liabilities 
Resulting from Improper Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled 
Debtor (1975) 31 Business Lawyer 343
113 Dr Kaveri, V., and Karunasagar, S., Health Code System: A Critique (1992) 21 Prajanan
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Code System" (HCS) was introduced in 1985. The salient feature o f  the Health Code 
System is that it classifies all bank loans into one o f  the eight groups o f the Health Code.114
The Health Code System is supposed to be used by banks to follow up and 
monitor borrowers but the Code has a number o f  limitations. Most o f  the deficiencies arise 
from inadequate definitions in the Code which makes classification o f loans difficult. The 
Code, however, can be used as a useful tool to quantify credit risk and to facilitate 
appropriate follow up action. It is by no means an end in itself but a means to an end.
Another programme that concentrates on credit monitoring is the "Service Area
Approach" introduced in 1989. This programme concentrates on rural lending and one o f  
its primary objectives is to ensure that bank credit is properly utilised by rural 
borrowers.115 Proper supervision o f the end use o f  loan funds is the main task o f  the 
scheme. The credit monitoring schemes which are in progress within the banking system 
are regularly monitored by the Reserve Bank o f India.116
Rigorous monitoring is almost non existent in Sri Lanka. No serious attempt has 
been made to address the matter either. The general practice in the State Banks are that, 
once a loan is granted the files are “closed” until default occurs and the banks attention is 
drawn to the matter.117 It was said that the lack o f  supervision is due to the banks being 
understaffed, and consequently, they are unable to allocate competent staff to carry out
219-220
114 Health Code No. 1 - Satisfactory, No. 2 - Irregular, No. 3 - Sick - Viable/Under Nursing, 
No. 4 - Sick - Non Viable/Sticky, No. 5 - Advances Recalled, No. 6 - Suit-filed accounts, 
No. 7 - Decreed Debts, No. 8 - Bad and Doubtful Debts.
H5 Ojah, P., Service Area Approach[ [1989] RBI Bulletin 137; Malhotra, R., Service Area
Approach, [1990] RBI Bulletin 715
116 Examples are the Credit Management Arrangement (CMA), Quarterly action plan 
meetings, Periodical inspections and direct contact with the senior executives of the
banks.
H7 Interview with Mr. P. Gunasekera, Chief Legal Officer, Peoples’ Bank Head Quarters, at
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regular monitoring. It is indeed an inadequate reason and definitely a short sighted one,
particularly when loan defaults are a significant threat to the financial stability o f the
banks. There also appears to be a problem with the attitude towards default. For example,
the Federation o f  Chambers o f Commerce and Industry o f  Sri Lanka observed that
"[CJaution must be made that overdoing such monitoring can sometimes be a 
harassment or an interference to the borrower in carrying out his project. 
Therefore, though monitoring is necessary it should be carried out with utmost 
caution and prior agreement so that it would not affect the progress o f the 
project." (emphasis added)118
The Federation also suggests that, at the time o f  granting the loan the guidelines relevant 
to monitoring must be made part o f  the loan instrument, and that such provisions must be 
made compulsory by law. The underlying presumption o f  these comments appears to be 
that the lender must at all times be concerned o f  the borrower’s interests. The fact that 
appears to be overlooked is that the borrower has a binding obligation to repay the loan he 
took from the lender. If a lender monitors the loan rigorously to ensure repayment, it 
cannot be construed as a "h a ra ssm e n tIf this kind o f attitude is allowed to prevail without 
challenge a debt conscious culture which is already lacking in Sri Lanka will never be 
nurtured.
In Malaysia banks do monitor loans and it is usually carried out by the credit 
departments.119 Staff shortages to carry out loan supervision, particularly in rural areas are 
a problem to lenders, but are not a cause for concern yet.120 Perhaps the extensive credit 
appraisal that is carried out prior to lending may have had the desired result, because loan
the Bank, on 14 May 1997
The Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka, Memorandum on 
Debt Recovery Laws in Sri Lanka, (Unpublished) 1990, 11
11  ^ Chen Kah Leng, Country Report for Malaysia, Presented at the Regional Symposium on
Legal Issues on Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished) Manila, 1993, 34
120 Baharuddin, A., Cheema, S., and Yaacob, H., (Eds.) Credit and Rural Development,
Universiti Sains Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1978,22
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defaults are relatively few ,121 thus the need for rigorous monitoring o f loans has not arisen. 
Monitoring o f  a loan is carried out as a matter o f  routine banking functions.
Regular systematic monitoring o f  the progress o f  the loan will assist in
minimising loan defaults. When a borrower is in financial difficulty, regular monitoring
will indicate the problem to the bank. Action can then be taken as a matter o f urgency to
deal with the matter. The underlying principle is that loan repayments must be taken
seriously by the lender if  they are to be taken seriously by the borrower. As one banker in
the United Kingdom commenting on the purpose o f  debt covenants observed:
"Covenants in themselves don't allow a bank to lend money and then put the file 
away for five years - that bank still needs to keep in contact with the customer at 
all times."122
3.6 INFORMAL CREDIT
“It is difficult to give a clear-cut definition o f  the informal sector because 
o f  its heterogeneity. The term covers the activities o f  a great number o f  
intermediaries such as the professional and non-professional moneylender, 
pawnshops, merchants and petty traders, landlords, shopkeepers, indigenous 
bankers and finance corporations; it also contains se lf help groups like 
guilds and other professional, recreational and religious organisations, 
burial associations and a great number o f  rotating and non-rotating savings 
and credit associations; finally it covers private borrowing and lending 
arrangements between friends, neighbours and relatives. The essential 
characteristics o f  the informal market are its fragmentation and 
specialisation, its localised and small scale operations which are beyond the 
reaches o f  official regulation and control by the central bank. Most o f  its 
transactions are not recorded in official statistics.”123
There is a common belief that credit from the informal sector is inherently 
expensive, due to the applicable high interest rates, and that such credit is generally
Interview with Mr. Ng Chih Kaye, Head of Special Credits, Credit Control Division, 
May Bank Head Quarters, at the Bank, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997
Jay, J., and Taylor, P., Bankers' Perspectives on the Role o f Covenants in Debt Contracts 
(1996) 11 JIBL 201
Bouman, F., Small, Short and Unsecured: Informal Rural Finance in India, Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1989, 6
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used for unproductive purposes. On the other hand, the cost o f  credit from public 
institutions is cheap and used for productive purposes. But experience has shown that in 
less developed countries low interest rates alone offered by credit institutions are 
inadequate to draw the rural borrowers away from their traditional sources o f  credit, the 
moneylenders, and borrow instead from banking institutions. 124 In India credit 
institutions provide only 10% o f the total rural credit despite considerable investment 
and expansion o f  these institutions. 125 In Sri Lanka the non institutional sector provides 
over 70% o f the rural credit.126 The position is similar in Malaysia.127 Despite a number 
o f  rural credit programmes in force the small borrowers still borrow from money 
lenders, The obvious question that arises is why the rural borrowers go to private 
moneylenders i f  the interest rates charged are exorbitant?
3.6.1 Role o f  Informal Credit and Institutional Credit
Credit must be easily available. In most o f  the credit programmes designed to 
provide finance to the poor, there are a number o f  criteria a borrower has to satisfy to be 
able to apply for a loan. For example, a Sri Lankan co-operative bank will consider a 
loan application from a customer only if;
a) the applicant has been a member o f  the local Co-operative Society for at 
least two years
124 World Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, 112-113; 
Bouman, F., and Houtman, R .,"Pawn Banking as an Instrument o f Rural Banking in 
the Third World” (1988) 37 Economic Development and Cultural Change 69-89
125 Singha, S.K., Recovery o f Loans from Farmers: Repaying Capacity and Repayment 
Performance, Deep & Deep Publications, Delhi, 1992, 207
126 Jayamaha, R., Development Banking in Sri Lanka: Coercion or Moral Suasion? (1991) 
9 International Journal of Development Banking 6
127 Lee Sheng-yi, The Monetary and Banking Development o f Singapore and Malaysia, 
3rd Ed., Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1990, 122-123
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b) The amount applied for does not exceed twenty times the value o f shares 
owned by the member
c) the applicant had not defaulted on any previous loan
d) the applicant has a savings account into which regular deposits have been 
made
e) there are no outstanding loans
f) the crops for which the loan is being used are insured
g) there are two guarantors
h) the applicant is the owner o f the land or the registered ande (share) 
tenant.128
Poor farmers cannot satisfy all these criteria and the result is that they are effectively 
excluded from accessing credit from institutions.129
Credit must also be prompt and adequate. The lending decision must be taken 
quickly and the loan funds disbursed when a borrower needs the funds. A  principle o f  
credit appraisal is that loans are granted only to creditworthy borrowers. Very often, 
small borrowers are not considered creditworthy either because o f their inability to 
provide security or because they have defaulted in the past. As a result, only financially 
stable farmers succeed in obtaining loans.130 This is socially unjust. The fact that a small 
farmer may be able to provide less security does not mean that he is less productive and 
unable to repay his loan. The reason for default may have been that he had to pay high 
interest rates on his loan or that the money earned by production was diverted towards 
satisfying a more pressing need.
128 Southwold-Llewellyn, S., Some Explanations for the Lack o f Borrower Commitment to 
Specialised Farm credit Institution: A Case Study o f the Role o f Rural Sri Lankan 
Traders In Meeting Credit Needs (1991) 15 Savings and Development 290-291
129 in a community study carried out in Sri Lanka, only 4 out of 143 families were eligible 
to apply for these loans. Ibid., 291
1^9 Baharuddin, A. H., Cheema, S., and Yaacob, H., (Eds.) Credit and Rural Development, 
University Sains Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1978, 28
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Loan documentation is also complicated for a village borrower. Filling o f  loan 
applications, providing proper security documents and the long procedures to have the 
loan approved create a psychological inhibition among borrowers from taking loans 
from credit institutions. A  rural borrower would consider the loan processing 
inconvenient, bureaucratic and uncertain. He will also not consider obtaining loans from 
an institution because it would be incapable o f supplying credit when needed. On the 
other hand, a private moneylender may lend credit purely on the personal knowledge o f  
a borrower. He may even lend to a person who has defaulted earlier, because the lender 
was aware o f  the circumstances in which that person had defaulted.131
Institutions provide loans only for productive purposes. Poor people are unable 
to distinguish between credit given for productive purposes and for consumption. If the 
need for consumption were more urgent, the credit granted for productive purposes 
would inevitably be used up.132 A moneylender will grant loans for both productive and 
non productive purposes because he understands that a poor villager's production and 
consumption needs are intricately bound together and cannot be separated.
Another practical difficulty faced by poor borrowers is that they cannot reach 
the banks easily. They have to walk for hours or travel by bus to reach them. The 
restricted hours for which banks are open would also not be convenient.133
Clearly, rural people have a continued preference to borrow from the informal 
sector. Bankers themselves do not have the required motivation to encourage the rural
131 Narula, R. K., and Gopalakrishnan, V., Agricultural and Rural Advances by 
Commercial Banks, UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1982, 36
132 David, C., and Meyer, R., “Measuring the Farm Level impact o f Agricultural Loans” 
in Howell, J., (Ed), Borrowers and Lenders, ODI, London, 1980, 202-203
133 in India the banking hours are 10.30 a.m. -3.30 p.m. and in Sri Lanka, banking hours 
are 9.30 a.m. -1.30 p.m.
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poor to borrow from the banks.134 Lending to the rural sector is costly to a banker 
because administering a large number o f loans o f  small value and at low interest rates is 
not profitable. Obviously, the workload o f  lending to a large number o f  small borrowers 
is greater than lending to fewer larger borrowers. The high rates o f  default among 
small borrowers also discourage bankers from lending to them because the performance 
o f  a branch is judged by its profits.135 In the event o f  default, debt recovery is a very 
slow process and more difficult due to communication difficulties with borrowers. Loan 
supervision, which is a key element o f  a lending transaction, is also difficult. Due to 
these problems the bankers’ attitude towards lending to rural borrowers is not 
encouraging. Banking institutions are primarily geared to operating in an urban 
environment and most often fail to understand the needs o f  the rural villager. The loans 
are given for a short term, for the purpose o f  production and are usually inflexible with a 
strict repayment schedule. The relationship between a borrower and a lender ends with 
this type o f  single transaction.
3.6.2 Banking fo r  the Poor
What could banks do to improve the disbursement o f  credit to the poor? In all 
three countries, a number o f banks have set up credit schemes to direct credit to the 
rural poor, but they have not achieved the intended success.136 A  common complaint 
about institutional credit is that the loan process has too many formalities, which poor
134 Munasinghe, C., Banking for the Poor: Policies, Problems and Prospects, Paper 
Presented at the SLAAS Seminar on Banking for the Poor, Colombo, 1990, 6
135 Sanderatne, N., Banking for the Poor (1991) 17 Economic Review 3
136 Rangarajan, C., Banking With the Poor [1994] RBI Bulletin 353; Watawala, L., 
Financial Innovations for the Rural Poor: The Asian Experience (1991) 17 Economic 
Review 6-8, & 15; Pang Yok, J., and Savarimuthu, N., Banking in Malaysia, 
Longman, Kuala Lumpur, 1985, 125-128
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borrowers found to be too complex. The lending process, therefore, must be made 
simpler so that borrowers would have no inhibitions about applying for a loan and 
having it approved. It is equally important that there is flexibility in the terms o f the 
loan and in the repayment schedule. For example, i f  a farmer borrows money to buy 
seed the loan repayments would be dependent on the crops he harvests. As Gunasekera 
observed:
“The fact that the crop and not the farmer is made the focal point in all 
credit schemes so far operated is a fundamental conceptual default. Credit 
has been considered as an important input in increasing the yields o f  a 
particular crop and not as an input to increase the production potential o f  the 
farmer through whom the yields are to be increased."137
Credit must be directed to the borrowers with genuine financial needs. These 
borrowers must be identified correctly so that the loans granted by banks will ease their 
financial needs.138 The availability o f  security should not be a requirement in rural 
lending because most often small borrowers do not have security to offer. The question 
that banks should ask themselves is not what they are lending against, but what they are 
lending for. W ells’ study o f the informal rural credit market in Malaysia concluded that 
the credit institutions have predominantly acted as “loan windows” to disburse 
subsidised credit. 139 He also states that the “lions share” o f  concessionary formal credit 
was given to farmers with land holdings, while small farmers resorted to informal 
lenders for their credit requirements.140 If the productive activity the loan was given for
137 Gunasekera, R., “Institutional Credit to the Peasant Sector Through Co-operatives” in 
Samarasinghe, S.,(Ed.) Agriculture in the Peasant Sector of Sri Lanka, Ceylon Studies 
Seminar, Peradeniya, 1977,49, at 51
138 Yaron, J., “What Makes Rural Finance Institutions Successful? ” (1994) 9 The World 
Development Research Observer 49-70
139 Wells, R., The Informal credit Market in Malaysia, Faculty of Economics and 
Administration, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, 7
140
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has the potential to generate an income, and it is within the repayment capacity o f  the 
borrower, loans must be granted.
The low interest rates charged under most o f  the credit schemes make them an
unprofitable and costly service if  default occurs.141 As a result, lenders are overcautious
when lending decisions are made, and are always concerned about institutional viability.
Therefore, low interest policies encourage lenders to select potential borrowers who can
provide security which in turn results in better to do borrowers receiving concessional
credit. In Taiwan, “realistic” interest rates helped to ensure that the loan capital was
employed for the productive purpose it was borrowed.142 In Indonesia, Kupedes, a credit
scheme designed to provide loans for either investment or working capital to poor
individuals charged an interest rate that covered the costs o f  funds, transaction costs, a
reserve for bad debts and a profit margin. The repayment rate was 98%.143 A completely
different result was seen in Malaysia when the government decided to give an interest
subsidy to poor farmers through the Malaysian Agricultural Bank (BPM). In 1981, the
BPM reduced the interest on paddy loans to 0% and later marginally increased it to 4%.
Ishak Shari explains the outcome o f the programme as follows:
“When the uncollected principal and the opportunity cost o f  the interest rate 
subsidy were taken into consideration, it was estimated that the total subsidy 
cost ranged from RM10 million to RM24.9 million per annum during the 1980- 
1985 period. The persistently high level o f  arrears and negative spreads has left 
BPM in a precarious financial position requiring an annual grant from the 
government o f about RM30 million.”144
Adams, D., and Von Pischke, J., “Microenterprise Credit Programs: Deja Vu” (1992). 
20 World Development 1463-1470; Ellis, F., Agricultural Policies in Developing 
Countries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992
Johnston, B., and Kilby, P., Agriculture and Structural Transformation, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1975, 314
Schrader, H., Formal and Informal Finance in Contemporary Indonesia, South East 
Asia Working Programme Working Paper No. 213, University of Bielefeld, 1994, 6
Ishak Shari, Rural Development and Rural Poverty in Malaysia, in Jamilah Ariffin
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A  poor person’s credit need cannot be compartmentalised into production and 
consumption needs. Empirical research has shown that rural borrowers use institutional 
loans to defray the costs associated with consumption.145 A  more practical approach to 
adopt would be to provide credit for productive as well as consumption needs. It must 
be borne in mind however, that the main purpose o f  providing credit is the promotion o f  
economic activity. Operating a proper credit plan may assist in achieving this objective 
where the poor borrower would be able to satisfy all his credit needs from a banking 
institution, rather than from a private money lender. Lack o f  enthusiasm on the part o f  
bankers to lend to the poor is one o f the weakest institutional obstacles to rural 
lending.146
3.6.3 New Approach To Rural Lending
The formal financial sector has failed to diagnose and solve the problems faced 
by rural borrowers. What is needed is a new approach to rural lending with personalised 
banking as the prime feature. It w ill essentially require the assistance o f  semi or non 
governmental organisations to act as the local agents o f  the banks and to introduce 
institutional borrowing to the rural sector. These organisations can work as 
intermediaries between lenders and borrowers and effectively breakdown the existing 
obstacles faced by both parties. The main advantage to banks is that the entire credit
(Ed), Poverty Amidst Plenty, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1994,45
145 David, C., and Meyer, R., Measuring the Farm Level Impact o f Agricultural Loans, in 
Howell, J., Borrowers and Lenders : Rural Financial Markets and Institutions in 
Developing Countries, ODI, London, 1980, 202-203; Floro, S., and Yotopoulos, P., 
Informal Credit Markets and the New Institutional Economics: The Case o f Philippine 
Agriculture, Westview Press, Oxford, 1991, 79-80
146 Rangarajan, C., Rural India: The Role o f Credit [1996] RBI Bulletin 295; Fernando, N., 
and Nanayakkara, C., The Rescheduling of Cultivation Loans : Field Observations from 
the Anuradhapura District (1984) 14 Central Bank of Sri Lanka Staff Studies 121
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cycle becomes externalised. Credit appraisal, loan documentation, loan supervision and 
debt recovery can all be facilitated effectively by linking banks and borrowers.
‘People’s participation’ is the underlying concept o f  credit disbursement in this 
manner. This approach has been tried in several developing countries and it has proved 
to be very successful. 147 An attempt made by the National Bank o f  Agriculture and 
Rural Development in India to link banks with rural borrowers through “self-help 
groups” has also proved to be very successful. Over two thousand groups managed to 
secure loans and the repayment performance was 95% as compared to 50% in the case 
o f normal bank lending.148 In Sri Lanka, a number o f  similar schemes have been 
implemented. Gam Pubuduwa (Village Awakening) and Praja Naya Niyamaka 
(People’s Loan Intermediary Scheme) are two examples. In the Gam Pubuduwa 
scheme, "Upadeshakas” (Advisors) are recruited and trained to identify projects in 
villages which require credit and then assist in providing the required credit. The 
objective o f  the scheme is to provide “bare foot banking” .149 In the Praja Naya 
Niyamaka scheme, about 7000 local agents have been recruited to act as intermediaries 
to select creditworthy borrowers and assist them with obtaining credit.150 In Malaysia, 
institutions such as the Farmers’ Organisation Authority, and the Fisheries Development 
Authority assist poor people to organise and consolidate themselves into rural credit co­
operative societies so that funds channelled by the government may be productively 
utilised by the loan recipients. Other rural development institutions include MARA, i.e.
147 World Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, Chapter 8
148 Rangarajan, C., Rural India: The Role o f Credit [1995] RBI Bulletin 296
149 Jayamaha, R., and Wilson, P., Development Banking in Sri Lanka: Coercion or Moral 
Suasion? (1991) 9 International Journal of Development Banking 8
150 Watawala, L., Financial Innovations for the Rural Poor: The Asian Experience (1991) 
17 The Economic Review 7
131
the Council o f  Trust for Indigenous People and the Federal Agricultural Marketing 
Authority.151
The problems associated with this type o f  scheme must not be ignored.152 First, 
despite the keenness to implement credit schemes through people’s participation, there 
must be a proper administration mechanism to carry out the scheme. Non governmental 
organisations, voluntary organisations, and self-help groups must have the necessary 
administrative capabilities to carry out the role o f  providing an effective link between 
institutional lenders and rural borrowers. Second, these organisations must be 
supervised by a central body, to which they must be accountable. Since these 
organisations are involved in credit disbursement, the central banks would be the 
appropriate bodies to supervise their functions.
The moral obligations o f  borrowers play an important role in this type o f  
scheme. For example peer pressure is used to encourage loan repayments.153 Group 
lending schemes are seen in Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Ghana, and Zimbabwe where, 
borrowers are organised into groups and apply for a loan as a single group and share the 
responsibility o f  repaying the loan.154 In some instances, women are the preferred 
recipients o f  loan funds, because they are known to successfully shoulder the burden o f
151 Lee Sheng-yi, The Monetary and Banking Development of Singapore and Malaysia, 
3rd Ed., Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1990, 123-124
152 Ryan, P., Barriers to Introducing Group Lending to Small Farmers: The Case of the 
Mahaweli Development Programme in Sri Lanka, Discussion Paper No. 60, 
Development and Planning Centre, University of Bradford, 1995
153 Wickrama, K., and Keith, P., Savings and Credit : Women’s Informal Groups as 
Models for Change in Developing Countries (1994) 28 Journal of Developing Areas 
365
154 Hupi, M., and Feder, G., "The Role o f Groups and Credit Co-operatives in Rural 
Lending” (1990) 5 The World Bank Research Observer 187-207
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their family’s survival needs.155 For example, research has shown that for every 100 
rupees earned by an Indian woman 92 rupees is used for children, education and health. 
By contrast, a man spends only 40 rupees on such needs.156 In India, under the integrated 
Rural Development Programme (IRDP) 40% o f  the beneficiaries have to be women. 
Similarly, in Bangladesh 75% o f  the loan recipients from the Grameen Bank are 
women. In Indonesia, under the Badan Kredit Kecamatan scheme money is mostly lent 
to middle aged peasant women.157
3.7 CONCLUSION
Credit allocation and control can be more effective in all three countries. There 
are no easy solutions to reduce the problems faced by lenders, but the introduction o f  
specific measures may improve the existing situation.
In India and Sri Lanka, banks will consider a loan application favourably only if  
the borrower can provide security. It is indeed an inflexible banking practice to follow, 
because it effectively cuts access to credit to poor borrowers who would be unable to 
provide security. If a banker assessing the credit worthiness o f  a borrower is o f  the view  
that there is an element o f  doubt as to the repayment capacity o f  a borrower, security 
must be taken. However, to insist on security irrespective o f  all other criteria being 
satisfied raises the question whether, in practice, effective credit assessment is limited to 
checking if  the borrower could provide adequate security? In Malaysia, when small
155 Singh, S., Rural Credit: Issues for the Nineties [1990] Economic and Political Weekly 
2534
156 Statistics quoted by the ‘Women’s World Banking’ at the UN Conference On Women, 
held in Beijing on 4 September 1995, See Walker, T., and Boulton, L., Micro Lending 
Offers Power to World’s Poor, Financial Times of 5 September 1995; Kuper, S., Safe 
Bets and Entrepreneurs, Financial Times of 21 November 1995
157 World Development Report, World Bank, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989,
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loans are granted, banks would take security only if  the borrower’s creditworthiness is 
such that security is required. For larger loans however, banks are compelled to take 
security by law. In all three jurisdictions, a shift in approach towards assessing the 
credit worthiness o f  a borrower is essential whereby the lender will place greater 
emphasis on the ability o f  the borrower to repay the loan, rather than on obtaining loan 
security which at present receives greater attention.
Whether the establishment o f  private credit reference agencies w ill assist lenders 
in their credit appraisal process needs further consideration. There is no legal obstacle to 
establishing these agencies, but w ill they be effective in providing up to date 
information to lenders? The Credit Information Service provided by the Reserve Bank 
o f  India, the Credit Intelligence Bureau o f  Sri Lanka and the Rating Agency o f  Malaysia 
all seem to be functioning quite well and provide an adequate service. It is therefore 
doubtful whether there is a pressing need for the establishment o f  private rating 
agencies. Even in countries like the United Kingdom obtaining information from such 
agencies does not appear to be popular. In a survey that was carried out among 252 
banks, it transpired that 76% o f  the banks occasionally or never used these agencies to 
obtain credit information.158
In India and Sri Lanka, only a court o f law could decide if  a loan transaction is 
harsh and unconscionable, but in Malaysia the law specifies the maximum rate o f  
interest that can be charged on secured and unsecured loans. Lenders will, no doubt, feel 
more confident when negotiating the interest rate with potential borrowers where there 
is guidance as to whether the transaction is likely to be challenged as a harsh and
117-120
1^8 Berry, A., Faulkner s., Hughes, M., and Jarvis, R., Bank Lending: Beyond the Theory,
Chapman & Hall, London, 1993, 76 and Table 6.1
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unconscionable contract.
In India and Sri Lanka, there is a need for strong well drafted documentation
which are written clearly, free o f mistakes and obvious omissions so that parties could
understand its contents. It is quite acceptable to use standard forms for certain types o f
loans particularly, if  the loan transaction is straight forward, as it reduces the cost o f
borrowing. However, a distinction must be made when the loan transaction is more
complex. Unfortunately, lawyers are not involved in preparing security documents or in
negotiating and finalising loan agreements and as a result the legal interest o f lenders are
not adequately protected. Badly drafted documents become the basis o f numerous disputes
because borrowers themselves do not understand the jargon they have signed. An
Australian court once observed that it was regrettable that the bank's mortgage forms were
"long and involved documents" which did not take into consideration certain decisions o f
the courts and comments o f well known academic writers. Referring to the complexity o f
the bank's mortgage deed, Fox J remarked,
"It surely is a sad commentary on the operation o f  our legal system that a borrower 
should be expected to execute a document which only a person o f extraordinary 
application and persistence would read, which if  read is virtually incomprehensible 
and which, in any event, has a legal effect not disclosed by its language159.
The need for loan supervision is mostly needed in India and Sri Lanka where the 
proportion o f  non performing loans is currently very high. India appears to be aware o f the 
need to supervise loans and a number o f credit monitoring schemes are in operation. If the 
Health Code can be revised where the criteria laid down for the classification o f borrowers 
is practicable rather than being idealistic, the system may be a useful guide for the purpose 
of follow up action. Of course, the effectiveness will also depend on the seriousness and 
sincerity o f bank officials. The Service Area Approach could be effective if  the bank
159 Richard v Commercial Bank of Australia (1971) 18 FLR 95, at 99-100
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officers are successful in integrating with the rural borrowers so that correct information is 
obtained as to whether the loan funds were utilised properly. In Sri Lanka, the response to 
the debt recovery problem has been to provide "fast track debt recovery methods."160 Thus 
the emphasis has been to provide remedies for the problem. It is equally important that 
attention is given to finding out the causes o f default if  a long term solution to the debt 
recovery problem is to be found. Credit supervision is an important method o f finding out 
these causes.161 Central Bank must therefore take the initiative to appoint a committee to 
study the problem further. Important lessons may be learnt from the extensive research 
carried out in India, a country with similar social and economic problems.
The informal sector continues to play a prominent role in providing credit to the 
rural borrowers. Credit appraisal by an institutional lender involves collecting personal 
information about borrowers, the purpose for which the loan has been applied and 
determining the availability o f  security. To build personalised knowledge about 
borrowers in rural areas is a difficult task for a credit institution. Loan documentation is 
another aspect that rural borrowers find difficult to comply with. The loan agreement 
will state the terms o f  the loan and a strict repayment schedule is usually included. As 
one farmer observed “the government wants paddy and money on an exact date. If you 
default, you must go to court.” 162
Supervising the progress o f  loan funds granted to rural borrowers is not easy due
160 ^  1990, The Debt Recovery (Special Provisions) Act, No. 2 of 1990 and The Recovery 
of Loans by Banks (Special Provisions) Act No. 4 of 1990 together with 14 other 
amendments to various statutes were enacted.
161 Silva, K., Supervision, Identification of Alarm Signals, Treatment of Sick Units : 
Rehabilitation and Restructuring o f Loans [1990] Economic Review 38
162 Southwold-Llewellyn, S., Some Explanations for the Lack of Borrower Commitment to 
Specialised Farm Credit Institution: A Case Study o f the Role of Rural Sri Lankan 
Traders In Meeting Credit Needs (1991) 15 Savings and Development 290, at 291
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to geographical constraints and poor communication facilities. Lack o f  staff committed
to rural lending is also a problem for banks. Private moneylenders are obviously better
placed to pursue the loan repayments and constantly follow up repayments The debt is
collected “on the spot.” The conclusion that may be drawn is that despite very basic
methods o f  credit appraisal and loan documentation, the rural lender continues to be in
the money lending business primarily due to aggressive loan supervision and debt
recovery. Contrary to popular belief, a village moneylender may also be a “friend” or
“relative” and may not always be the extortionate trader trying to usurp an advantage
from a poor person. The acting Secretary General o f  the Asian Pacific Regional
Agricultural Credit Association has noted,
“In most o f  the countries, the informal credit agencies like money-lenders still 
play a prominent role in providing credit to the rural people. The very fact that 
they like to borrow money from such agencies despite prohibitive rates o f  
interest, indicates that the formal credit system is not flexible enough to provide 
to the rural people credit services o f  the type they need. On the other hand, the 
informal credit agencies are reportedly have little problem o f loan collections 
thanks to the personalised approach and precautionary measures adopted by 
them. It may perhaps be worthwhile for the banks to study the policy procedures 
and systems o f  informal credit agencies for lending and collections”163
Specific changes alone are not adequate to resolve the existing problems. The 
administration o f  the entire loan transaction must be streamlined. It is essential that 
more resources are spent on training bank officers and lawyers who will improve the 
quality o f  credit appraisal, loan documentation and supervision. In addition, political 
interference on lending decisions must be stopped. As Yash Ghai puts it: “The 
ideological strength o f  legality comes from the appearance o f  even-handedness o f  the
Quoted in Southwold-Llewellyn, S., Some Explanations for the Lack o f Borrower 
Commitment to Specialised Farm Credit Institution: A Case Study o f the Role of Rural 
Sri Lankan Traders In Meeting Credit Needs (1991) 15 Savings and Development 285, 
at 293 foot note 9
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legal system and o f  the equal application o f  the laws to all, including top leaders.”164
Ghai, P., The Rule o f Law, Legitimacy and Governance, in Ghai, Y., et al., The Political 
Economy of Law, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987, 254
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INTRODUCTION
Lenders may extend credit to borrowers with or without security. If the 
reputation or record o f a borrower reassures a lender sufficiently that the money will be 
repaid, it may be prepared to extend credit without security. In all other cases a lender
will demand some form o f  security as a safeguard against a risk that the borrower may 
not be able to repay the loan, or be forced into insolvent liquidation proceedings. By 
taking security the immediate benefit to a lender is the reduction o f  risk against default, 
but it will also have a greater economic benefit in the long term.1 Where security is 
provided, a lender may be willing to authorise a loan more easily. It may also be 
prepared to offer lower interest rates, extend longer periods for which the loan is granted 
and i f  necessary, increase the amount o f  the loan.2 Favourable lending terms will 
inevitably result in a better flow o f  credit to the economy, leading to increased 
investment and growth rates.3
A lender’s objective o f  taking security is to recover a debt granted to a 
borrower if  it defaults under a loan agreement. A  borrower granting security to a lender 
must therefore diligently keep to his repayment schedule, or run the risk o f  the lender 
enforcing its rights if  it defaults. In the event o f insolvency o f  a borrower, a lender with 
security will be considered a secured creditor, and stand outside the insolvency 
proceedings. For this reason, secured creditors are often called super-priority creditors. 
By contrast, creditors who are unsecured would receive little or nothing through the 
rateable distribution process employed in such proceedings.4
1 Flesig, H., The Power of Collateral in The World Bank : View Point, No 43, World
Bank, 1995; Flesig, H., The Right to Borrow, in The World Bank: View Point, No. 44, 
World Bank, 1995
2 Simpson, J., and Rover, J., General Principles o f a Modern Secured Transactions Law,
in Norton, J., and Andenas, M., (Eds.), Emerging Financial Markets and Secured 
Transactions, Kluwer Law International, London, 1997, 143,144
3 Professor Diamond observes:
"Modem business depends on credit. Although the over extension of credit is not to be 
encouraged, responsible credit helps the economy and, in business transactions security 
contributes to the more responsible use of credit"
Diamond, Prof. A.L., A Review o f Security Interests in Property, HMSO, London, 2
4 Goode, R., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 2nd Ed., Sweet and Maxwell,
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If lenders find it difficult to enforce security and recover their debts, the 
objective o f  taking security will prove to be useless. I f on the other hand, the security 
enables the lenders to recover debts quickly without following a cumbersome process, 
the security will be more valuable to a lender. As Mather observes,
“Security is taken as an insurance in case o f  need and it must always 
be remembered that the test o f  any sound insurance is that it should be 
available, readily realisable and sufficient when required. Nothing is 
more disconcerting than to find that the security, taken as an insurance 
against the unexpected, is inadequate or cannot be realised when it is 
most needed.”5
In many developing countries including India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, lenders 
rarely grant credit without security. Land is the preferred form o f  security6 and lenders 
are hesitant to accept tangible movable properties, stocks and current assets, account 
receivables and book debts, livestock, etc. as collateral,7 not least because the law does 
not provide much protection for intangible security. If such security is to be accepted, 
an additional personal guarantee may be demanded. This practice makes it difficult for
London, 1997, 143-144, 151-161; Fletcher, I., The Law o f Insolvency, 2nd Ed., Sweet 
and Maxwell, London, 1996, 613-616
Mather, L., Securities Acceptable to the Lending Banker, Waterlow and Sons Ltd., 
London, 1960,1
Exception are the socialist countries where land is owned by the state or private 
ownership is limited, and countries where only part of the land is alienated and the rest 
held by the community under customary law. Hiscock, M., Law and Political Change 
: Land Use by Foreigners in Socialist Countries o f the Third World in Cranston, R., 
and Good, R., Commercial and Consumer Law, Clarendon Press Ltd., Oxford, 1993, 
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Sri Lanka : Interview with Mr. M. Fernando, Deputy General Manager Credit
Department, Peoples’ Bank Headquarters, Colombo, at the Bank, on 14 May 1997; 
Malaysia : Chen Kah Leng, Country Report For Malaysia, Paper Presented at the 
Asian Development Bank Symposium on Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and 
Security, (Unpublished) Manila, 1993, 16 ; See Generally : Cranston, R., Credit 
Security and Debt Recovery : Law’s Role in Reform in Asia and the Pacific in Norton, 
J., and Andenas, M., (Eds.), Emerging Financial Markets and Secured Transactions, 
Kluwer Law International, London, 1997, 219,239; How Legal Restrictions on 
Collateral Limit Access to Credit in Bolivia, Report No. 13873-BO, World Bank, 
Washington DC., 1994
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anyone without real estate to secure credit facilities for business activities.8 Farmers 
working on rented land are also excluded from accessing credit for fanning projects thus 
forcing them to borrow from private moneylenders. The overall effect o f  these lending 
policies is that they lead to high interest rates, low volume o f  lending and low  
investment in the countries.
Why do lenders consider security over movable property more risky than loans 
secured by real property? To a lender, this type o f  security has some inherent 
weaknesses for which there are little or no legal remedies. Some types o f  movable 
property may depreciate in value with time, and the economic value o f  the security may 
have reduced by the time o f enforcement. The absence o f  inefficient registries makes it 
extremely difficult for lenders to trace movable property subject mortgages. Sometimes 
it is impossible to identify before a court the exact property which bears a security 
interest. By contrast, the delays experienced in enforcing real security will not reduce 
the economic value o f  the property significantly. Further, problems related to 
identification will not arise, and the problems connected to land registration are 
comparatively few.
Despite the advantages o f  taking real security, lenders face a number o f  
problems when such security is taken. The laws provide for a wide range o f  securities, 
but lenders are forced not to execute certain forms o f  securities due to varying legal 
constraints. High stamp duties payable on certain security instruments, effectively 
restrict lenders from using such forms o f security. India provides a good example. 
Shroff observes,
8 Flesig, H., The Right To Borrow : Legal and Regulatory Barriers that Limit Access to 
Credit by Small Farms and Businesses, The World Bank : View Point, No. 44,
World Bank, Washington DC., 1995
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“Legal innovativeness has unfortunately had to be deployed in order to 
side step these unreasonable levies based on short sighted policies. The 
impact o f  such duties in restricting development by choking financial 
transactions, and movement o f  capital has been under estimated.”9
Generally, the methods o f  enforcement are complex and most often require the secured 
creditor to obtain a court order. In most developing countries, the court systems are 
inefficient, slow and follow protracted procedures that result in unreasonable delays in 
issuing judgements and their enforcement.10 Delinquent borrowers often exploit these 
weaknesses in a system by raising spurious defences at the trial or challenging the 
enforcement procedures to delay the eventual realisation o f the secured assets.
In this chapter, it is proposed to examine the range o f  security which is 
available to lenders in India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, their enforcement and the 
problems encountered in the enforcement process.
4.2 RANGE OF AVAILABLE SECURITY IN INDIA
The majority o f  lenders in India are prepared to give credit to potential 
borrowers only if  they are able to provide adequate security to cover the principal 
money advanced and the interest. The laws provide for a wide range o f  security devises 
that lenders may take over immovable as well as movable property. There are however, 
several legal as well as practical difficulties that restrict the free use o f  these forms o f  
security.11 Creating mortgages over immovable property involves numerous procedural 
formalities, the most important two being registration o f  the mortgage (except in
Shroff, C., India Country Report, Presented at the Asian Development Bank 
Symposium on Debt Recovery, Credit and Security (Unpublished), Manila, 1993, 22
Shihata, I., The World Bank In a Changing World: Selected Essays and Lectures, Vol.
II, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995, Chapter 4
Hegde, S., Mortgage (1995) 66 The Journal of the Indian Institute of Bankers 115
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equitable mortgage) and obtaining tax clearance by the relevant authorities.12 Most 
mortgage instruments require to be stamped as well. According to the Indian Stamp Act 
1889, stamp duty is payable not on a particular “transaction” but the “instrument,” thus 
lenders avoid using forms o f security that need to be stamped.
4.2.1 Security Over Immovable Property
The Transfer o f  Property Act 1882 governs the law o f  property. A  mortgage 
created over real property is the most acceptable form o f  security to a lender.13 Indian 
law recognises six types o f  mortgages.14 They are: a simple mortgage; mortgage by 
conditional sale (equitable mortgage); usufructuary mortgage; English mortgage; 
mortgage by deposit o f  title deeds; and anomalous mortgage.
A simple mortgage is created when the mortgagor personally undertakes to pay 
the mortgage money, and expressly or by implication agrees that in the event o f  default 
the mortgagee shall have the right to sell the mortgaged property and utilise the sale 
proceeds to settle the outstanding mortgaged debt.15 In a simple mortgage, the 
mortgagee is not given possession o f  the property nor is he given the ownership o f  the 
property. The mortgagee’s right to sell the property is subject to obtaining an order from 
a civil court directing the sale.
A mortgage by conditional sale is in fact, as the name clearly suggests, a form
12 Kolarkar, S., Paper Presented at the ADB Symposium on Legal Aspects o f Debt 
Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished), Manila, 1993, 18
12 Section 58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, defines a mortgage as the transfer
of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment
of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan or an existing or future debt or 
the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a primary liability.
14 Section 58 (b)-(f) ; Nath, B., Cases and Materials on The Transfer o f Property Act
1882, Eastern Law Book Co., Lucknow, 1987, 347-390
12 Section 58(b)
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o f  sale upon a condition. The mortgagor "ostensibly" sells the mortgaged property on 
condition that in default o f  repayment by a certain date the sale shall become absolute, 
or on payment being made the sale shall become void .16 Clearly, there is an "ostensible" 
transfer o f  ownership o f  property on default o f payment. In 1929, the law was amended 
by adding a proviso to section 58(c) which states that an "ostensible sale" shall not be 
regarded as a mortgage, unless the stipulation for repurchase is contained in the very 
document which effects the sale.17 There has been much controversy over this 
amendment particularly, on the question whether a provision in a deed o f sale for re­
purchase by the borrower is presumptive evidence o f  a mortgage.18
The Indian Law Commission recommended that this section requires 
clarification, and suggested that section 58(c) should clearly state that, the embodiment 
o f  a condition for re transfer in the document o f  sale would not, by itself, be evidence o f  
a mortgage.19 So far this recommendation has not been given effect to by the Indian 
legislature. Lending institutions rarely accept this type o f  mortgage, and the reason may 
be the uncertainty that shrouds the interpretation o f the statutory provision.
An usufructuary mortgage is created when a mortgagor delivers or agrees to 
deliver possession o f the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and agrees with the
16 Section 58(c)
1*7 The Indian Supreme Court has held that, after the 1929 amendment, if the parties chose
to incorporate this term in the same document, i.e. the document in question and not by 
a separate document, the presumption that inevitably follows is that their intention was 
to take a document of mortgage by conditional sale. Chunchun Jha v Ebadat Ali 
[1954] AIR (SC) 345
18 In Janki Devi v Mt. Murta Kuer Agrawal J held that, if the condition is incorporated in
the deed, a reasonable inference may be drawn with respect to the intention of the 
parties to create a mortgage and that this inference may be displaced. [1974] AIR 
(Patna) 246 at 247
1^  Seventieth Report o f the Law Commission on the Transfer o f Property Act 1882, 1977,
Sadar Patel Marg., Allahabad, 1977, 400
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mortgagee that he is entitled to use the usufruct until the principal sum and interest are 
paid. This type o f mortgage is not a useful form o f security for a lender and is hardly 
used in banking transactions.20
An English mortgage is defined in the Act as an agreement whereby the 
mortgagor binds him self and transfer the mortgaged property absolutely to the 
mortgagee subject to the condition that the property w ill be re-transferred to the 
mortgagor upon repayment o f the mortgage loan.21 In an English mortgage the 
mortgagor transfers the property "absolutely" to the mortgagee, but the general 
definition o f  a "mortgage" in the Transfer o f Property Act states that a mortgage is a 
transfer o f  an interest in specific movable property.22 In 1939, the Privy Council decided 
that in an Indian English mortgage the transfer would be absolute but for the proviso for 
re-transfer, thus dispensing with this apparent inconsistency.23 It may then be said that 
although the word absolute is used in section 58(e) only the mortgagor’s interest is 
transferred subject to the right o f  redemption.
An equitable mortgage is created where a debtor delivers to his creditor or his 
agent, documents o f title to his immovable property with an intention o f creating a 
security for the money that was or would be advanced to him by the creditor.24 To 
create a valid equitable mortgage the title deeds to the property must be deposited with 
the lender, with a clear intention o f  creating security. The mortgage can be entirely oral 
and does not require registration. A  written document is not required to create such a
20 Section 58(d)
21 Section 58(e)
22 Section 58(a)
23 Ramkinar v Satyacharan [1939] AIR (PC) 14
24 Section 58(f)
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mortgage because it is created by the act o f depositing the title deeds. The law however, 
does not prohibit such a document being executed. Equitable mortgages can be created 
quickly and without much expense because they need not be registered. They also do 
not require to be stamped hence, it would be an ideal form o f security for a lender to 
take. Unfortunately, equitable mortgages can be created only in certain specified towns 
in India which have been notified in the official Gazette by the Government, (e.g. 
Bombay, Calcutta, Madras)
A form o f mortgage that cannot be defined as any one o f  the five discussed 
above is called an anomalous mortgage. Possibly, these are forms o f  mortgages based 
on local customs and practice, and are o f little use to a commercial lender.25
4.2.2 Security Over Movable Property
Movable property is commonly used as a form o f  security, and is generally 
given by way o f  pledge or hypothecation.26 The substantive law governing a pledge  is 
the law o f  contract and not property law. A pledge is a possessory security taken over 
movable property. Actual or constructive delivery o f  the property is essential to its 
validity. In Official Assignee o f  M adras v Mercantile Bank o f  India, Lord Write 
explained,
“At the common law a pledge could not be created except by a delivery o f  
possession o f the thing pledged, either actual or constructive. It involved a 
bailment. If the pledgor had the actual goods in his physical possession, he could 
effect the pledge by actual delivery: in all other cases he could give possession 
by some symbolic act, such as handing over the key o f  the store in which they 
were.” 27
In modem commercial lending constmctive delivery will constitute the delivery o f a
25 Section 58(g)
26 Indian Contracts Act, 1872, Sections 172- 181
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valid document o f title which represents the goods such as a bill o f  lading, or an 
acknowledgement (called an attornment) by the warehouse keeper that he holds the 
goods to the order or disposition o f the bank.28 The right to the property pledged is with 
the pledgee but this right is limited to the extent o f  the debt that is due.
The Indian law on pledges is quite advanced and its enforcement not difficult. 
For example, "key loan" arrangements are recognised in India. In a key loan 
arrangement, the property that is pledged is under the control o f  the lender possibly in 
its warehouse, and released to the borrower as and when required by the borrower.29
Hypothecation is not defined by any Indian statute, but it is generally explained 
as a mortgage o f  movable property without the mortgagee being given actual possession 
o f the property.30 There is an assumption that the mortgagee has "constructive 
possession" o f  the property which has now been construed as having "legal 
possession".31 Although Indian statute law does not recognise this type o f  security, the 
Indian courts have recognised it.32 In Bank o f  India v S.B. Shah Ali court observed:
[1935] AC 53, at 58
In Dublin City Distillery (Great Brunswick Street, Dublin) Ltd v Doherty, court held 
that the delivery and receipt of a warrant does not per se amount to a delivery and 
receipt of the goods. Lord Atkinson said,
“The warehouseman holds the goods as the agent of the owner until he has attorned in 
some way to this person and agreed to hold the goods for him; then and not till then 
does the warehouseman become a bailee for the latter, and then and not till then is there 
a constructive delivery of the goods.” [1914] AC 823, 847
Bank of Maharashtra v Official Liquidator [1969] AIR (M ys)280
Shroff C.S. India Country Report, Paper Presented at the Asian Development Bank 
Symposium on Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security (Unpublished), 
Manila, 1993, 29- 30
Abichandani, R., (Ed) Pollock and Mulla on Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 
11th Ed., Vol. 11, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 1994, 1053-1054; Nadar Bank Ltd., v 
Canara Bank Ltd., [1961] AIR (Mad) 326
Bank o f Maharashtra v Official Liquidator [1969] AIR (Mys) 280; State o f Andra 
Pradesh v Andra Bank Ltd. [1988] AIR(AP) 18
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"[The] courts have recognised the principles o f common law and rendered justice 
according to equity and good conscience and therefore that being the law in
force, action does lie in the court in respect o f  a hypothecation"33
The use o f  hypothecations is fairly common among Indian bankers. Non bank
institutions have also given loans on security o f movable property subject to a
hypothecation.34
Another form o f  security which banks favour are guarantees, particularly, from 
corporate borrowers.35 Generally, personal guarantees are taken from directors o f a 
company or in the case o f  a group, one company will guarantee the obligation o f  another 
company in which they have a strong shareholding. Guarantees are favoured by lenders 
because if  the debtor company becomes insolvent, the bank has a right to institute a 
separate cause o f  action against the guarantor without first commencing proceedings 
against the principal debtor. The reason is that the guarantor’s liability does not cease as 
a result o f the debtor becoming insolvent. This right o f  the lender can be waived by the 
parties by entering into a contract to the contrary. It must be noted that the Reserve 
Bank o f  India has directed banks not to obtain personal guarantees from company 
directors if  it is satisfied about the debtor company's financial stability and 
management.36 The statutory provisions that govern guarantees in India are seen in the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872.37
33 [1988] AIR (AP) 18,23
34 Kothari, V., State Bank o f India v S.B. Shah A l i : Right to Repossess Assets Exists in
Hypothecation Too (1998) 13 JIBL 34, 35
3  ^ A Guarantee is an accessory contract, not a primary contract and therefore a surety’s
liability to the to the creditor does not arise until the principal debtor defaults - See
Goode, R., Legal Problems of Credit and Security, 2nd Ed., Sweet and Maxwell,
London, 1988, 188
36 Tannan, M., Tannan’s Banking Law and Practice in India, 19th Ed., India Law House,
New Delhi, 1991,525
3 7 Sections 124-147
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The floating charge is a creation o f the English Equity Courts o f  the 19th 
Century38 and is now recognised in a number o f  common law countries. Indian law 
recognises the creation o f a floating charge by a corporate borrower in favour o f  a 
lender, as a means o f  security for money lent to it.39 In the absence o f  special statutory 
provisions, floating charges can only be created by companies that are governed by the 
Companies Act o f 1956. Where a company creates a floating charge, it must be 
registered with the Registrar o f  Companies within 30 days o f  its creation. Failure to do 
so would make the charge void against the liquidator or any creditor o f  the company in 
the event o f  a winding up.40 The primary objective o f  registration is to show other 
creditors inspecting the register to what extent the company's assets are encumbered or 
unencumbered, which in turn would reflect the company's creditworthiness.41
The trust receipt is a creation o f international banking practice. When importers 
and exporters o f  goods need to raise finance from their banks, the use o f  trust receipts 
plays an important role. A trust receipt is a document by which the bank’s customer, the 
pledgor, acknowledges that it holds the goods and the proceeds o f  the sale on trust for 
the bank.42 A  trust receipt allows a lender to part with the documents o f  title to the 
goods pledged without forfeiting its rights as pledgee so that the borrower can take 
delivery o f  the goods, and also deal with them as the lender’s trustee. When goods are 
being imported, a buyer will normally pledge the shipping documents to the bank to
Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191
State o f Andhra Pradesh v Sri Raja Ram Janardhana (1965) 2 Comp.LJ 222
Section 125
Re Jackson and Bassford Ltd (1906) 2 Ch 467 at 476 per Buckely J.
Hapgood, M., (Ed) Paget’s Law of Banking, 11th Ed., Butterworths, London, 1996, 
563; Gutteridge, H., & Megrah, M., Law of Bankers Commercial Credits, 7th Ed., 
Europa Publications Ltd., London, 1984, 215
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obtain finance. The buyer may take delivery o f  the goods and The bank would then 
execute a letter o f  trust and release the shipping documents so that the buyer may take 
delivery o f  the goods. Similarly, when goods are being exported a bank may lend 
money to an exporter to purchase the goods against a trust receipt, i f  the seller agrees to 
hold the goods or the sale proceeds in trust for the bank or as agent o f  the bank. The 
Indian legislature is silent on the use o f  trust receipts. The Banking Laws Committee 
recommended that the law relating to trust receipts be codified so that it w ill enable 
banks to play a more effective their role as catalysts o f  the country's economic 
development.43 The Reserve Bank o f  India prepared the "Banking Companies (Trust 
Receipt Transactions Bill) based on the Uniform Trust Receipts Act o f  the United States 
o f  America, but the Bill has not been pursued beyond the stage o f  getting comments 
from the banks. In practice, financial institutions rarely use this form as security due to 
its weak legal position. Occasionally, lenders accept trust receipts from borrowers with 
excellent credit ratings or adequate collateral, to finance imports for short periods, 
usually between 15-30 days.44
4.3 RANGE OF SECURITY AVAILABLE IN SRI LANKA
Like in India, land is the most readily accepted form o f  security by Sri Lankan 
lending institutions.45 It is usually granted by way o f  a mortgage over the property.46
43 Report o f the Banking Laws Committee on Personal Property Security Law,
Government of India, Delhi, 1977, Para 1.2.93
44 Kolarkar, S., Paper Presented at the ADB Symposium on Legal Aspects o f Debt 
Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished), Manila, 1993, 22
45 Report o f the Bank o f Ceylon Commission, Sessional Paper XXVII, Vol. II,
Government Printer, Colombo, 1963, Para 198
46 Weerasooria, W., Credit and Security in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) : The Legal Problems of
Development Finance, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, 1973, Chapters 5 & 6
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Most leading credit institutions in the country, such as the Development Finance Credit 
Corporation and the State Mortgage Bank will lend only on the security o f  a primary 
mortgage. Some credit institutions do take secondary mortgages but only as additional 
security for further loans they may grant. Private moneylenders and investors however,
do accept subsequent mortgages as security for loans granted by them. The law 
provides for a similar range o f  securities to those available in India, but lenders do not 
use all these forms o f  security. The main cause for this appears to be the uncertainty 
surrounding its effectiveness.
4.3.1 Immovable Property as Security
The law that governs mortgages over real property is the Mortgage Act 1949, 
(as amended) and Roman Dutch Common Law.47 The Mortgage Act recognises four 
types o f  mortgages. Namely, mortgage by deposit o f  title deeds, conditional transfer, 
usufractuary mortgage, and concurrent mortgage.
A  borrower may mortgage his land to an approved credit agency by the deposit 
o f  title deeds with the lender.48 This form o f mortgage facilitates the granting o f  short­
term loans quickly and at low cost. Procedures such as valuations o f  the land, 
examinations o f  title and the execution o f  the normal instruments o f  mortgage which
The Roman Dutch Law of mortgage is fundamentally different from the law of 
mortgage at English Common Law. In a legal mortgage granted to a lender at English 
Common Law, ownership of the mortgaged property is transferred to the lender but 
possession is retained by the mortgagor until repayment in full or until the lender takes 
steps to sell the property in the event of default. In other words, if the property is sold, 
the mortgagee sells his own property and not the property of the mortgagor. Under the 
Roman Dutch Law, the mortgagor does not transfer title of the property to the 
mortgagee, but continues to retain title in his own hands. Consequently, the mortgagee 
does not have a right of ownership to the property but only the right to recover payment 
of the debt. The mortgagee’s right is in fact a real security right in the immovable 
property.
Sections 69 & 70(1) Mortgage Act, Legislative Enactments of the Democratic
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must be notarialy attested are dispensed with. There is also provision for stamp duty to 
be paid in instalments. These mortgages are very similar to the equitable mortgages 
recognised by the Transfer o f  Property Act in India.
At a glance, this type o f  security should make credit more freely available to 
prospective borrowers but lenders in Sri Lanka, like their counterparts in India appear 
hesitant to use this special form o f mortgage. There appear to be at least two reasons. 
First, the law does not recognise the rights and liabilities o f  the parties to such a type o f  
mortgage. Second, the Mortgage Act has granted all approved credit agencies in the 
country the power o f  parate execution, (i.e. a creditor can proceed to sell the assets 
belonging to the debtor without a court order) These credit agencies can enforce their 
rights o f  parate execution only if  a mortgage is created in the form approved in the 
schedules to their incorporating statutes. The form which is used to create a mortgage by 
depositing title deeds differs from the forms that have been approved by the respective 
statutes establishing the credit agencies and as a result, these credit agencies are hesitant 
to take security o f  this nature for fear that their right o f  parate execution may not be 
effective.
A conditional transfer o f immovable property has become a controversial form 
o f  security. A  conditional transfer is a contract o f  sale between the borrower and a 
lender over immovable property subject to a condition that the debtor will have a right 
to repurchase the property within a stipulated time. In the event o f  default, the creditor 
has the right to seize the property and claim its ownership. The key features o f a 
conditional transfer in Sri Lanka and a mortgage by conditional sale in India are the 
same. Consequently in both countries a question that arose is whether a contract o f  sale
Socialist Republic o f Sri Lanka, 1980, (Revised Ed.) Cap. 98
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document is in fact a mortgage bond because it gives the debtor the option to repurchase 
the property, or whether it is a bill o f  sale subject to a time constraint. It was seen that 
the position in India has not been resolved yet, but the Sri Lankan courts have held that 
a conditional transfer cannot be treated as a mortgage.49
The law allows usufructuary mortgages to be created over immovable 
property. A  holder o f a usufructuary mortgage has the right to take possession o f  the 
property only for the purpose o f  enjoying its profits in lieu o f interest due on money 
lent. The debtor retains the right to redeem the property from the creditor at any time. 
This form o f  security is not useful to a lender, consequently, like the lenders in India, Sri 
Lankan lenders do not accept such security.
Concurrent mortgage is where one mortgage bond is executed in favour o f two 
or more persons (each o f  whom is referred to as "mortgagee11) in consideration o f  sums 
due or payable to each o f  such persons by the mortgagor.50 These mortgages are mainly 
used as forms o f  investment and are not important to a lender whose objective is to 
obtain security for a repayable loan. Hence leading credit institutions do not accept 
such mortgages.51
4.3.2 M ovable Property as Security
Apart from immovables, movables may also be offered as collateral.52 Principles o f  
Roman Dutch Law and the Mortgage Act govern the mortgage o f  movables in Sri 
Lanka. The law recognises security over movables in the form o f a pledge  or a mortgage
49 Weeramantry, C., Law of Contracts, Vol. 2, Mortlake Press, Colombo, 1967, 638-640
50 Section 65(1)
51 Henry Zoysa v The Jupiter Cigarette Co. Ltd. (1968) 72 NLR 12
52 Weerasooria W., Credit and Security in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) : The Legal Problems of
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created by way o f  registration ,53 A  pledge may be validly created when a borrower and 
a lender enter into an oral agreement to mortgage movable property, and actual delivery 
o f the property is given. The “ostensible” and “bona fide” possession o f  the property by 
the mortgagee, is essential for the mortgage to be valid.54 In the case o f  Indian Bank Ltd  
v Chartered Bank, et al the Supreme Court while explaining the legal principles 
governing the mortgage o f movable property in Sri Lanka held that the phrase 
"ostensibly and bona fide in such custody" to mean that possession should be not only 
bona fide, but be o f  such a nature as to make it apparent to others that such person was 
in possession .55
A  mortgage may be created by way o f  registration where the property is not 
actually delivered to the lender. A  mortgage can be created by executing a written 
document by the borrower or by an authorised person to do so, and having the document 
registered at the office o f  the Registrar o f Lands within 21 days o f  its execution. 
Registration o f  such a document is essential for its validity but it does not confer 
priority or any other additional right to the parties.56
The Mortgage Act sets out a special procedure for the mortgage o f  shares o f  a 
company in favour o f "approved credit agencies." The borrower deposits the share 
certificates with such a credit agency and then executes a document transferring the 
shares in favour o f  the agency, or leaves the transferee's name blank. Such a transfer is
Development Finance, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, 1973, Chapters 5 & 6
53 Ibid., Chapter 7
54 Sections 17 & 18, Registration of Documents Ordinance, No 23 of 1927 and Section
18, Prevention of Frauds Ordinance 1840
55 (1941) 43 NLR 49; For a similar view see the Second Interim Report o f the Ceylon
Mortgage Commission, Sessional Paper V, Government Printers, Colombo, 1945, Para 
94
56 Section 17, Registration of Documents Ordinance No. 23, 1927
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commonly known as “transfer in blank.”57 As mentioned earlier, in Sri Lanka the 
mortgage o f  movables is governed by Roman Dutch Common Law principles and the 
Mortgage Act, and the law relating to companies is based on English Common Law 
principles and the Companies Act. As a result, a question that needs to be addressed is 
which principles govern the mortgage o f  shares in a company when the special 
procedure set out in the Mortgage Act does not apply? The Supreme Court in Mitchell v 
Fernando58 held that Roman Dutch Law applied. Counsel argued that the Civil Law 
Ordinance required matters relating to Joint Stock Companies to be decided according 
to English Law and that shares are things not known to Roman Dutch Law, but the 
judges took the view that this matter was one o f  mortgage and not an issue in respect o f  
Joint Stock Companies. Although the law provides for the mortgage o f shares as 
security, state lending institutions do not lend on the security o f  shares. Leading private 
banks however do lend on such security, provided the shares are o f  a publicly quoted 
company.
The Mortgage Act also has special provisions where a mortgagor can mortgage 
life insurance policies in favour o f “approved credit agencies.”59 Where the mortgagor 
defaults payment, the approved credit agency has the right to surrender the policy to the 
insurer and to recover payment o f the value o f the policy or o f  such amount that would 
have been payable to the assured, as if  the policy was surrendered by him. A lender that 
is not an approved credit agency, and who has taken a mortgage over a life insurance 
policy as security will on the borrower’s default have to obtain a court order to realise 
the policy. Unfortunately, this cumbersome and expensive procedure o f  recovery makes
57 Section 73
58 (1945) 46 NLR 265
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lenders very hesitant to lend on the strength o f such security.
Surety Bonds are commonly accepted because it is considered to be one o f  the 
safer categories o f  collateral. They are also commonly known as guarantees, possibly 
due to the influence o f English Laws in Sri Lanka. Although commercial matters are 
governed by English Common Law principles, the law o f  suretyship is based on Roman 
Dutch law principles.60 The law protects the surety's interests where the principal debtor 
and creditor are in conflict. For example, the law allows a number o f  defences to a 
surety unless he has not expressly renounced them .61 In practice however, banks and 
financial institutions do not enter into a contract o f  suretyship unless the surety 
expressly renounces all the legal privileges he enjoys. Many state lending institutions 
are prohibited from taking personal guarantees to secure loans, and are limited to taking 
immovable property as security. On the other hand, some state banks, most private 
banks, and other lending institutions do take personal guarantees when granting loans. 
Invariably, when loans are given to private limited companies the directors are required 
to guarantee the loans as additional security, and this has been the practice in 
commercial lending for a long time. In 1968, the Bank o f  Ceylon Commission 
observed:
"Ordinarily land should be the most readily available security in any 
developing country, but the defect o f  the law in Ceylon lowers its usefulness as 
a security. This accounts for the fact that in the classification o f  advances on
Sections 81 & 84
Apart from Roman Dutch principles the Prevention Of Frauds Ordinance, No. 7, 1840 
also applies. According to Section 18 all contracts of suretyship must be in writing 
and signed by the surety.
Some of the defences are, (a) Beneficium Ordinis Sec Exclusionis (i.e. surety to be sued 
only if the principal debtor is unable to satisfy the judgement debt) (b) Beneficium 
Divisionis (i.e. when several persons are sureties for the same debt the creditor must 
divide his claim pro rata) (c) Beneficium Cedendarum Actionum (i.e. if  a surety pays to 
the creditor the debt due to him he is then entitled to enforce all the rights previously 
available to the principal creditor.
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security, the percentage classified as "other" was increased to a high level o f  
35.5 per cent o f  all advances. We understand that the principal form o f  security 
categorised under this head is the security o f guarantors.”62
Even today, commercial lenders sometimes lend purely on the creditworthiness o f the 
guarantor, and it would be correct to say that suretyship ranks equally to security taken 
over immovables.
The Sri Lankan Companies Act 1982 recognises a floating charge as a valid 
charge.63 Once a floating charge is created, it must be registered with the Registrar o f  
Companies within 21 days o f  its creation for the purpose o f  giving notice to other 
creditors that the company's assets have been charged. If the registration requirement is 
not satisfied the charge is void against the liquidator, or any creditors that may have a 
claim. Although the Sri Lankan Companies Act recognises the floating charge very 
few, if  any, such charges have been created. The reason may be ignorance, or fear that 
the security may prove to be worthless owing to the reluctance o f  the courts to depart 
from the Roman Dutch Law which is against extrajudicial execution.
Unlike in India, Sri Lanka has legislated for trust receipts by enacting the Trust 
Receipts Ordinance.64 The Ordinance specifies that trust receipts may be executed only 
when goods are being imported into the country or exported out o f  the country.65 
Further, a trust receipt can be executed only by an approved credit agency recognised by 
the Trust Receipts Ordinance.66 Consequently, all commercial and state banks that lend 
on the security o f  trust receipts have been declared as approved credit agencies by the
62 Report o f the Bank o f Ceylon Commission, Sessional Paper XXVII, Vol. I, 
Government Printer, Colombo, 1968, Para 210
63 Section 91(1) & (2), Companies Act No. 17 of 1982
64 No. 12 of 1949. This Ordinance was enacted as a direct result of the recommendations 
made by the Mortgage Commission of 1945.
65 Section 2 & 3 respectively
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Director o f  Commerce.
4.4 RANGE OF AVAILABLE SECURITY IN MALAYSIA
There is a wide range o f  security that lenders may take from borrowers.67 
Malaysian lenders however, favour taking land security,68 and are no different to lenders 
in India and Sri Lanka. Compared with the range o f  security that may be taken over 
immovable property in India and Sri Lanka, there are only two forms o f  security over 
immovable property that may be taken under Malaysian Land law. There are no obvious 
limitations to creating security.
4.4.1 Security Over Immovable Property
The land law o f  Malaysia is primarily governed by the National Land Code 
(hereafter NLC) o f  1965, which is fundamentally based on the general structure o f the 
Australian Torrens System .69 English legal concepts are also reflected in some statutory 
provisions o f  the NLC, particularly in dealings and interests in land.70 In addition,
English judgements also influence land law matters. Where land is offered as security
the law provides for the creation o f  two forms o f  security, namely, a statutory charge 
and a statutory lien by deposit o f  title documents and entry o f  a caveat.71
Section 5
Pheng, L., Banking Law, Butterworths Asia, Malaysia, 1995, Chapter 4
Chen Kah Leng, Country Report For Malaysia, Paper Presented at the Asian 
Development Bank Symposium on Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, 
(Unpublished) Manila, 1993, 16-17
Sykes E., and Walker S., The Law of Securities, 5th Ed, Law Book Co., Sydney, 1993
Wong D., Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States, Singapore University Press, 
Singapore, 1975, 158 - 159
Sood, T., and Tee, K., Land Law in Malaysia: Cases and Commentary, Butterworths, 
Singapore, 1987, Chapter 7
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A charge can be created over a whole land as security by executing a formal 
document for the repayment o f  any debt and interest.72 A  charge so created will become 
effective as a security interest only upon due registration.73 By contrast, it is possible to 
create a valid but "unregistered charge or equitable charge." However, compared to that 
o f a statutory chargee, the remedies available to an unregistered or equitable chargee is 
quite limited.74 A  borrower that creates a charge in favour o f  a bank remains the legal 
owner o f  the property, and as a result enjoys the benefits o f  being vested with the 
property. As legal title to the property remains with the chargor he has the right to 
transfer the property subject to the charge to a third party, but the transferee would be 
bound by the conditions o f the charge. He would also have the right to create second 
and subsequent charges over the land,75 and may grant a lease, sub lease or exempt 
tenancy over land with the prior consent o f  the lender.76
A  widely discussed issue among writers and judges is whether a charge created 
under the NLC could be distinguished from a mortgage at Common Law, or whether 
such a statutory charge could in fact be considered in the general nature o f an English 
mortgage. Briefly, the argument distinguishing the two is that, in an English Common 
Law mortgage, the title to the property is transferred to the mortgagee with a proviso for 
redemption, whereas in a torrens mortgage, legal title to the property remains with the 
chargor.77 On the other hand, some argue that although there is a fundamental
72 Section 241(1) NLC
72 Section 243
7  ^ Oriental Bank v Chup Seng Restaurant and Butterworth Sdn Bhd. [1990] 3 MLJ 493
at 495 per Mohamed Dzaiddan J
7  ^ Section 241
76 Sections 215(3) and 216(1)
77 Bank Bhumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Doric Development Sdn Bhd and Ors [1988] 1 MLJ
462- 463
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difference between the two securities the torrens mortgage has many features o f an
English Common Law mortgage as a security device.78 When a charge is created under
the torrens system, it does not involve the transfer o f the legal ownership o f  the land
from the chargor to the chargee, and the chargor remains in possession o f  the property.79
Sir Samuel Thomas CJ observed,
“[a] charge is a very different transaction to a mortgage. There is no such thing 
as a mortgage o f  land known to the law o f the Federated Malay States. Charges 
alone are recognised. The rights arising from a charge are contained in the Land 
Code. It is not possible to seek to introduce the elements o f  an English mortgage 
into a charge as provided by the law o f the Federated Malay States.”80
On the other hand, the Malaysian courts often resort to English principles for guidance 
in the interpretation o f  statutory provisions particularly, i f  the legislation is silent on an 
issue.
The second form o f security that lenders accept is a statutory lien that is created 
in its favour over land or a lease owned by the borrower. A  statutory lien may be 
created by an owner or lessee by depositing with the lenders his original document o f  
title to the land, or in the case o f  a lease a duplicate copy as security for a loan. The 
lender will then apply to the land registry for the entry o f  a lien-holder's caveat, and 
upon the caveat being entered it will become entitled to a lien over the land or lease.81 
Once a lien holder's caveat is entered, the owner o f  the land is precluded from 
registering any dealings with regard to that property without the prior consent o f  the lien 
holder.82
78 Wong D., Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States, Singapore University Press, 
Singapore, 1975, 173-174
79 E.S. and A. Bank v Philip (1937) 57 CLR 302 at 321
80 Gan Khor v Soan Bin Pelita [1935] 4 MLJ 158 per Sir Samuel Thomas CJ
81 Section 281
82 Sections 322(3) and 350(5)
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To create a valid statutory lien under the NLC the deposit o f  title documents 
with the lender alone is not adequate, because the formality o f  registering the lien 
holder's caveat is also an essential part o f  the process. The nature o f  the statutory lien 
created under section 281 o f  the NLC has been debated in the Malaysian Courts. In 
Zeno Ltd  v Prefabricated Construction Company (Malaysia) Ltd., Rajah Azlan Shah J 
ruled that the lien holder's interest is "an equitable interest in the land capable o f  being 
caveated."83 On appeal the court ruled that a lien is a separate legal-statutory lien, and 
that it has an independent existence apart from a charge. Therefore, if  a charge is 
avoided for non-compliance with the law, the lien is not avoided, provided it complies 
with the law .84
Jual Janji transaction is another form o f  security used in Malaysia. It is a kind 
o f Malay customary dealing with land. It evolved as a customary security transaction 
because under Islamic Law, a Muslim is prohibited from accepting or paying interest 
on any loan he takes or borrows. Since the majority o f  Malay peasants are Muslim they 
will not pay interest under a normal loan agreement. The majority o f  Jual Janji 
transactions are entered into by peasant borrowers to raise money for cultivation, 
usually "padi" (paddy) in rural areas. The borrower "transfers - to use the word in a 
loose sense - his land to the lender who thereby takes possession o f  it. Whatever profits 
the lender may make out o f the land will be his to keep as a reward, akin to interest for 
the loan. The borrower is entitled to resume the land upon discharging the debt except 
that, where a period was fixed for the repayment o f  the loan default will turn the
83 [1967] 2 MLJ 104, 107
84 Paramoo v Zeno Ltd [1968] 2 MLJ 230
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original, arrangement into an absolute salc,ju a lpu tu s .”85
After the torrens system o f  land dealings was adopted in Malaysia, Jual Janji 
transactions were not given any recognition. Consequently, it changed it's form where 
the borrower transferred the title o f  the land to the lender, subject to an agreement that it 
w ill be re-transferred to the borrower upon the debt being settled in full within the 
stipulated period. This transformed the original Jual Janji customary security 
transaction into a form o f  security akin to an English mortgage at common law. They 
are now used by non-Muslim borrowers as well.
4.4.1 Security Over Movables
Pledge is a form o f security that is widely used by Malaysian lenders.86 The law 
governing the pledge is found in the Contracts Act 1950 and the Sale o f  Goods (Malay 
States) Ordinance 1957.87 A pledge is defined as a bailment o f  the goods as security, for 
the payment o f  a debt or performance o f  a promise.88 The law recognises the actual 
delivery o f  goods or constructive delivery,89 for example by handing over the key to the 
warehouse in which the goods are kept.90 A question that would arise is whether a 
pledge o f  documents means that it is in fact a pledge o f  goods represented by the
85 Wong S., Jual Janji Transactions - A Question o f Recognition and Equitable 
Intervention (1973) 15 Mai LR 27
86 Sing, J., Credit and Security in West Malaysia, University of Queensland Press, St. 
Lucia, 1980, 216- 224
87 The Contracts Act 1950 is identical in most material aspects to the Indian Contracts
Act 1872 and the Indian statute, which in turn was based on the English statutes.
88 Sections 124 & 125, Contracts Act, 1950
89 Section 101 & 102, Contracts Act, 1950
90 In addition to Malaysia, key loan systems are operated in Indonesia and Singapore. 
Allan, D., et al, Credit and Security : Economic Orders and Legal Regimes (1984) 33 
ICLQ 22, 80
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documents, or whether the pledge applies only to the documents. 91 In the United 
Kingdom, the Factors Act 1889 recognises the pledging o f  title documents to goods as a 
pledge o f  the goods relating to the transactions covered by that Act.92 Malaysia does not 
have a Factors Act but provisions o f  the English statute could be applied in Malaysia by 
applying the Civil Law Act o f 1956 (Revised 1972). This would mean that under 
Malaysian law a valid pledge o f the goods themselves could be created by pledging the 
documents o f title to the goods. 93
Malaysian lenders often take floating charges created over debtor companies 
movable assets present and future, and considers it as an effective form o f  security.94 As 
in India and Sri Lanka, the Malaysian Companies Act states that a floating charge 
created by a company is void against a liquidator or any creditor o f  the company unless 
it is registered with the Registrar o f  Companies. Registration must be carried out within 
30 days o f  its creation.95
Trust receipts are widely used by bankers when loans are granted to borrowers 
for the purpose o f  importing and exporting goods96 The law governing trust receipts in 
Malaysia is far from settled. In fact there is no legislation which has been enacted to 
deal with the subject. The law that governs trust receipts is the law applicable to 
pledges, i.e. the Contracts Act, 1950 and the English Factor's Act, 1889.
Lenders in Malaysia readily accept personal guarantees when granting credit
91 Section 101 & 102 of the Contracts Act, 1950
92 Section 2
93 Chan Cheng Kum v Wah Tat Bank Ltd. [1971] MLJ 177
94 Interviews with Chan Yim Fun and Lim San Peen, Executive Directors, Price-
Waterhouse, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, on 29 May 1997.
95 Section 108
96 Yok, J, and Savarimuttu, N.G., Banking in Malaysia, Longman Malaysia, Selangor, 
1987,106
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facilities, particularly to small and medium scale businesses. Personal guarantees are 
normally taken in addition to taking real security from borrowers. In the case o f  
corporate lending, banks would normally require the directors or shareholders o f the 
company to guarantee the credit facilities so that the guarantors are responsible for the 
profitable running o f  the enterprise which would ensure repayment o f  its debts. In the 
case o f  loans to larger businesses the size and reputation o f  the enterprise is considered 
adequate security. The law governing guarantees is the same as in India. In both 
countries the respective Contract Acts contain the statutory provisions which are 
identical in all material aspects.97
The Malaysian Contracts Act defines a contract o f  guarantee as "a contract to 
perform the promise or discharge the liability o f  a third person in the case o f  default. 
Such a contract can be either oral or written, and must be supported by consideration. A  
guarantor’s liability to the lender co-exists with that o f  the principal debtor and also to 
the same extent as the borrower98 unless a limitation has been placed in the guarantee. 
Further in the case o f  default, a lender has the right to proceed against a guarantor 
without first exhausting all its remedies against the principal debtor. In Kwong Yik 
Finance Bhd v Mutual Endeavour Sdn Bhd & Or the plaintiff sought to recover the 
money from the debtor as well as the guarantors, the 2nd and 3rd defendants. The 
guarantors contended that they were liable to pay the plaintiff only i f  there was a 
shortfall o f  the debt owing, and that recovery proceedings must first be filed against the 
principal debtor. The Court held that,
For Malaysia, see sections 77-100 in Part VIII of the Contracts Act of 1950. For India, 
the identical statutory sections are seen in sections 124-147 of the Indian Contracts Act 
1872
Sections 81
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“Just as the guarantors have no right to demand that the plaintiff creditor calls 
upon the first defendant as the principal debtor, to settle the debt before asking 
them, the guarantors, to pay, they too have no right to insist that the plaintiff set 
o ff the charged property just to o ff set the debt before suing them on the 
guarantee. The plaintiff had the option to exercise which o f  two securities it 
wished to enforce. It may even enforce both securities, as is done in this case, i f  
it is found that one security is insufficient to settle the debt and it was to meet 
this eventuality that the plaintiff had in its wisdom insisted upon two forms o f  
security, the charge as well as the guarantee." 99
ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY IN  INDIA
Security is truly effective only to the extent that it may be enforced both 
quickly and cheaply for the purpose o f  recovering the underlying debt which is due, and 
where there are competing claims against an insolvent debtor, to gain priority over other 
unsecured creditors. I f enforcement o f security is time consuming and expensive, 
valuable funds o f  lending institutions will be held up from being used for other 
creditworthy purposes. Enforcement is therefore an important aspect o f security which 
must be considered.
In India, enforcing security is not easy. There are a number o f  legal as well as
practical problems that hamper effective enforcement o f  security. A  significant
difficulty faced by Indian lenders is that the law does not freely provide for self-help
remedies. The majority o f Indian judges are also reluctant to allow extra-judicial
enforcement procedures. The concerns o f  the Indian judges were well explained by
Krishnaswamy Naidu J when he said,
“While the power o f sale without the intervention o f  court may be supported and 
justified in the conditions prevailing in a commercially advanced country like 
England, where the machinery employed for selling the properties can be said to
be perfect and reliable its introduction in India,  does not seem to be
necessary or justified since from the result o f  its working it has been found that 
there is scope for its abuse resulting in great injustice to bonafide mortgagors
[1989] MLJ 135, 136
who are likely to be deprived o f their properties by an improper and irregular 
exercise o f  the power o f  sale.”100
4.5.1 Enforcement o f  Mortgage Security Under the Transfer o f  Property Act, 1882
The enforcement o f  a mortgage security is governed by section 67 o f the 
Transfer o f Property Act. In the absence o f a contract to the contrary, a bank as a 
mortgagee has the right, at any time after the loan becomes due, to obtain from court a 
decree for the sale o f  the property that was mortgaged, or a decree for foreclosure. Once 
a decree for foreclosure has been obtained the mortgagor is absolutely debarred o f his 
right to redeem the mortgaged property. Prior to 1929 the remedy o f  foreclosure was 
available to mortgagees with conditional sales and English mortgages but Rule 4(2) o f  
Order 34 o f  the Civil Procedure Code empowered the Indian courts to direct a sale in 
lieu o f  foreclosure. The result was that courts in various parts o f  the country exercised 
their discretion differently. For example, the trend in the courts in Calcutta and 
Alahabad was to refuse foreclosure, while in Bombay foreclosure decrees were 
granted.101 In 1929, section 67 was amended by section 31 o f the Transfer o f  Property 
(Amendment) Act o f  that year.
Section 67(a) (as amended) provides, amongst others, that:
".. .Nothing in this section shall be deemed-
(a) to authorise any mortgagee other than a mortgagee by conditional sale 
or a mortgagee under an anomalous mortgage by the terms o f  which he is 
entitled to foreclose, to institute a suit for foreclosure, or an usufructuary 
mortgagee as such or a mortgagee by conditional sale as such to institute a 
suit for sale; or..."
100 ^ Batcha Saheb v Nariman K. Irani [1955] AIR (Mad) 491,493
101 See the observations of the Report of the Special Committee of 1929 on the changes 
required to Section 67 in TP Act reported in Chitaley D., Appu Rao, S., A.I.R. 
Commentaries, The Transfer of Property Act (No. 4 o f 1882) 4th Ed., Vol. 11, All 
India Reporter Ltd., Nagpur, 1969, 1277
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According to the first part o f  clause 67(a) a mortgagee by conditional sale has a 
right o f  foreclosure but the latter part prohibits filing a suit for a decree o f  sale. In other 
words leaving only the remedy o f  foreclosure available to a mortgagee by conditional 
sale.102 A  usufructuary mortgagee cannot sue for a decree o f  sale or foreclosure. The 
remedy is possession o f the mortgaged property. A  lender that takes mortgaged security 
by accepting a deposit o f  title deeds can enforce its security only by way o f  sale.103 A  
lender with a simple mortgage can obtain only a decree for sale but not for 
foreclosure.104 In the case o f  anomalous mortgagees the enforcement rights w ill solely 
depend on the terms and conditions governing the mortgage. Clause 67(a) allows such a 
mortgage to file for a decree o f  foreclosure and does not prohibit him from filing suit for 
a decree o f  sale i f  the mortgage agreement does not bar such an action.105
It is obvious that section 67 lacks clarity. The remedies available to 
mortgagees that have taken different forms o f mortgages need to be simply restated, 
rather than having to work out what the law is intending to communicate. In 1977 the 
Law Commission o f India recommended that section 67 should be redrafted, and that 
the right to bring action for foreclosure should be removed from the statute.106 This 
recommendation was not implemented by the Government in office.
A  mortgagee with an English mortgage can enforce its security by first 
obtaining a decree for sale o f  the property but it cannot file suit for a decree o f
102 Vala Punja & Ors v Puna Mavji & Another [1963] AIR (Guj) 112, 115
103 Ramazan Yegi & Another v Messrs Balthaza & Son Ltd [1936] AIR (Rang) 290, 292
104 Chandramma v Gunasethan [1931] AIR (Mad) 542
105 Savitri Devi v Beni Devi & Others [1968] AIR (Pat) 222, 225
106 jQth Report of Law Commission of India on The Transfer o f Property Act, 1882, 
Sadar Patel Marg, Allahabad, 1977,472
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foreclosure.107 In addition to having a right o f sale by obtaining a court order, in very 
limited circumstances, a mortgagee would have the right o f  extra judicial sale under 
section 69 o f  the Act. A bank or lending institution which has taken an English 
mortgage is also entitled to appoint a receiver o f income o f  the mortgaged property or 
any part thereof.108 The lender also has authority to apply to court for the appointment o f  
a receiver, i f  the person appointed by the deed is not in a position to act as a receiver. 
Such an appointed receiver will be deemed to have been appointed by the mortgagee.109
A receiver appointed under an English mortgage is the agent o f  the mortgagor 
unless the mortgage instrument provides to the contrary. Consequently, the mortgagor is 
solely responsible for the receiver’s acts unless such acts are caused by the improper 
intervention o f  the mortgagee. The powers and duties o f  a private receiver are set out in 
sections 69A (3)-(8), and these statutory provisions are identical in all material 
particulars to section 109 o f  the English Law o f  Property Act.110 Conversely, the Civil 
Procedure Code also empowers mortgagees to have receivers appointed by court under 
Order 40 Rule 1 which gives a court receiver a range o f  powers.
Power o f  Extra-Judicial Sale
The mortgagee that has taken an English mortgage has the right to sell the 
mortgaged property without first obtaining a court order. This right o f  extra-judicial 
enforcement may be used in the following situations:
Section 69(1) provides:
107 Mukherjeev Agrawalla [1968] AIR (Cal) 153
108 Section 69(a)(i)
109 Section 69(a)(ii)
HO Chitaley D., and Appu Rao S., AJ.R. Commentaries : The Transfer o f Property Act
(No.4 o f1882) 4**1 Ed., Vol. 11, All India Reporter Ltd., Nagpur, 1969, 1359
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“(a) where the mortgage is an English Mortgage, and neither the mortgagor 
nor the mortgagee is a Hindu, Muhammedam or Buddhist or a member 
o f  any other race, sect tribe or class from time to time specified in this 
behalf by the State Government in the Official Gazette;
(b) where a power o f sale without the intervention o f  the Court is expressly 
conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage deed and the mortgagee is 
the government;
(c) where a power o f sale without the intervention o f  the court is expressly 
conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage deed and the mortgaged 
property or any part thereof was, on the date o f  the execution o f the 
mortgage deed, situate within the towns o f  Calcutta, Madras, Bombay or 
in any other town or area which the State Government may, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.”
The law allows the right o f  private sale only in extremely limited situations. In
1977 the Banking Laws Committee observed that this approach was clearly right for an
era where the principal providers o f  credit were private moneylenders, and went on to
recommend that the law should be amended to give the right o f  private sale to banks and
certain public financing institutions, because they are now the providers o f  credit for
productive development purposes.111 The Committee was o f  the view that if  the right o f
private sale is withheld from these lenders it would adversely affect the flow o f  credit,
and hinder expeditious debt recovery due to unnecessary delays and high litigation
expenses. The Committee recommended that the application o f  this law should be
modified and suggested that,
"The power o f sale without the intervention o f  court should be allowed to all 
banks and certain notified financing institutions and this should be available to 
them with reference to all types o f  advances other than those made against the 
security o f  agricultural land and should be available independent o f  the form o f  
the mortgage in their favour."112
This recommendation has not been given effect to.
Report o f The Banking Laws Committee on Real Property Security Law, Government 
of India, Delhi, 1977,31
Report on Real Property Security Law, Government of India, Delhi, 1977, 34
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4.5.2 Enforcement O f Rights Under a Pledge or Hypothecation
Where goods are pledged to a lender and the borrower defaults payment, the 
lender has two alternate remedies open to it. A lender may file action for the payment o f  
money and retain the pledged goods as security or he may, after giving the pledgor 
reasonable notice sell the pledged property without a court order.113 Once the sale is 
completed the proceeds must be used to satisfy the outstanding debt and any excess 
must be repaid to the borrower. Lenders that have entered into "key loan arrangements” 
also have the power to sell the property without court intervention.114
Unlike in a pledge, a lender’s right with regard to goods hypothecated to it is 
not clearly stated in any Indian statute. Lenders therefore insist on including a specific 
clause in the hypothecation agreement which gives them the power to take possession 
and sell the secured property without a court order. The effectiveness o f  inserting such 
clauses has been argued in a number cases, and judicial opinion is diverse. Some courts 
have ruled that a hypothecation agreement is entirely regulated by the terms o f the 
contract between the parties and upon default, a lender can exercise his right o f  
possession and sale without a court order. In Bank o f  Maharashtra v Official Liquidator, 
Narayana Pai J said
“Hypothecation is only an extended idea o f  a pledge, the creditor permitting the 
debtor to retain possession either on behalf o f  or in trust for himself, (the 
creditor) Hence so far as the movables actually covered by hypothecation deeds 
are concerned, there can be no doubt that the bank is entitled to retain possession 
and also exercise the right o f  private sale.” 115
By contrast, other courts have ruled that a hypothecation agreement creates only an
Section 176, Contracts Act, 1950; See Abichandani, R., (Ed) Pollock and Mulla on 
Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 11th Ed., Vol. 11, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 
1994,1059-1061
114 Bank Of Maharashtra v Official Liquidator (1969) AIR (Mys) 280
U5 [1969] AIR (Mys) 280, at 287
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equitable right in favour o f  the hypothecatee, and that such rights can be enforced only 
after obtaining a court order. A  particularly strong case is Bank o f  India v S.B. Shah Ali 
where a hypothecation agreement between the parties specifically gave the Bank o f  
India the power to take possession, appoint receivers and to sell a lorry by public 
auction or private sale. Upon default, the Bank took possession and sold the lorry 
without obtaining a court order. The Court held that the bank was not entitled to take 
possession or sell the property without an order from the Court. In so holding the Court 
explained:
"[W]hen the hypothecation creates only a charge, it is only a right in respect o f  
the property and such a covenant in the contract can only be enforced through 
court. The reason being that in the absence o f  de ju re  or de facto  possession or 
transfer o f  title, a person cannot take the law into his own hands and take 
possession o f the goods forcibly when the debtor obstructs taking possession."116
4.5.3 Receivership Under the Companies Act, 1956
Indian law recognises the creation o f a floating charge by a company in favour 
o f a debenture holder as a means o f  security for money lent to it.117 If a borrower 
defaults repayment a debenture holder may, if  authorised to do so by the debenture, 
appoint a receiver. Failing such authority in the debenture the bank may apply to court 
for an order to have a receiver appointed.118 Notice o f  a receiver's appointment must be
given to the Registrar o f Companies within thirty days o f  the appointment, who will in
turn, enter it in the Register o f  Charges. The sanction for non-compliance is a fine.119 
Further, a bank may appoint a manager to the charged property under the terms o f  the
116 [1987] 2 Andhra Law Times Report 470, at 476
117 Singh, A., Company Law, 9th Ed., Eastern Law Book Co., Lucknow, 1989, 351
11  ^ Section 137(1) Companies Act, 1956
Section 137(2) Companies Act, 1956
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debenture, or have a manager appointed by court.120 A ll the statutory provisions relating 
to a receiver also apply to a manager.121 To a lender, the most important point about 
taking a floating charge as security is that it has the power to appoint a receiver or 
manager without recourse to court. Although the law clearly provides for extra-judicial 
appointments, Indian banks still prefer to have receivers appointed by court under Order 
40 Rule 1 o f  the Civil Procedure Code.122 This is rather surprising because the delays 
experienced in the Indian courts are widely known, and a right which enables a lender to 
enforce its security privately can be very useful.
4.6 ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY IN SRI LANKA
The legal handicaps faced by Sri Lankan lenders trying to enforce security 
were recognised as far back as in 1934. The differing views expressed by the various 
commissions o f  inquiry as to the changes that should be made to the law, left the 
problem unresolved for over fifty years. In 1934, the Banking Commission observed 
that banks and other commercial bodies repeatedly made representations to the 
government in office complaining that "the Judiciary had to be frequently approached to 
enforce the rights o f  creditors", and that the commercial laws o f  Ceylon did not help the 
creditors.123 No steps were taken to address this deficiency. Later, the Mortgage 
Commission o f  1945 disagreed with the recommendations made by the Banking 
Commission. It was particularly opposed to the Banking Commission’s
120 Section 424, Companies Act, 1956
121 Singh, A., Company Law, 9th Ed., Eastern Law Book Co., Lucknow, 1989, 357
122 Pillai, P., & Nair, P., Law of Receivers, 3rd Ed., Law Book Company, Allahabad, 
1988, 818-822
123 Report o f the Ceylon Banking Commission, Sessional Paper XXII, Vol. 1, Government 
Printers, Colombo, 1934, Para. 426
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recommendation that banks must be given extra-judicial enforcement powers. The 
Mortgage Commission concluded that, what ever the provisions may be in English law 
so far as Ceylon is concerned, it is unhesitatingly o f the opinion that it would be most 
unwise to confer the right o f  parate execution over land.124
The Wimalaratne Committee o f 1985 recommended that parate execution in 
relation to corporeal movables should be extended to more lending institutions. There 
was strong opposition to the suggested changes by the Bar Association o f Sri Lanka, 
and as a result implementation o f these recommendations were deferred.125 Meanwhile, 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank also indicated that the laws in the 
country must be suitably amended to facilitate expeditious debt recovery. Eventually, 
however, significant change in the law o f  credit and security in Sri Lanka occurred in 
early 1990, when the Cabinet approved the enactment o f  fourteen statutes as one 
package relating to debt recovery. The enforcement o f  security without court 
intervention is now governed by the Recovery o f  Loans By Banks (Special Provisions) 
Act, 1990.
4.6.1 Parate Execution Under the Recovery O f Loans By Banks (Special Provisions) Act, 
1990
The Recovery o f  Loans By Banks (Special Provisions) Act gives the right o f  
parate execution to all commercial banks, and extends this right in respect o f  both 
immovable and movable property. When a borrower defaults in payment, the board o f  
directors o f  a bank has the power to authorise the sale o f  the property mortgaged to it by
124 Second Interim Report o f the Mortgage Commission, Sessional Paper V, Government 
Printers, Colombo, 1945 Para 94-95
125 Third Report o f the Presidential Commission On Finance and Banking on Debt
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public auction to recover its debts.126 I f however, payment is made to the bank before the 
date for the auction is fixed, no further steps may be taken by the bank.127 The Board 
also has the power to authorise any person to take possession o f  the property mortgaged 
to the bank. Such a person appointed by the Board o f  Directors has all the rights and 
powers o f  a receiver appointed under the Mortgage Act.128 When the outstanding debts 
have been fully recovered, the Board must surrender possession o f  the mortgaged 
property to the borrower.129
So far, lenders have been extremely reluctant to exercise their statutory rights 
o f parate execution, possibly in the past because the courts have viewed this remedy as 
deplorable and harsh. For example, in the case o f  Mendis v The Ceylon State Mortgage 
Bank which arose under the Mortgage Act o f  1949, the Bank sold the property by 
auction to a sole bidder for almost half its market value. The court decided that the bank 
did not commit a breach o f any legal duty by selling the property, and that in the 
absence o f  any negligence in the conduct o f the sale the bank was not liable for the loss 
suffered by the appellant. But both judges were critical o f  the fact that a legislative 
measure intended to benefit the subject had in its operation produced a result which, 
though not illegal, was “revolting to ones sense o f  justice and fair play.”130 Basnayake 
CJ, observed:
"The plaintiff has suffered a cruel fate at the hands o f  the State lending 
institution whose aid he sought. No private moneylender would have been 
permitted by the courts to act in the way the defendant bank had done. This case
Recovery Legislation, Department of Government Printing, Colombo, 1992, 1
126 Section 4
127 Section 10
128 Section 5
129 Section 5(3)
130 (1959) 61 NLR 385, 382
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should serve as a warning to the legislature against entrusting vast powers to 
State agencies without adequate safeguards."131
4.6 2 Enforcement O f Mortgage Security Under The Mortgage Act, 1949
The law and procedure under which a mortgagee can realise its security is 
contained in the Mortgage Act o f 1949.132 The provisions o f  this Act reflect principles o f  
Roman Dutch Law.
Power o f  Sale
A  lender that has taken immovable property as security, can sue the debtor to 
enforce payment, whether or not the mortgagor is in possession o f the mortgaged 
property at the time o f  action.133 Where a court concludes that the mortgage ought to be 
enforced, it must make an order for the mortgaged property to be sold. The law prohibits 
the sale o f  any other property o f  the mortgagee other than the mortgaged property which 
the lender has taken as security for the recovery o f  any money found to be due under the 
mortgage.134 If however, if  a loan exceeds Rs. 150,000/- a lender taking a mortgaged 
security has the right to call upon the borrower to renounce the benefit afforded to it 
under the Act.135
131 Ibid., at 386
132 Legislative Enactments o f the Democratic Socialist Republic o f Sri Lanka, 1980,
(Revised Edition) Chapter 98
133 Section 7
134 Section 46
135 Section 47A as amended by the Mortgage (Amendment) Act, No. 3 of 1990. In
1945, the Mortgage Commission, while recommending the enactment of Sections. 46 
and 47 of the Act of 1949, stated that provision must be made for express renunciation 
of this right by way of a separate instrument attested by a Notary. (Second Interim 
Report o f the Mortgage Commission, Sessional Paper V, 1945, Para. 117.) The 
government in office at the time did not accept this recommendation, but in 1990, after 
the lapse of forty-five years the law was amended.
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Where a lender has taken movable property as mortgage security, and the 
borrower defaults, the Mortgage Act allows an action to be instituted to obtain an order 
from court for the sale o f  the movable property. If movable property has been 
mortgaged to an approved credit agency, the Act allows such an agency to sell by public 
auction any o f  the property subject to a mortgage without first obtaining an order from 
court.136 If the money realised is in excess o f the amount due to the agency the 
mortgagor is entitled to the balance after satisfying the debt, but i f  the money realised is 
insufficient, the agency will have to sue for the balance under the normal recovery 
procedures o f  the country.137
Receivership
The Mortgage Act allows a mortgagee o f  land to make an application to court 
for the appointment o f  a receiver in respect o f the land which is mortgaged to it.138 A  
receiver so appointed would have all the rights and powers o f  the owner o f  the land for 
its management, protection, and preservation and for the collection o f  rents and profits 
accruing from the property.139 The receiver has a duty to court to submit accounts, to 
make payments into court from the rents and profits received, and must be responsible 
for any damage caused to the land or loss incurred by his negligence, or any intentional 
act o f  omission .140
A  mortgagee o f  movable property also has the right to make an application to 
court for the appointment o f  a receiver. However such an application may be made only
136 Section 85
137 Section 87
138 Section 37(1)
139 Section 41(1)
1^0 Section 42
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i f  the mortgage is created in respect o f  the entirety o f  the goods which include existing 
as well as future stock in trade.141
4.6.3 Receivership Under The Companies Act, 1982
The Sri Lankan Companies Act recognises a debenture holder’s right to appoint
a receiver and manager o f  the property if  such a power is conferred by the debenture.
The Act provides for the appointment o f  a receiver and manager by obtaining an order 
from court, or where the debenture provides for it without recourse to court. 142 Once a 
receiver or manager is appointed he is under a duty to inform the Registrar o f  
Companies o f  his appointment within 7 days, and the Registrar, in turn, must enter the 
fact in the Register o f Charges.143 A  receiver who does not comply with these 
requirements is guilty o f  an offence and is liable to a fine.144 Although the law provides 
for the appointment o f a receiver under a debenture, in practice, hardly any appear to 
have been appointed by lenders.
4.7 ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY IN  MALAYSIA
Malaysian law recognises judicial as well as private enforcement procedures. 
Compared with India and Sri Lanka, lenders are not hesitant to exercise their extra­
judicial enforcement rights and have them carried out by qualified insolvency 
practitioners.145 The relative efficiency o f  the judicial process in Malaysia, compared
^41 Section 96
142 Section 382
143 Section 98(1)
144 Section 98(2)
145 Interviews with Mr. Lim San Peen and Mrs Chan Yim Fun, Executive Directors, Price 
Waterhouse Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, on 29 May 1997.
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with India and Sri Lanka, is a factor.
4 .7.1 Enforcement o f  Real Property Security Under the National Land Code, 1950
Where a lender has taken a statutory charge as security under the National Land 
Code (NLC) and the borrower defaults in repayment, the NLC provides the chargee 
with two remedies namely, judicial sale and, in limited circumstances, possession . 146
Judicial Sale
The National Land Code has two different procedures for the sale o f  charged 
property created under the Code.147 In both instances the chargee must serve notice on 
the chargor in the prescribed form identifying the breach, and requiring it to be 
remedied within one month or such time as may be specified in the charge. Warning 
should be given that proceedings will be commenced to obtain an order for sale o f  the 
property in the event o f  a continued failure to remedy the breach.148 If payment is not 
made and the land or the lease is held under registry title149 an application could be made 
to the High Court for an order to sell the charged property.150 An order will normally be 
granted unless the court is satisfied o f  the existence o f  "cause to the contrary."151 The 
order will specify that the sale must be by public auction under the direction o f an
146 Section 253
147 Fatt, W., & Lieng, C., Chargee’s Remedies & Chargor’s Rights Under the NLC
[1990] 3MLJxcvii
148 Section 254
149 According to section 5 of the NLC, “registry title” means title evidenced by a grant or 
state lease or by any document of title registered under the provisions of any previous 
land law.
1^0 Order 83 of the Rules of the High Court
156 Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd v Oon Seng Development Sdn Bhd (1990) 1 MLJ
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officer o f  the court and not less than one month from the date o f  the order.152 Where 
there have been no bidders at the public auction the court has allowed the sale o f  
property by private treaty.153
If the charged land is held under a “land office title” an application for sale can 
be made to the Land Administrator (formerly known as the Collector o f Land 
Revenue).154 The Land Administrator shall hold an enquiry and give an opportunity to 
the chargor to show cause why the order for sale should not be made. The Land 
Administrator will make an order for sale unless there is good cause or reason to the 
contrary.
A lender that has taken a statutory lien over land may enforce the security by 
first proving the outstanding debt in court, obtaining judgement in his favour and 
thereafter applying to court for an order o f  sale.155 The procedure to follow for an order 
for sale is the same as when a registered charge is enforced. Once an order for sale is 
obtained, it is carried out by public auction. After the auction has been completed the 
sale proceeds must be deposited in a special account in a government department. The 
procedure to retrieve the money from the account is reported to be bureaucratic and 
takes up to one year or more.156
Possession
A chargee could also take possession o f the property over which it has a
152 Section 257 & 259 NLC
153 Malaysian United Bank v Cheah Kim Yu (Beh Sai Ming & Satu Lain Pencelah) [1991]
1 MLJ313
154 Section 260 NLC
155 Section 281(2) NLC
156 Interview with Mr. Ismail, Senior Practising Lawyer, Mohamed Ismail & Co, Kuala 
Lumpur, on 30 May 1997.
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charge. It would then be able to receive either rents or profits which would otherwise be 
payable to the chargor by its tenants, or i f  the property is not subject to a lease or 
tenancy by taking actual possession o f  it.157 This however, is a remedy seldom used by 
lenders in Malaysia who prefer to exercise their rights o f  judicial sale. At least two 
reasons could be given. First, i f  the property is occupied by the chargor or his tenants, a 
chargee bank cannot take actual possession without serving prior notice o f  its intention 
to do so .158 Second, the chargee bank would be accountable to the chargor not only for 
what it receives whilst being in possession o f  the property but also for any additional 
income it should have received by the prudent exercise o f  its powers. 159
The enforcement o f  a charge or lien created under the NLC requires judicial 
intervention. A  practice has therefore evolved where clauses are inserted into security 
documents giving lenders the power o f sale by private treaty without making the 
required application to court. This practice has received judicial approval in certain 
cases.160 The position is however far from resolved as some judges have refused to 
uphold the validity o f  private sales.161
157 Section 271 NLC
!58 Section 272 NLC
159 Section 274 NLC
160 United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v Official Receiver and Liquidator of Soon Hup
Seng Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) & Another [1986] 1 MLJ 75 (HC); The case was
criticised for undermining the purpose of The National Land Code in Puthucheary, J., 
& Nadkami, N., UMBC v Soon Hup Seng: Deathknell for Chargor Protection [1987] 2 
MLJ cxlvii
161 In Re Sama Corp Sdn Bhd; C l Holdings Bhd v Fabatan Pemegang Harta [1992] 2 MLJ 
251. See also Cheang, L., & Chiew, A., A Legal Impossibility : Arming Chargees With 
Private Power of Sale o f Charged Land Outside the Provisions o f the National Land 
Code, 1965 [1990] 1 MLJ xxxvi
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4.7.2 Enforcement o f  a Pledge
If a pledgor defaults in payment within the stipulated time the pledgee may 
either sue for payment and retain the goods until payment is made, or sell the pledged 
goods after giving the pledgor reasonable notice.162 If the proceeds o f  such a sale are not 
adequate to repay the amount due, the borrower will continue to be liable to the lender 
to pay the outstanding balance. If however, the sale proceeds are greater than the 
outstanding debt the lender must return the surplus to the borrower. 163
4.7.3 Appointing a Receiver Under the Companies Act, 1965
The enforcement o f  a debenture that has created a fixed or floating charge or 
both, over a debtor’s property is by the appointment o f  a receiver to realise the assets 
subject to the charge in favour o f the debenture holder.164 A  receiver and manager may 
be appointed either by court, or by the debenture holder if  such a right has been 
conferred upon it by the debenture. In practice, lenders often appoint receivers privately 
because they consider the judicial process to be too slow .165 The powers o f  a receiver 
appointed by a debenture holder are derived from the debenture deed.166 The duties o f a 
receiver however, are outlined in the Act.167 The primary duty o f  the receiver is to 
realise the secured assets and discharge the liabilities o f  the debtor in the proper order o f
162 Section 129, Contracts Act, 1950
163 ibid.
164 Kamar, S., Powers of Receiver and Manager [1995] 3 MLJ 229
165 Interview With Mr. Lim San Peen, Executive Director, Price Waterhouse Malaysia, 
Kuala Lumpur, on 29 May 1997
166 in the Malaysian High Court case Tan Ah Tech (t/a Plumcon Plumbing Construction 
Co) v Coffral (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Wan Yahya J said,
“...a debenture holder’s receiver is only empowered to act and do all things which he is 
authorised according to the debenture and the covering trust deed which provide for his 
appointment.” [1992] 1 MLJ 553, 558
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priorities. Expenses o f receivership are considered pre preferential debts and employee 
dues are considered preferential debts. Both these debts have priority over a floating 
charge holder’s claim .168 A  receiver therefore has a statutory obligation to pay these 
debts before settling the debts o f the debenture holder.
4.8 PROBLEMS OF ENFORCING SECURITY
Banks and other lending institutions in India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia may 
follow a number o f  procedures judicial and otherwise to enforce their security rights. 
Lenders in India and Sri Lanka are particularly concerned as to the poor results achieved 
by them when the available enforcement mechanisms are used. A  recent decision given 
by the Federal Court o f Malaysia also raises the question whether judicial attitudes are 
changing in favour o f  debtors. Broadly speaking, the basis o f  the problem may lie in the 
“credit culture” in these countries. In other words, whether the laws and judicial 
attitudes in these countries are pro-creditor or pro-debtor. Let us examine some o f the 
relevant laws.
4.8.1 Industrial Sickness in India
In 1981 the Reserve Bank o f  India appointed a committee under the 
chairmanship o f  Shri T. Tiwari (Tiwari Committee) to examine the legal and other 
difficulties faced by banks and financial institutions in the rehabilitation o f  sick 
industrial undertakings, and suggest remedial measures including changes in the law .169 
The Committee observed that the remedies available under various statutes were
167 Part VII, Sections 182-192
168 Section 191
169 Interim Report on the Issue of Special Legislation, RBI, Delhi, 1981, Para. 1.1
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inadequate, and as a result many sick companies which were potentially viable were not
being revived. Many o f  the difficulties faced in rehabilitating sick companies arose
because laws like the Companies Act were not primarily meant to deal with the problem
o f industrial sickness, and even if  the laws did refer to it the approach would be sectoral
and limited to its own angle rather than based on a co-ordinated view. The Committee
recommended that in such a situation it was necessary,
"to get out o f the multiplicity o f  the existing laws and procedures and draw up a 
special legislation which will enable speedy and effective action to be taken for 
rehabilitation o f  the sick units. Such a legislation can create a specialised body 
exclusively devoted to revival o f sick units, which step would ensure unified 
approach and speedy and time-bound decisions."170
In 1985, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act171 was enacted to 
implement the recommendations made by the Tiwari Committee.
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
The purpose o f this Act is to provide for preventive, ameliorative, and remedial
measures that are essential for reviving sick or potentially sick companies, and for
ensuring expeditious enforcement o f  the schemes o f  revival devised by the authorities
under the Act.172 In order to achieve the said objects, the Act provides for the
establishment o f  the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) with both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. Under section 15(1) o f  the Act, it is
mandatory for a “sick company”173 to report its sickness to the BIFR within sixty days
170 Interim Report on the Issue of Special Legislation, RBI, Delhi, 1981, Para. 10.1
171 No. 1 of 1986
172 Statement of Objects and Reasons
173 xhe Reserve Bank of India has defined a "Sick Unit" as one which has incurred cash 
loss for one year, and in the judgment of the banks is likely to continue to incur cash 
losses for one year as well as the following year and which has an imbalance in its 
financial structure such as current ratio 1:1 and worsening debt ratio (total liabilities to 
net worth) - Tiwari Committee Report, 1981, Para 2.1
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o f finalising the audited accounts. Where the Board decides a company had become 
sick but it is practicable for the company to make its net worth positive, reasonable time 
should be given to the company to do so .174 Where it is not practicable for a sick 
company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time, the Board may direct 
for rehabilitation.175
According to section 22 when an inquiry is pending, or a rehabilitation scheme 
is under preparation or consideration, or i f  such a scheme is being implemented, or an 
appeal against the decision o f the Board is pending, no proceedings for the winding up 
o f the sick company, or the execution or distress or such like against the company's 
assets, or the appointment o f  a receiver, can be proceeded with, except with the consent 
o f  the Board or Appellate Authority. Clearly, section 22 presents a significant
obstacle to lending institutions intending to enforce their security rights. The restrictive 
approach taken by the Indian courts in making orders under this provision has not been 
encouraging either. There have been a number o f  cases in the High Courts where 
creditors o f  sick companies have argued that their case falls outside the scope o f  section 
22 .176 In Gram Panchayat v Shree Vallabh Glass Works L td .'11 the Supreme Court held
that, since the company was sick and a rehabilitation a scheme was being prepared
under the direction o f the BIFR, there was an automatic suspension o f legal proceedings 
against the debtor company's properties. On a more sympathetic note to the creditors, 
Jagannatha Chetty J added,
174 Section 17(2)
175 Section 17(3)
176 Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co Ltd. v U.P. State Electricity Board [1992] AIR 
(All) 247 ; The Industrial Bank o f India v Nira Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. [1992] AIR 
(Bom) 365; Navanit R. Kamani v R. Kamani [1989] AIR (SC) 9
177 [1990] AIR (SC) 1018
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"It may be against the principles o f  equity if  the creditors are not allowed to 
recover their dues from the company, but such creditors may approach the 
board fo r  permission to proceed against the company for the recovery o f  their 
dues. If the approval is not granted, the remedy is not extinguished. It is only 
postponed."178 (emphasis added)
Although the court accepted that it is against equity not to allow creditors to recover
their dues, the temporary suspension o f  their remedies was justified on the ground that 
the BIFR had the discretion to allow the proceedings to continue. In practice however, 
the BIFR may never allow it because its primary concern is to revive the company and if  
proceedings against the company are allowed to continue the company may have to 
incur further costs and liabilities and aggravate its financial difficulties.179 The majority 
o f the decisions given by the Indian courts under section 22 o f  the Sick Industries Act 
suggests that courts have shown a great keenness to give effect to provisions o f  the Act 
thereby enhancing the prospect o f a sick company being revived. Although the courts 
have not ignored the interests o f the creditors completely, the concern shown has been 
negligible.180
4.8.2 Power o f  Extra Judicial Sale Under The Transfer o f  Property Act, 1882
The Transfer o f  Property Act does not permit a bank as a mortgagee to exercise
178 ibid., 1020
179 Navanit R. Kamani v R Kamani [1989] AIR (SC) 9 Thakar J at page 18 : "Having 
given our anxious consideration to the decision rendered by BIFR sanctioning the 
scheme taking into account all the factors we fully agree with the reasoning and 
conclusion of BIFR and hereby stamp the scheme with the imprimatur of this court”
180 In the case of M/s Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd v Church o f South India Trust 
Association Agarwal J pointed out that the provisions of 22(1) seek to assist in 
achieving the objectives of the Act and further explained that:
"It could not be the intention of Parliament in enacting the said provision to aggravate 
the financial difficulties of a sick industrial company while the said matters were 
pending before the Board of the Appellate Authority by enabling a sick industrial 
company to continue to incur further liabilities during this period."
[1992] AIR (SC) 1439, at 1445
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its power o f  extra-judicial sale, except in two limited circumstances stated in section
69.181 First, the mortgage in question must be an English mortgage and no other.
Second, both the mortgagee and the mortgagor cannot be a Hindu, Muslim or a
Buddhist or be a member o f  a race, sect, tribe or class officially notified by the state.
The judicial attitude towards extra-judicial sale has so far not been encouraging
either. In spite o f  the safe guards provided for in section 69(2),182 some Indian judges
seem to think that the Transfer o f  Property Act is “wreaking havoc" to the greater
detriment o f  honest mortgagors. In Batcha Sahib v Nariman K. Irani Krishnaswamy
Naidu J. while stating that it is a drastic provision, observed:
"while the power o f  sale without the intervention o f Court may be supported and 
justified in the conditions prevailing in a commercially advanced country like 
England, where the machinery employed for selling the properties can be said to 
be perfect and reliable its introduction in India...does not seem to be necessary 
or justified since from the result o f its working it has been found that there is 
scope for its abuse resulting in great injustice to bonafide mortgagors who are 
likely to be deprived o f  their properties by an improper and irregular exercise o f  
the power o f  sale."183
4.8.3 Enforcing a Hypothecation in India
A hypothecation is commonly known as a mortgage o f  movables without 
giving actual possession to the mortgagee. It is not statutorily defined consequently, the 
rights and duties o f  parties to a hypothecation agreement are not governed by statute 
law. Due to this inadequacy in the law, when a lender enters into a hypothecation
lo l This section has been modelled on the English Conveyancing Act of 1881; presently
contained in the English Law of Property Act of 1925 and therefore is in line with the
law in England. (41 & 42 Viet. C. 41, 15 Geo. V. Ch. 20)
182 An extra-judicial sale cannot be carried out unless and until:
a) notice in writing demanding the principal sum has been served on the mortgagor and 
payment has not been made for three months or
b) interest of at least Rs. 500/= is in arrears for three months after becoming due 
!83 [1955] AIR (Mad) 491, at 493
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agreement it w ill safeguard itself by insisting on including a clause that gives it the 
power to take actual possession o f  the property from the borrower and sell it i f  the 
borrower defaults. In practice, this may prove to be useless for a number o f  reasons.
According to an agreement between parties, a lender may have the power to 
take possession o f  the hypothecated goods, but i f  the borrower refuses to give 
possession it w ill not be lawful for a lender to take possession forcibly. If an attempt is 
made to take possession without the borrower’s consent, the lender may have to face 
criminal proceedings filed by the borrower on grounds such as wrongful entry, trespass, 
and breach o f  peace. Even if  the borrower hands over the property willingly, 
identifying the hypothecated goods may be a problem because the property may not be 
demarcated. Simply locking up the entire premise with all the goods is obviously not 
practical. A  borrower may actively dissipate the hypothecated goods without the prior 
consent o f  the banks thus leaving the security valueless. Similarly, i f  the goods are o f  a 
perishable nature and the borrower does not take adequate safeguards to preserve the 
stocks, they may have depleted completely. Due to the difficulties faced by lenders to 
take possession o f  hypothecated goods, their right to sell the goods will automatically 
prove to be useless.
The Indian courts have also taken the stand that hypothecation does not always 
give a lender the power to take possession or to sell the property i f  the borrower 
defaults. In State Bank o f  India v S.B. Shah A li184 the bank was empowered by a 
hypothecation agreement to take possession, appoint receivers and sell by public auction 
goods that were hypothecated to it as security. The bank sold by public auction a lorry 
that has been hypothecated to it. The District Court held that the bank was liable in
184 1987 (2) Andhra Law Times Report 470
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damages for taking possession o f the lorry without first obtaining a court order. On 
appeal, the High Court o f Andhra Pradesh reversed the lower court decision and 
concluded,
“If there is a mere charge in the hypothecation agreement, the hypothecatee has 
to approach the court and seek , the intervention o f  the court for obtaining a 
money decree and selling the hypothecated goods through the court. Where 
there is any specific clause in the hypothecation agreement, the hypothecatee can 
proceed without the intervention o f the court.” 185
The law on this issue will not be resolved until it is decided by the Indian Supreme 
Court. The decision o f the High Court has however, further strengthened the case for 
lenders seeking expeditious enforcement procedures.186
4.8.4 The Sri Lankan Recovery o f  Loans by Banks (Special Provisions) Act No.4 o f  1990
"One o f  the greatest impediments to dynamic lending by the Bank o f Ceylon and
People's Bank has been the archaic debt recovery law o f  this country  The
World Bank loan will be given to us only i f  we liberalise our debt recovery laws 
because the loans will be given through the state banks, the National 
Development Bank and the DFCC to "the small industrialists, the small
agriculturists, o f the country The Bar Association O f Sri Lanka is the greatest
impediment to the two State Banks lending to the farmers, fisherman and other 
small people o f Sri Lanka..”187
Heated arguments for and against the reform o f  the then debt recovery laws in force 
continued until finally, in 1990 new legislation was introduced streamlining the debt 
recovery laws and complimenting the expanding commercial activities in the still 
emerging market economy in Sri Lanka. Although the enactment o f  this new legislation 
appears to be somewhat forced, it wrought a change long demanded by the lending 
community.
185 [1995] AIR (AP) 134, 143-144
l 8  ^ Kothari, V., State bank o f India v S. B. Shah A l i : Right to Repossess Assets Exists in
Hypothecations too [ 1998] 13 Journal of International Banking Law 34
l 8  ^ Rt. Hon. R. De Mel (Then Finance Minister), Hansard, 25 November 1987, 898 - 899
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The Recovery o f  Loans by Banks (Special Provisions) provides for the 
management or sale o f mortgaged property to banks without a court order. The right o f  
management or sale is initiated when the Board o f  Directors o f  a bank passes a 
resolution which is recorded in writing. The resolution is considered conclusive 
evidence o f the authorisation o f  either the sale or the management o f  the property.188 If 
a foreign bank carrying on business in Sri Lanka through a branch office were to 
exercise its rights under this statute, the required resolution would have to be passed by 
the Bank's Board o f  Directors at its head office, abroad. Each time action needs to be 
taken to recover a non-performing loan, foreign banks are compelled to follow this time 
consuming process. Given that debt recovery is part o f  the routine work in a bank, the 
law should simplify the position by recognising the general authority given to a 
management team in Sri Lanka by the Board o f  Directors. It is important however to 
ensure that adequate safeguards are provided so that the Board o f  Directors would 
ultimately take responsibility for the decisions taken by the local managers.
When a resolution is passed by the Board o f  Directors o f  a bank authorising the 
sale o f  a property, the lender has a statutory obligation to send a notice to the borrower 
informing him o f the resolution so that the borrower is given an opportunity to take 
steps to settle the debt even at that stage. This statutory obligation placed upon lenders 
has adversely affected the debt recovery process because dishonest borrowers use it as a 
delaying tactic. It was reported that when notice is sent to borrowers they make one or 
two payments in order to have the sale stopped and then default again.189
Where a sale o f a property has been authorised by the Board o f  Directors, the
188 Sections4&5
Interview with Mr. P. Gunasekera, Chief Legal Officer, Peoples’ Bank Head Quarters, 
Colombo, at the Bank, on 14 May 1997.
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law allows the board to fix an "upset price" below which the property cannot be sold to 
any other person other than the bank to which the property is mortgaged.190 The Act is 
silent as to criteria to be followed in fixing the upset price. It is possible that banks may 
fix a nominal amount so that the bank is assured o f  recovering its dues. It is therefore, 
important to fix the upset price by taking guidance by an independent valuation. The 
valuation should apply to all purchasers including the lender as well. When the 
mortgaged property is sold, the "Board" o f  the bank must issue a certificate o f  sale and 
thereupon all the rights, title and interest o f  the borrower to and in the property vests 
with the purchaser o f the property.191 A  matter which requires clarification is whether 
the certificate o f  sale must be signed by all the members o f  the "Board" or whether two 
o f  its members may sign the certificate on behalf o f  the Board. Clarification o f  this word 
will no doubt help foreign banks.
Where immovable property is to be sold, the Act provides for the possession o f  
the sold property.192 The Act does not set out a procedure to take possession o f  movable 
property which is to be sold in a similar manner. At present banks in the country find it 
almost impossible to seize property because one o f  the main reasons is that bank 
officers seizing property do not have adequate powers to carry out their task.193 Bank 
officers must be given powers similar to that o f court appointed fiscal officers provided 
adequate safeguards are taken so that they do not abuse their authority.194
If a lender decides not to sell the mortgaged property it can pass the required
190 Section 11
191 Section 15
192 Section 16
193 Interview with Mr. P. Gunasekera, Chief Legal Officer, Peoples’ Bank Head Quarters, 
Colombo, on 14 May 1997.
194 Section 222 of the CPC
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resolution and take over the management o f the property in order to recover its dues. 
The “property” may consist o f  a large industry or a business and taking over its 
management by a lender is not an easy task. In countries like the United Kingdom there 
are qualified insolvency practitioners that are a regulated profession, and they act as 
receivers and managers. Such receivers and managers are able to decide the best course 
o f  action for the benefit o f the lender and are reported to have had success in saving 
enterprises in financial difficulties.195 But in Sri Lanka, the accountancy and legal 
professions are yet to provide such specialised services o f  which lenders may avail 
themselves.
4.8.5 Restriction on Receiver’s Powers in M alaysia
Compared with India and Sri Lanka, the problems encountered by lenders 
when enforcing security are few. However, there are a few legal, administrative and 
cultural difficulties faced by lenders in Malaysia. The most notable legal barrier lies 
in the recent decision o f the Federal Court where a receivers right o f  private sale over 
land charged under the National Land Code was restricted.
4.8.5.1 The Kimlin Decision
Until the recent landmark decision o f Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd v 
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad,196 the power o f  receivers and managers appointed by 
debenture holders to sell charged property o f a defaulting borrower without judicial
Flood, J., The Professional Restructuring o f Corporate Rescue : Company Voluntary 
Arrangements and The London Approach, Research Report No. 45, Certified 
Accountants Educational Trust, London, 1995
196 [1997] 2 MLJ 805
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involvement had been recognised.197 Briefly, the facts o f the case were that Kimlin,
executed a first legal charge over certain plots o f  lands in favour o f  Bank Bumiputra
Malaysia under the National Land Code to secure banking facilities. Subsequently, a
second legal charge was executed in favour o f the same bank. Kimlin also executed a
deed o f  debenture in favour o f  the bank which created ( 1) a fixed charge over all its
plant, equipment, machinery, motor vehicles and (ii) a first floating charge over all its
undertakings, properties and assets, both movable and immovable. In the event o f
default, the debenture allowed the bank to appoint receivers and managers o f the
charged property, and they were given the power to take possession o f  the assets o f the
company and to sell the assets o f  the company. Following default by Kimlin, the bank
appointed receivers and managers. The debenture did not contain an express provision
appointing the receivers and managers as Kimlin’s agents consequently, they applied to
the High Court for “leave to sell the lands” subject to a statutory charge under the NLC.
Subsequent to the application Kimlin went into to liquidation. The High Court held inter
alia, that the receivers and managers were entitled to sell the lands without a judicial
sale under the NLC .198 The liquidator appealed. The Federal Court ruled that the
debenture did not confer on the debenture holder a power o f  sale that was exercisable
independently o f  the provisions o f the NLC. Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ said,
“It follows that no power o f  sale can be conferred by a chargor under the Code 
on a chargee himself by way o f  a debenture or power o f  attorney or otherwise,
197 Kamar, S., Powers and Duties o f Corporate Receivers and Managers, 1996, Malayan 
Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, Cap. 3; Cheang, L., and Chiew, A., A Legal 
Impossibility : Arming Chargees with Private Power o f Sale o f Charged Land Outside 
the Provisions on the National Land Code, 1965, [1995] 1 MLJ xxxvi; United 
Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v Chong Bun Sun & Another Application (1994] 2 MLJ 
221, 228F-229D; United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v Official Assignee and 
Liquidator o f Soon Hup Seng Sdn Bhd (in Liquidation) & Another [1986] 1 MLJ 75
198 Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Ors v Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd (in 
receivership) [1993] 2 MLJ 126
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but proceedings must be brought by the chargee to obtain a judicial sale in 
accordance with the rigid procedure laid down in the Code. In such 
circumstances, any power o f  sale which purports to be conferred on a chargee 
himself, omitting all mention o f  notice and periods o f  default by a debenture or 
power o f  attorney and the necessity for obtaining a judicial sale would be invalid 
and ineffective to entitle a purchaser to be registered as owner...
In our view, the provisions o f  the Code setting out the rights and remedies o f  
parties under a statutory charge over land comprised in Pt XVI are exhaustive 
and exclusive and any attempt to contracting out o f  those rights unless expressly 
provided for in the Code would be void as being contrary to public policy .”199
This decision has overturned a long-standing practice o f  “private sales” o f lands by 
receivers and managers and has caused much furore and anxiety amongst bankers, 
receivers and managers themselves and their legal advisors. It was reported that
“[a]n emergency but informal meeting had to be held on 17 June 1997 between 
Bank Negara and most commercial banks in Kuala Lumpur to consider the 
impact and grave consequences o f Kimlin’s decision on the banking industry as 
well as on the position o f  receivers and managers and find alternatives or 
solutions.”200
There has been much controversy over this decision. Some authors shared some o f the 
concerns o f  the bankers and insolvency practitioners and disagreed with the courts 
decision.201 Others found the case was rightly decided.202
4.8.6 Muslim Culture in Malaysia
According to Muslim culture a person is not expected to benefit from the loss o f another 
who becomes worse o ff as a result o f  that persons actions. The majority o f  Malay people 
are Muslim and follow these practices. Lenders therefore find it difficult to sell
199 [1997] 2 MLJ 805, 823 - 824
200 Kok, S., A Review o f The Federal Court Case o f Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd
[1997] 3 MLJ ci, cvi
201 Kamar, S., Power o f Sales by Receivers and Managers Over Land Under a Debenture,
[1998] 1 MLJ cxxix; Kok, S., A Review of The Federal Court Case o f Kimlin Housing 
Development SDN BHD, [1997] 3 MLJ ci
202 Cheang, L., Eyes for Us to See: The Kimlin Decision, [1998] 2 MLJ xxxix
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property located in areas where the majority are Muslims. These are social realities that 
banks have to take into account203
4.9 CONCLUSION
Efficient debt recovery is necessary to sustain the providers o f credit in a 
modem economy, and the availability o f enforceable security goes a long way towards 
meeting this requirement. The effectiveness o f security can be measured by the extent to 
which it can be enforced expeditiously, and the cost involved. Self-help remedies do not 
involve judicial involvement, and could be carried out without delay and at low cost. 
Such remedies are particularly useful to lenders in India and Sri Lanka because there are 
extensive delays in the judicial system. If the law has provided for extra-judicial 
enforcement o f  security lenders must be encouraged to use these remedies, and where 
the law has not provided for such remedies serious consideration must be given to 
introduce self-help remedies.204
The difficulties faced by the Indian and Sri Lankan credit institutions have 
more to do with the enforcement o f security than its creation. In India, extra-judicial 
sale is available only in very limited circumstances. When the Transfer o f  Property Act
203 Interview with Mr. Ng Chih Kaye, May Bank Head Quarters, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 
May 1997.
204 The Indian Banking Laws Committee was very much aware of this problem and 
recommended that the law should provide for realization of security without judicial 
intervention. The Commission observed:
“Realisation of security through judicial process is very expensive and time consuming. 
If the funds of banks and other financial institutions are locked up, other eligible and 
creditworthy purposes are starved of credit in a period of credit scarcity. Hence, the 
law should provide for the realisation of dues of banks and other public financing 
institutions by recourse to the security as far as possible without judicial intervention. 
The necessity for this is very much apparent as regards these credit purveyors.”
Report on Personal Property Security Law, Government of India Press, Delhi, 1977, 
102
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was enacted in 1882, banks primarily serviced the credit requirements o f foreign
entrepreneurs. The indigenous borrowers were virtually excluded from accessing credit
from banking institutions, and they had to satisfy their borrowing requirements from
unscrupulous moneylenders.205 Laws were therefore enacted to safeguard the interests
o f  the indigenous borrowers by restricting creditors from recovering their secured debts
other than by obtaining a court order. This reasoning was appropriate over a century
ago but not any longer. It is now time to remove this restriction because the main
providers o f  credit are not moneylenders, but responsible and regulated financial
institutions. The Indian Banking Laws Committee recognised that the continuation o f
this restriction with reference to banking and financial institutions “affects adversely the
flow o f  credit and encourages protracted and vexatious litigation which comes in the
way o f  expeditious debt recovery...” 206 The Committee concluded:
“[t]he pow er o f  Sale without the intervention o f  the court should be allowed to 
all banks and certain notified financing institutions and this should be available 
to them with reference to all types o f advances other than those made against 
the security o f  agricultural land and should be available independent o f  the form 
o f  the mortgage in their favour.”207
These recommendations were not given effect to.
In India, creating a mortgage by the deposit o f  title deeds, (also known as 
equitable mortgage) is simple, inexpensive and does not require registration or 
stamping. These obvious advantages are vitiated by the fact that lenders have to go 
through the procedure o f  obtaining a court order to enforce their security rights. This 
further confirms the point that the Transfer o f  Property Act must be amended to allow
205 Report o f the Banking Laws Committee on Real Property Security Law, Government of 
India, Delhi, 1977, 31
206 Report o f The Banking Laws Committee on Real Property Security Law, Government 
of India, Delhi, 1977, 34
207 ibid
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extrajudicial enforcement o f security. In addition, an amendment to the Sick Industrial 
Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985 will also have to be made whereby section 22 
o f  the Act does not prevent extra-judicial sales for an unspecified time period. 
Similarly, a private sale carried out by a provisional liquidator or a liquidator appointed 
after a receiver must be recognised, by amending the Companies Act accordingly.
Indian law in respect o f  hypothecation agreements is far from settled. Most 
importantly, there is a need for the word “hypothecation” to be statutorily defined and 
the rights and liabilities o f  the parties to a hypothecation agreement to be clearly set out. 
In the event o f  default, the right o f  a creditor to take possession and sell the secured 
property without a court order must be included in the statute.
In Sri Lanka, it does not appear as though a substantial overhaul o f  the law 
governing the creation and enforcement o f  security is required. Such a change was 
required a decade ago, and legislation has been passed bringing about, in instances, 
radical reform. What needs to be done now is to fine tune the law by introducing 
legislation remedying the deficiencies that have been identified as impeding the 
satisfactory working o f  the existing legislation.
The landmark decision given by the Federal Court o f  Malaysia in Kimlin 
Housing Development Sdn Bhd has had a number o f  far reaching implications. Debt 
recovery will become slow and banks may become cautious about taking land as 
security from corporate borrowers. At present banks loan up to 80% o f  the value o f the 
collateral but it is possible that banks may reduce this percentage.208 It is also possible 
that debenture holders may opt to wind up a debtor company on the ground that it is 
unable to pay its debts under section 218(2)a o f  the Companies Act and then appoint a
208 Kamar, S., Power o f Sales By Receivers and Managers Over Land Under a Debenture,
197
liquidator for the company. Receivers in Malaysia are also known to hive down viable 
parts o f  a company’s business, to a subsidiary company and selling the subsidiary as a 
going concern to recover the debts o f  the debenture holder. Hiving down may involve 
dealing with charged land under the NLC as well as a debenture, and in such 
circumstances receivers will be prevented from hiving down viable parts o f an 
enterprise.
Urgent legislative reform is required in India. The Transfer o f  Property Act 
must be amended to remove the legal obstacles present when creating and enforcing 
security. Whilst the introduction o f  remedial legislation is vital, a greater credit 
consciousness is also required o f  the judiciary and the legal fraternity if  credit 
institutions are to thrive. However, the Sri Lankan experience shows that judicial 
attitudes, as well as the practices o f  lawyers, which have been conditioned over a long 
period o f  time are not easily changed.
[1998] 1 MLJ cxxix
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INTRODUCTION
The debt recovery crisis has had a wide spread negative impact on economic 
growth in most developing countries.1 Investment has been impeded as a consequence o f  
increased lending costs and the denial o f  credit to many borrowers.
If debt recovery proves to be difficult, banks and financial institutions will 
become more averse to risk and be unwilling to lend to borrowers without adequate 
security.2 As has been seen, lenders favour real property security, and as a result a large 
number o f persons who are unable to provide established collateral are denied access to 
credit,3 thus perpetuating inequalities in society. If a lender has to go to court to enforce its 
security, it will benefit the lender only at the stage o f execution. The property therefore is
World Development Report, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, 2-3, 70-78
Berger, A., and Udell, G., Collateral, Loan Quality and Bank Risk (1990) 39 Journal Of 
Monetary Economics 21
Sarap, K., Transactions in Rural Credit Markets in Western Orissa (1987) 15 India
effectively removed from the market until the process o f  litigation, sometimes spread over 
many years, is over. As a result, large amounts o f  real estate tied up as security to loans, is 
immobilised, and cannot be used in a more productive manner.
When the legal process for the recovery o f over-due debts becomes excessively 
long, it may further encourage dishonest borrowers to exploit deficiencies in the system .4 
These borrowers may obtain loans with the deliberate intention o f  avoiding payment or, 
where loans have already been obtained, discontinue repaying the loan because o f the well 
known delays experienced in the courts. These defaulters also take an unfair share o f the 
new credit in the form o f unpaid interest and capital, depriving more deserving borrowers 
o f this credit. It is also likely that such a borrower would have invested the credit 
unwisely. Economic returns generated from the credit facility may therefore be marginal 
or even non-existent. On the other hand, honest borrowers who are fully conscious o f  their 
obligations to a lender are indirectly penalised by being required to pay high interest rates.
Timely repayment o f loans is important to ensure the financial soundness o f  
lenders. Where borrowers are in default, lenders may reschedule loans, but ultimately 
they rely on recovery procedures and the courts to compel debtors to pay up. If the courts 
and the judicial system in a country fail the lenders, bad debts will begin to mount in 
number. As has been said earlier this will inevitably have a negative impact on the 
economy as a whole.
This chapter will examine the judicial remedies presently available to lenders to 
recover debts from defaulting borrowers. The remedies available will be described, and an 
attempt will be made to identify why, if  at all, they are ineffective. Possible solutions will
Journal Of Peasant Studies 83, 93
4 Murgatroyd, P., Legal Management Aspects of Debt Recovery: Lessons to be Drawn and 
Where Do We Go From Here, Paper Presented at the Regional Symposium on Legal 
Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, Manila, 1993,1-3
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then be suggested.
5.2 ORDINARY ACTIONS IN  INDIA AND SRI LANKA
A lender seeking to recover money it has lent together with unpaid interest there 
on has the right to institute a suit in any civil court that has jurisdiction against a defaulting 
borrower and to seek recovery from court. Both in India and Sri Lanka, civil suits are 
governed by the respective Codes o f Civil Procedure.5
The Sri Lankan Civil Procedure Code is based primarily on the Indian Civil 
Code. In addition, some parts are based on the Civil Procedure Code o f New York o f  1880 
and the English Rules o f  the Supreme Court framed in 1883 and 1885 under the Supreme 
Court Judicature Act.6 Since the Sri Lankan Civil Procedure Code is based on its Indian 
counterpart, most o f the statutory provisions are virtually identical. The procedures 
governing ordinary actions as well as well as summary actions are the same. Therefore, to 
avoid repetition, these two procedures will be discussed together. Attention will however 
be drawn to such differences as there may be.7
In both jurisdictions, a bank may institute an ordinary debt recovery suit by 
presenting a written plaint to a court8 o f  competent jurisdiction.9 The jurisdiction o f a 
court may be limited in respect o f the value o f the action, subject matter o f  the action, or
India - Act No V of 1908, Sri Lanka - Legislative Enactments of Sri Lanka, Vol.V, 1980 
(Revised), Chapter 105
See the comments of the Commission headed by Sir Samuel Grenier, appointed to draft 
the Sri Lankan Civil Procedure Code, in The Ceylon Sessional Papers, Vol XXIII, 
Government Printer, Colombo, 1955, 3
Saha, A., The Code of Civil Procedure, Vols. 1&2, 5th Ed., Premier Publication Co., 
Allahabad, 1996; Nand Lai., The Code of Civil Procedure, Act No V of 1908, 3rd Ed., 
Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad, 1996; Wickremesinghe, K., Civil Procedure 
in Ceylon, Wesley Press, Colombo, 1971
Every plaint must show the defendant's interest and liability to be sued and a statement of 
facts setting out the jurisdiction of the court. India - Section 26 & Order 7; Sri Lanka - 
Section 39
India - Section 7, Sri Lanka -  Section 9
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the area over which the jurisdiction extends. In India, the District Courts do not have
pecuniary limitations thus these courts have jurisdiction to hear all debt recovery suits 
irrespective o f  the value o f  the claim involved.10 In Sri Lanka, the District Courts can 
entertain civil actions where the claims are more than Rs. 750/=.n The court will 
thereafter order summons to be issued to the defendant ordering him to appear before it on 
a given date to answer the claim filed against him .12 A  process server entrusted with the 
duty o f  serving a summons must make every endeavour to effect summons personally,13 
but if  the defendant refuses to acknowledge the service o f  summons, it could be served by 
affixing a copy o f  it on the outer door o f  his house.14 If, however, the defendant avoids 
actual service, substituted service is possible after obtaining a court order.15 In India, court 
may also order summons to be served by registered post in lieu of, or in addition to, actual 
or substituted service.16 When an acknowledgement o f summons signed by the defendant 
is filed in court, or when the defendant or his agent refused to acknowledge summons, the 
court issuing the summons is required to declare that the summons had been duly served 
on the defendant. The same rule applies when summons is served by registered post.17 In
10 Thakkar, C., Civil Procedure, 3rd Ed., Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 1994, 30
11 Wickremesinghe, K., Civil Procedure in Ceylon, Wesley Press, Colombo, 1971,43
12 India - Order 5 Rule 1; Sri Lanka - Section 55
12 In Babun Nona v Ariyasena, the process server claimed that summons were delivered to
the defendant’s husband while she was inside the house which the defendant denied. The
Supreme Court of Sri Lanka held that the statutory requirement had not been complied
with and that such provisions are imperative and should be strictly observed. (1957) 56 
NLR575
14 A temporary absence of the defendant from his house does not justify the process server
affixing the summons to a door of his house. It is the duty of the process server to take 
pains to find out where the defendant is in order that, if possible, personal service may be 
effected. Subramaina Pillai v Subramania Ayyar (1898) 21 ILR (Mad) 419
12 India - Order 5 Rule 20; Sri Lanka - Section 60
1  ^ India - Order 5 Rule 19A
12 The Law Commission of India observed that a number of cases had been reported where
injustice had been done to defendants due to fraudulent activities of plaintiffs with the 
assistance of dishonest postmen motivated to make a false endorsement regarding refusal.
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Sri Lanka, service by registered post is possible only where a liquid claim is made under 
summary procedure.18
On the day stated in the summons, both the plaintiff and the defendant must be 
present in court either in person or by their respective attorneys and the defendant must 
file a written statement o f  his defence in court.19 The court will, thereafter* fix a date for 
the trial. Where the defendant does not appear and it is proved that a summons was duly
served and that his absence was intentional, the court may order the suit to be heard
20exparte.
At the pre-trial stage any party may, without filing an affidavit, apply to court for 
an order directing the other party to the suit to disclose on oath all the documents that may 
be relevant for the trial which are or have been in his possession.21 If court decides that the 
discovery o f documents will enable the suit to be disposed o f  more effectively without 
unnecessary delay and save costs, it may make an order for discovery.22 On the other 
hand, if  it is clear to court that no good can reasonably be expected to come from ordering 
it, court can refuse the application for discovery.23
At the trial, issues will be framed, oral and documentary evidence will be 
recorded and arguments by both parties will be advanced. After the case has been fully
The Committee therefore recommended that section 19A must be amended to remove the 
mandatory nature of the section and leave it to the discretion of the court to declare 
whether refusal should be deemed to be equivalent service. 140th Report of The Law 
Commission on the Need to Amend Order V Rule 19A with a view to Foreclose Likely 
Injustice, Government of India, Delhi, 1991,10-11
Sri Lanka - Section 705A and 705B
India - Order 9 Rule 1, Sri Lanka - Sections 73-74
Takwani, C., Civil Procedure, 3rd Ed., Eastern Book Co., Lucknow, 1994, 166; 
Wickremesinghe, K., Civil Procedure in Ceylon, Wesley Press, Colombo, 1971,438-439
India - Order 11 Rule 12, Sri Lanka - Section 102
India - Order 11 Rule 20 Wickremesinghe, K., Civil Procedure in Ceylon, Wesley Press, 
Colombo, 1971,161-163
Weerasuriya v Croos (1920) 22 NLR87
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heard, the court will pronounce its judgement in open court either on that day or on a 
future date.24 Once judgement is given it is followed by a decree.25 If a plaintiff is unhappy 
with the judgement, he can appeal to the Court o f Appeal against the judgement on a 
question o f  law or mixed fact and law26 and then to the Supreme Court.
............................Having obtained a decree from a court to recover the outstanding debt from the
judgement debtor the lender must then proceed to execute the decree.27 A  decree to pay 
money can be executed by the seizure and sale o f movable and immovable property o f the 
debtor.28 Where the decree is for any specific movable property, that property can be 
seized and sold. If the decree is for the recovery or delivery o f possession o f immovable 
property, it is enforced by the issue o f a writ o f execution to the Fiscal.
The only method available to execute a decree is through Fiscal Officers. The 
prevailing fiscal service in both countries has grave deficiencies and as a result execution 
o f decrees has become a long and arduous process.
5.3 ORDINARY ACTIONS IN  MALA YSIA
Malaysia has a three tiered superior court system with the Federal Court as the 
highest court o f law in the country.29 The next highest court is the Court o f  Appeal and 
thereafter the High Courts. All these courts can entertain appeals from the Subordinate
24 India - Section 33, Judgement must be made before thirty days have expired from the date 
of the trial. Sri Lanka - Section 184
25 India - Section 33, Sri Lanka - Section 188
26 India - Section 96, Sri Lanka - Section 754
27 India - Part n, Section 36-74, Chaturvedi, R., B.N. Baneijee on Law of execution, 4th 
Ed., The Law Book Co., Allahabad, 1994, Chapter 8; Sri Lanka - Chapters 22-23, 
Wickremesinghe, K., Civil Procedure in Ceylon, Wesley Press, Colombo, 1971, Chapter 
16
28 India - Part n, Section 60, Sri Lanka - Chapter XXII, Part A
29 Prof. M. Majid & T., Abdul Rashid, The Courts in Malaysia and their Jurisdiction (1995)
21 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 297; Ong Kok Bin, The Civil Court in Action, Pelanduk 
Publications, Kuala Lumpur; 1995, Chapter 3
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Courts which include the Magistrates and the Sessions Courts.30
In Malaysia, there are two classes o f magistrates, a First Class Magistrate and 
Second Class Magistrate.31 A  First Class Magistrate has the jurisdiction to hear a cause o f  
action where the amount in dispute does not exceed RM. IOjOOO/ ^ 2 A  Second Class 
Magistrate has jurisdiction to hear cases where the amount o f  the claim does not exceed 
RM. 25,000/=. The Sessions Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits o f  a civil nature where 
the amount in dispute does not exceed RM. 250,000/=33 The High Courts have unlimited 
jurisdiction.
A plaintiff lender has the right to file action in any one o f the Subordinate Courts 
or the High Courts, but the choice o f court will eventually be determined by the value o f  
the claim in contention. The court procedure to be followed is set out in the respective 
rules o f  the courts.34 In both courts the rules are very similar except that in some instances 
the Subordinate Court Rules are simpler. For ease o f discussion a typical debt recovery 
procedure in the High Court will be discussed while making references to the Subordinate 
Court procedure.35
A debt recovery suit can be commenced either by a writ o f  summons, originating
In 1994, there were a number of changes in the Malaysian Constitution relating to the 
Judiciary. Article 121 was amended so that a new Court of Appeal was founded and the 
existing Supreme Court was replaced by the Federal Court as the Highest Court. See 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1994, and Courts of Judicature (Amendment)Act 1994.
A first class magistrate has jurisdiction to hear civil suits but a second class magistrate's 
role is to assist a first class magistrate by performing routine functions such as signing 
warrants and summons when a first class magistrate is not available. As a general rule, 
second class magistrates are not encouraged to hear cases.
Section 10, Subordinate Court (Amendment) Act, 1978
Section 65(1), Subordinate Court Act, 1948 amended by section 4 of the Subordinate 
Courts Act, 1978
Subordinate Court Rules 1980 (P.U. (A) 328/80) and Rules Of The High Court 1980, 
(P.U. (A) 50/80) (hereafter referred to as SCR and RCH respectively)
Chang, G., Introduction to Civil Procedure in Malaysia & Singapore, 3rd Ed., 
Butterworths Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 1994; Abu Backer, H., Janab’s Key to Civil 
Procedure in Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd Ed., 1995
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summons, originating motion or petition,36 the most common form o f procedure being the 
one instituted by a writ o f  summons. A  writ so filed is like a command, informing the 
defendant to register an appearance within 8 days from the date o f  service o f  the writ 
because failure to do so will entitle the plaintiff to obtain judgement in his favour and 
commence execution proceedings.37 A writ may be issued by depositing with the Court 
Registrar copies which will then be served on the defendant. Normally, a writ can be 
served on the defendant personally but where his Solicitor has agreed to accept service it 
may be effected accordingly. Unlike in India and Sri Lanka, special court officers are not 
required to serve the writ, and if  necessary the plaintiff may himself do so. Where it is 
impracticable to effect personal service, substituted service is possible38 after first 
obtaining a Court order.39
Once the writ has been served on the defendant, he has the choice o f "entering 
appearance" or simply defaulting. Entering appearance means that the defendant informs 
the court that he wishes to defend the claim against him and gives notice to the Registrar 
by completing a memorandum o f appearance (Form 15) in duplicate and handing it over 
to him within the stipulated time limit. The Registrar will then allocate a date and time for
RCH Order 5 Rule 1, SCR Order 4
The summons must be based on Statutory Form No.2 and indorsed with the names and 
addresses of the parties (where applicable the names and addresses of the Solicitors). A 
statement of claim and another claim of costs and a statement to the effect that action 
will be stayed if the amount claimed and the costs are paid into Court. See RCH Order 6 
& SCR Order 5
Substituted service can be effected by posting a copy of the writ on the door of the house 
in the defendants last known address and on the notice board of the court issuing the writ 
and also publishing it in a local news paper. See RCH Order 62 Rule 5 & SCR Order 7 
Rule 18(1)
"The intention which underlies all procedure with regard to substituted service is that the 
defendant will probably get to hear of the proceedings" per Romer LJ. in Deverall v 
Grand Advertising Inc [1954] 3 All ER 389, 396; Sockalingam Chettiar & Ors v 
Somasundaram Chettiar [1941] 1 MLJ 103
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appearance and inform the defendant either in person or by post.40 If the defendant does 
not enter appearance within the specified time, judgement will be given in favour o f the 
plaintiff without a trial.41
Where the defendant appears in court on the given date and disputes the 
plaintiffs claim, the court will make an order directing him to file a defence, usually 
within two weeks.42 Unfortunately, the Subordinate Court Rules do not specify a time 
limit, which causes unnecessary delays.
In the run up to the trial, there are a number o f pre-trial proceedings that must be 
followed, all aimed at preparing the suit for an expeditious trial. The first is discovery and 
inspection o f  documents.43 The basis for making an order for discovery is only if  it is 
necessary to dispose o f the suit quickly or for saving costs.44 The second is the application 
by summons for directions i.e. the parties may apply to court seeking directions as to 
matters that were raised in the pleadings and how the evidence is to be presented at the 
trial. At this stage, the Court has the power to fix a date for the trial and also indicates the 
estimated length o f  the trial and the approximate number o f witnesses (if any). The 
procedure is in fact by nature a "stocktaking" process, whereby the Court can consider 
whether the case is ready to be tried and also can ascertain whether all the evidence is 
available so that it can assist the Court adjudicating the matter. Where directions are 
sought in this manner, it reduces the number o f interlocutory applications before and in the 
course o f the trial, and the overall effect is that it gives the Court an opportunity to give
40 RCH Order 12
41 There are a number of requirements that must be complied with before a judgement in 
default can be signed. If any of the requirements have not been complied with before 
default judgement is given it can be set aside for irregularity at the cost of the plaintiff. 
Fabrique Ebel Societe Anonyme v Syarikat Periagaan Tukang Jam City Point & Ors 
[1988] 1MLJ 188
42 RCH Order 18 Rule 2 & SCR Order 14 Rule 5
43 RCH Order 24
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such directions that will dispose o f the action in a just, expeditious and economical 
manner. The third pre-trial procedure is the asking o f  questions from the other side, 
generally known as directing interrogatories. Unlike discovery o f  documents, 
interrogatories refer to the discovery o f facts which involves asking questions that usually 
relate to the action.45 The answers that are given in reply become part o f  the pleadings46 
After all the pre-trial proceedings are completed, the case is ready for hearing.
On the date o f the trial if  the plaintiff fails to attend the hearing the action may be 
struck o ff and the counterclaim against him heard. If the defendant fails to attend, the case 
will be heard ex-parte and his counterclaim, if  any, dismissed. Any judgement obtained in 
this manner may be set aside on an application made to court within seven days. There is a 
strong possibility that the Court will award costs against the defaulting party. Judgement 
will be pronounced in open court immediately on the conclusion o f the trial or on a 
subsequent date and notified to all parties.47
Where the suit is for the recovery o f a debt, court may give judgement for the 
payment o f  money, possession o f land, or for the delivery o f  goods belonging to the 
debtor. When the party against whom the judgement was given refuses to comply with the 
order given by the court, it becomes imperative for the plaintiff to seek assistance from the 
Court to enforce the judgement. The enforcement procedure will vary according to the 
nature o f  the judgement.48 If the judgement is for the payment o f  money, it may be
Rank Film v Video Centre [1980] 2 All ER 273, C.A
Questions that do not relate to the dispute will not be allowed. For example, interrogatory 
proceedings cannot be made use of to obtain evidence for use in a subsequent action. 
Pertubohan Berita National Malaysia v Stephen Kalong Ningkan [1980] 2 MLJ 19 (FC)
RCH Order 26 & SCR Order 21
RCH Order 42 & SCR Order 29
Ong Kok Bin, The Civil Court in Action, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, 
Chapter 12
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5.4
5.4.1
enforced by a writ o f seizure and sale49 and if  it is for the possession o f  land it may be 
enforced by the issue o f a writ o f possession.50 In the case o f a judgement for the delivery 
o f  movables, a court may issue either a writ for specific delivery, with an alternative for 
the recovery o f  the assessed value o f  the property or, issue a writ for specific delivery 
only.5 1 ..................................................................................................................................................
SUMMARY PROCEDURE 
Objective
The object underlying summary procedure is to enable a plaintiff to obtain a 
judgement without delay, preventing a defendant unreasonably obstructing the litigation 
process, by advancing spurious defences. In Jacobs v Booth’s Distillery & Co., Lord 
Halsbury LC said:
" people do not seem to understand that the effect o f  0 .1 4  (Order 
governing summary procedure in the United Kingdom) is that, upon the 
allegation o f the one side or the other, a man is not permitted to defend 
himself in court; that his rights are not litigated at all. There are some things 
too plain for argument; and where there were pleas put in simply for the 
purpose o f  delay, which only added to the expense, and where it was not in 
aid o f  justice that such thing should continue, 0 .1 4  was intended to put an 
end to that state o f  things, and to prevent sham defences from defeating the 
rights o f  parties by delay, and at the same time causing great loss to the 
plaintiffs who were endeavouring to enforce their rights."52
If a plaintiff can prove that the case is straightforward and that the defendant has no case to 
answer, a judge has the discretion to deal with the action under summary procedure, in 
order to avoid delay.53 The discretion given to a judge is indeed a wide power, and it is the
HCR Order 47 & Form 88 (titled "Writ of Seizure and Sale”), SCR Order 30 Rule 1
Order 45 Rule 3 & Form 90 (titled "Writ of Possession”), SCR Order 30 Rule 3
Order 45 Rule 4 & Form 89 (titled “Writ of Delivery”), SCR Order 30 Rule 4
(1901) 85 Law Times 262 (HL)
In British & Commonwealth Holdings Pic v Quadrex Holdings Inc., Brown Wilkinson
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duty o f  the judge to give judgement in favour o f the plaintiff, i f  he were satisfied that there 
is no dispute worth arguing. As Esher M.R. said in Roberts v Plant,
"It is a strong thing to give such a power to a judge, and this Court and all 
the Courts have said, therefore, that they would watch strictly the exercise o f  
that power. But they did not mean by that they would give effect to every 
pettifogging objection which the ingenuity o f  a defendant could raise.54
5.4.2 Summary Procedure in India and Sri Lanka
A  plaintiff bank wishing to recover its debts has the option o f  bringing a suit 
under the ordinary procedure or alternatively, bringing a suit under summary procedure. 
In both countries the law governing summary actions is almost identical.55 Summary 
procedure can be used to recover debts only in certain types o f  commercial actions 
namely, suits for the recovery o f dues on negotiable instruments, liquidated demands 
arising under a written contract, and under an enactment or guarantee.56 As in ordinary 
actions, suits are instituted by presenting a plaint but summons are served on a special 
form.57 The defendant is not entitled to defend the claim against him as o f right, but can 
apply to court for leave to defend. The court may refuse leave or, i f  it is satisfied that there 
is a "triable issue" or the facts disclosed by the defendant show that the defendant has a 
substantial defence, leave may be granted unconditionally or upon conditions which 
appear to the court to be just.58 In Raj Duggal v Ramesh Kumar Bansal59 the Indian
VC said, “O 14 procedure is for clear cases and not for complicated cases which absorb 
many days to unravel” [1989] 3 All ER 492 at 512
(1895) 14 The Reports 222,226
India - Order 37; Sri Lanka - Sections 703-711 of the respective Civil Procedure Codes 
India - Order 37 Rule 1; Sri Lanka - Section 703
India - "Summons in summary suits on negotiable instruments" Appendix B Form 4 & 
4A, Sri Lanka - "Summons in an action of summary procedure on a liquid claim" 
Schedule 1, Form No. 19
India - Order 37 Rule 3; Sri Lanka - Section 706
[1991] 1 SCC(Supp) 191,191-192
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Supreme Court set out the following guidelines:
"The test is to see whether the defence raises a real issue and not a sham one, 
in the sense that if  the facts alleged by the defendant are established there 
would be a good or even plausible defence on those facts. If the court is 
satisfied about that leave must be given. If there is a triable issue in the sense 
that there is a fair dispute to be tried as to the meaning o f  a document on 
which the claim is based, or uncertainty as to the amount actually due or 
where the alleged facts are o f  such a nature as to the entitle the defendant to 
interrogate the plaintiff or to cross-examine his witnesses leave should not be 
denied. Where also, the defendant shows that even on a fair probability he has 
a bona fide defence, he ought to have leave. Order 37 should not be granted 
where serious conflict as to matter o f fact or where ant difficulty on issues as 
to law arises. The court should not reject the defence o f  the defendant merely 
because o f  its inherent implausibility or its inconsistency."
In India, where the court has granted conditional leave, the condition normally 
imposed by it is that either the full or part o f the sum in contention is first deposited in 
court.60 The position in Sri Lanka is slightly different. Section 704(2) o f the Civil 
Procedure Code specifically states that, depositing in court the sum mentioned in the 
summons, or giving security should not be a condition for granting leave, unless the court 
thinks the defence is not prima facie sustainable or there is a doubt as to its good faith.61 If 
the defendant has not applied for leave to defend the claim, or such application has been 
refused by the court, the plaintiff is entitled to judgement. Where leave to defend has been 
granted, the procedure thereafter is the same as in actions under the regular procedure.
Summary procedure is designed to settle disputes between parties when there is 
no arguable defence, and as quickly as possible with minimum cost. It is therefore an 
ideal procedure for banks to follow to recover their debts from defaulting borrowers, but in 
practice, both in India and Sri Lanka banks do not seem to be using this procedure 
extensively. At least two reasons common to both countries can be suggested. First, most 
bank suits involve a claim for the outstanding debt and for the enforcement o f security it
Order 37 Rule 3(2) Sarmon Pte Ltd., v Umesh Kumar Kajaria & Another (1995) 1 SCC 
Supp. 443
Natchiappa Chetty v Tambyah (1896) 6 NLR 205
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has taken from the borrower, but summary procedure can be utilised only to recover a debt 
or a liquidated money claim, thus barring the claim regarding security being filed under 
this procedure. This problem can easily be remedied by amending the law to allow a joint 
claim for the recovery o f the outstanding loan as well as the enforcement o f security. 
Second, , the excessive delays and backlog o f cases in both the legal systems have also 
nullified the effectiveness o f the procedure.62
In Sri Lanka, there is a misconception as to the meaning o f  the term "debt or a 
liquidated demand in money." In a well known case Sabapatipillai v Jaffna Trading Co,63 
the Supreme Court held that the "instrument or contract in writing for a liquidated amount 
referred to in section 703 must be o f  the same nature as the documents referred to 
immediately before the expression, namely, a bill o f  exchange, promissory note or cheque. 
This is a result o f  the well-known principle o f interpretation, the "ejusdem generis rule." 
If this section can be amended by omitting reference to the specific instruments, i.e. the 
bills o f  exchange, promissory note and cheque and redefining the term “debt or liquidated 
demand in money” by including a provision that states it is a “specific sum o f money 
arising out o f  a contractual obligation that has not been disputed,” in other words an 
outstanding amount o f money that is due to the creditor without a doubt what so ever, 
lenders may not consider this an obstacle any longer. In 1985, the Wimalaratne Committee 
suggested a definition based on an explanatory note given in Order 6 Rule 2 Note 4A o f 
the English Supreme Court Rules, but the Bar Association o f  Sri Lanka objected to the 
proposed definition and the governments in office since then have not pursued the
See the observations of the Indian Law Commission in its 79th Report on Delay and 
Arrears in High Courts and Other Appellate Courts, Government of India, Delhi, 1979, 3 
and The Wimalaratne Committee on The Law and Practice Relating to Debt Recovery in 
Sri Lanka, Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha, Ratmalana, 1985, 3
4 Ceylon Recorder 210
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matter.64 The recommendation o f the Wimalaratne Committee has much to commend. An 
amendment to Order 37 rule 2 o f  the Indian Civil Procedure Code on the same lines will 
extend the scope o f  the application o f  summary procedure to more suits filed in India.
5.4.3 Summary Procedure in Malaysia
Like in most other jurisdictions, summary procedure in Malaysia is designed to 
provide justice without delay if  the debt is virtually incontestable. Subordinate Courts as 
well as High Courts have jurisdiction to hear summary actions. The procedure followed in 
both Courts is identical except where the rules have been amended by the Subordinate 
Courts (Amendments) No.2 Rules o f 1981.65 Summary procedure can be used for
most actions initiated by summons.66 Where the claim is an action for specific 
performance or for the possession o f land, summary procedure is used but it is different to 
the usual procedure due to special rules that are applicable.67
A  plaintiff resorting to summary procedure must ensure that three conditions are 
satisfied.68 First, the defendant must have entered an appearance. Second, the statement o f 
claim must be completed, filed in court and a copy served on the defendant. Third, the 
affidavit in support o f the application must verify the facts on which the claim is made and
The Bar Association was of the view that the existing section should not be tampered 
with but did not suggest an alternative amendment that would resolve this misconception. 
Members of the Bar Association are themselves not clear in their minds as to the merits 
of the proposed definition, some construing it as widening the scope of the existing 
provision, while others take the view it narrows the scope. See Report o f The Bar 
Association Presented at the Seminar on the Proposed Debt Recovery Legislation, 
Ministry of Justice, Colombo, 1987, 6 & 9
Hamid, N., and Ravichandren, S., Summary Judgement, Central Law Book Corporation, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1993
The exceptions are where the claim by the plaintiff is for libel, slander, malicious 
prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction or breach of promise of marriage or a claim 
based on allegations of fraud. HCR Order 14 Rule(l)(2) a & b, SCR Order 26A Rule 
(D(a)
HCR Order 14 Rule 1(3)
HCR Order 14 Rule 1, SCR Order 26A Rule 2
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state that according to the deponents belief there is no defence to the claim except as to the 
amount o f any damages claimed.69 The court, however, has the power to request for 
additional proof o f the facts if  necessary. Summary procedure will be commenced by 
serving a summons, together with an affidavit, in support o f the claim, at least four days 
before the return date mentioned in the summons.70 The summons and affidavit may be 
served by post or by leaving it at the address given by the defendant in his memorandum 
o f  appearance. Personal service is not essential.
The Court Registrar has jurisdiction to decide summary cases brought before the 
Court, and the hearing is usually conducted in his chambers. If the Registrar is o f the 
opinion that the matter must be decided by a judge, he will refer the case to a judge.
At the hearing, i f  the defendant wishes to resist the application for summary 
judgement, he can file a counter-affidavit and claim that there is a triable issue71 or raise a 
bona fide defence. In the case o f Cheng Hang Ping & Ors v Intradagang Merchant 
Bankers (M) Bhd the Court o f Appeal held that denials in a defence do not constitute 
evidence because they are only challenges to the other side to show proof. The triable 
issues will be decided upon the "merits o f the case" which means that there must be a 
difficult question o f law or a substantial question o f fact involved. If the Registrar decides 
that there is a triable issue or a bona fide defence, he will dismiss the application for 
summary judgement with costs to the defendant and grant leave to defend the case. The 
order may be conditional whereby the defendant is required to pay into court the amount
69 Pembinaan KSYSdn Bhd v Lian Seng Properties Sdn Bhd & Another [ 1993] 1 MLJ 316
70 HCR Order 14 Rule 2(3), SCR Order 26A Rule 2(3) - The Subordinate Courts 
(Amendment) No.2 Rules of 1981 amended this rule by substituting the word 
"summons" with the word "notice".
71 In Keppel Finance Ltd., v Phoon Ah Lek [1994] 3 MLJ 26 the defendant argued that he 
should have been given unconditional leave to defend the case as there were triable 
issues. The court held that although the questions of law on which the Order 14 
application was based were not simple ones, the answers to the questions posed were 
clear and unarguable.
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o f the claim or provide security to the value o f that claim.72
If on the other hand, the Court Registrar decides that the case is virtually 
incontestable because all the issues are clear and the matter o f  substance can be decided 
once and for all, leave to sign summary judgement will be given.73 A  party aggrieved by 
the Registrar's decision has the right to appeal to the Judge in Chambers.
5.5 DEBT RECOVERY SUITS FILED UNDER SPECIAL LEGISLATION
5.5.1 The Indian Recovery o f  Debts Due To Banks & Financial Institutions Act, 1993
In 1981, the Tiwari Committee examined the legal and other difficulties faced by
the banks and other financial institutions. During their study the Committee recognised
that large amounts o f money advanced by the banks and other financial institutions were
blocked as unproductive assets because legal actions filed against defaulting borrowers
were subject to excessive delays due to the existing legal procedure and process o f
recovery in India. The Committee therefore recommended that,
"[t]he Central Government may set up a class o f  tribunals which would in 
summary way but following the principles o f  natural justice adjudicate finally, 
within a time bound schedule, all matters in relation to recovery o f  dues o f the 
banks and financial institutions"74
Later in 1991, another committee appointed to study the Indian financial system 
and reforms under the chairmanship o f Shri M. Narasimham also emphasised that the 
introduction o f new legislation for the recovery o f debts is long overdue and observed,
" that there is urgent need to work out a suitable mechanism through which
72 QBE Supreme Insurance & Ors v Syarikat Chemas Pemborong Sdn Bhd & Ors [1986] 1 
MLJ 56
73 Citibank NA v Ooi Boon Leong & Ors [1981] 2 MLJ 282 (FC)
74 Report o f The Committee Appointed to Examine the Legal and Other Difficulties Faced 
by Banks and Financial Institutions in Rehabilitation of Sick Industrial Undertakings and 
Suggest Remedial Measures Including Changes in the Law, Reserve Bank of India, 
Bombay, 1984, 77 (Tiwari Committee Report)
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the dues to the credit Institutions could be realised without delay and strongly 
recommends the Special Tribunals on the pattern recommended by the Tiwari 
Committee on the subject be set up to speed the process o f recovery."75
Finally in 1993, almost a decade after the Tiwari Committee made their 
recommendations, the Indian Parliament enacted the Recovery o f Debts Due to Banks and 
Financial Institutions Act.76 (Hereafter RDBF Act) The Act provides for the Central 
Government to establish special tribunals that are quasi judicial in nature, to adjudicate 
exclusively on the debt recovery actions o f banks and financial institutions in a summary 
way.77 It also provides for the establishment o f appellate tribunals. The Tribunals will be 
presided over by a presiding officer.78
If an institution falls within the definition o f a bank or financial institution under 
the Act, it no longer has to seek recourse from the Indian civil courts, but can pursue an 
application for an order before a Debt Recovery Tribunal. A lender may commence 
proceedings by filing an application in a tribunal that has jurisdiction and plead for an 
order in its favour. On receipt o f an application, the tribunal must issue a summons 
requiring the defendant to show cause within 30 days from the date o f  service o f summons 
as to why an order in favour o f the plaintiff should not be made.79 After giving both parties 
an opportunity to be heard, the tribunal will make an order as it thinks fit "to meet the ends 
o f justice".80 If it determines that a debt is owed to the plaintiff the Presiding Officer will 
issue a certificate based on his order to the Recovery Officer, empowering him to recover
Narasimham Committee Report on The Financial Systems, 1991, Standard Book 
Company, New Delhi, 1992,60
Act No.5 of 1993
Section 3
Section 10 - A presiding officer must be a judge, or qualified to be a judge or held office 
as a presiding officer of a tribunal for at least 3 years.
Section 19(3)
Section 19(4)
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the amount o f debt specified in the certificate.81 The Recovery Officer will then proceed to 
recover the certified debt, either by attaching and selling the movable or immovable 
property o f  the debtor, arresting and detaining the debtor in prison, or appointing a 
receiver to manage the movable or immovable properties o f  the debtor.82
If a party is aggrieved by the order made by the Tribunal he can appeal against 
that decision within 45 days o f the date on which the order was made to the Appellate 
Tribunal.83 Where the defendant is the aggrieved party and seeking an appeal, he must first 
deposit in the Appellate Tribunal seventy five per cent o f  the amount o f the debt 
determined by the tribunal in order to have the appeal entertained.84 After giving both 
parties an opportunity o f  being heard, the Appellate Tribunal will make an order 
confirming, modifying or setting aside the order made by the Debt Recovery Tribunal.85
There are some obvious shortcomings in the statute that may pose problems in 
the future if  the legislation is not suitably amended. First, the Central Government has 
taken upon itself too much responsibility in the administration o f the tribunal. For 
example, in addition to appointing the Presiding Officer, it is also responsible for 
appointing the Recovery Officer and all other employees (emphasis added) o f  a tribunal.86 
To take over the responsibility o f providing staff for the tribunal is unnecessary, because 
such matters can easily be delegated to the Presiding Officer, particularly when Central 
Government administration is riddled with red tape and bureaucracy. It has already been 
said that the largest single factor in the accumulation o f  case backlog in the High Courts is
Section 19(7)
Section 25
Section 20(3)
Section 21
Section 20(4)
Section 7(1)
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the enormous delay in making appointments to fill vacancies.87 If this is a significant 
problem in the judicial system and a similar bureaucratic procedure is followed to appoint 
staff to the tribunals, before long it will adversely affect the smooth running o f the 
tribunal.
. Although the primary object o f the statute is to provide banks and financial 
institutions with an expeditious recovery procedure, it is silent on two important aspects 
relating to time. The Act does not provide with a time limit for the service o f  a summons 
on the defendant. Once summons are effected, it requires the defendant to show cause 
within thirty days88 from the date the application was filed with the tribunal.89 After taking 
into account the practical difficulties that a lender may face to serve summons a realistic 
time limit must be set out otherwise all the defaulting borrower will have to do is avoid the 
process server until this period has passed. The second matter is that the Act is silent as to 
the outcome o f a case if  these time limits are exceeded. Failure to comply with time limits 
must not have the effect o f extinguishing the debt.90
The RDBF Act applies to Indian banks and financial institutions and foreign 
institutions that the Central government may specify by notification after having regard to 
its business activity and the area o f its operation in India.91 All other financial institutions, 
i.e. foreign banks with no Indian presence must pursue recovery actions in the ordinary 
civil courts. If a loan is granted by a consortium o f lenders both local and foreign, the
124th Report of the Law Commission on The High Court Arrears : A Fresh look, 
Government of India, Delhi, 1988, Chapter II
Section 19(3)
Section 19(8)
Similar technical problems are reported in the rules of the Special Courts established in 
Bangladesh. See Husain, A., Country Report for Bangladesh, Presented at the 
Symposium on Legal issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security (Unpublished), 
Manila, 1993,28-29
Sections 2(d),(e),(f),(h)
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debt recovery under the RDBF Act involves a "two track" system.92 Local banks will have 
the option o f seeking a remedy under the RDBF Act while the foreign banks will have to 
pursue their claim in the ordinary civil courts. It is indeed difficult to follow why foreign 
banks are barred from bringing actions under this statute, particularly when such lenders 
are entitled to bring actions under Order 37 o f the Civil procedure Code that provides for 
summary procedure.
Another significant omission in the Act is that it does not provide for determining 
complex issues such as set-offs or counterclaims. If the tribunal cannot adjudicate on such 
matters the defendants would be barred from using these as defences.
A question that also needs clarification is whether a property subject to a 
mortgage that is attached and sold by a recovery officer enforcing an order o f the tribunal 
is in fact sold free o f encumbrances. Usually, to enforce such security, a decree from a 
civil court under the Transfer o f Property Act is required.93
A  recovery officer is a public servant and is not required to have any training 
legal or otherwise to carry out his duties, which includes not only the power to attach and 
sell the property o f the defendant but also to arrest the defendant and detain him in 
prison.94 The Act considers the arrest and detention o f defaulters in prison a "mode o f 
recovery o f  debts."95 Arresting defaulting borrowers cannot be described as a mode o f debt 
recovery but only a punishment for default.96 Given that the primary objective o f the Act is
92 Shroff, V., The Indian Debt Recovery Act (1995) 10 JIBL 29
93 Goyle, L., The Transfer Of Property Act o f1882, Eastern Book Company, Calcutta, 1991,
226-235
94 Section 25; The Indian and Sri Lankan Civil Procedure Codes also provides for this 
remedy. India- Order XXI Rules 37-41, Sri Lanka- Section 298
95 Section 25(b)
96 in countries like the United Kingdom and Australia, the imprisonment of debtors was
abolished in the nineteenth century. (1869 and 1843 respectively) However, in Canada, 
statutes permitting the imprisonment of debtors are still in force. Tilbury, M., et al, 
Remedies : Commentary and Materials, 2nd Ed., Law Book Company, Sydney, 1993,
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debt recovery, the inclusion o f penal provisions is not necessary. Perhaps it can be argued 
that including such provisions would be a deterrent to other defaulters or it is a mode o f  
coercing debtors to pay their debts, but it is indeed an antiquated approach to debt 
recovery. From a lenders point, recognising ordinary commercial risk as a criminal risk to 
make, debt recovery more effective is an impractical and pointless exercise. For example 
in Bolivia, non payment o f debts is a criminal offence, consequently, one third o f  the 
people in jail in La Paz are there for “debt related crimes.” 60% o f  them are women. The 
Bolivian experience has shown that sending people to jail as a remedy for debt recovery 
has failed completely.97
In Jolly George Varghese v Bank o f  Cochin98 the judgement debtors appealed 
against a court warrant that directed the arrest and detention in a prison o f the debtors, on 
account o f  non payment o f  a debt due to the respondent bank. The question before the 
Indian Supreme Court was whether such deprivation o f  liberty was illegal. The Court 
having examined the provisions o f Order XXI Rule 37 and Section 51 o f the Civil 
Procedure Code99 as well as Article 21 o f  the Constitution100 and Article 11 o f the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, directed the case to be re- 
adjudicated, and emphasised that the question might arise some day as to whether the 
proviso to section 51, read with Order XXI Rule 37 (CPC), was in excess o f  the 
constitutional mandate contained in Article 21. Article 11 o f  the International Covenant
824-826; Dunlop, C., Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2nd Ed., Carsewell, Ontario, 
1995, Chapter 5
97 How Legal Restrictions on Collateral Limit Access to Credit in Bolivia, World Bank, 
Washington DC, 1994, ii
98 (1990) AIR (SC)470
99 Section 51 of the Civil Procedure Code grants power to the Court to enforce a decree and 
one of the modes is by arresting and detaining the defendant, and Order XXI Rule 37 of 
the Code sets out the procedure to follow when detaining a person. Chaturvedi, R , B. N. 
Banerjee On Law o f Execution, 4th Ed., Law Book Co., Allahabad, 1994,417 - 425
1^0 Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the protection of life and personal liberty of a
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on Civil and Political Rights, as quoted in the Jolly Varghese case reads:
"No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground o f inability to fulfil a 
contractual obligation."
Thus, it is clear that international law frowns upon holding debtors in prison and limiting 
their personal freedom. It is important to take note o f  such views when legislation is being 
drafted so that it commands the respect that is properly due.
An important aspect o f a civil suit is the award o f interest on a debt during the 
litigation period and also the costs involved. Both these issues have not been addressed in 
the new statute and the law must be amended so that a presiding officer can make such 
orders.
5.5.2 The Sri Lankan D ebt Recovery (Special Provisions) Act o f  1990
Until 1990, there were only two types o f actions a creditor could file to recover 
its overdue debts. They are: the regular procedure and the summary procedure under the 
Civil Procedure Code. In 1985, Wimalaratne Committee reviewed the problems relating to 
poor debt recovery and recommended a number o f amendments to the Civil Procedure 
Code. The committee went on to say that action based on the suggested amendments 
alone was not adequate to meet the legitimate needs o f  the lending community and that it 
was opportune to enact legislation providing for a special debt recovery procedure. The 
World Bank also made it a precondition that the country's debt recovery laws must be 
liberalised if  it were to grant further loans to the government,101 thus forcing the 
government in an indirect way to accelerate the implementation o f the recommendations. 
Finally, in 1990, despite strong opposition from the Bar Association, the Debt Recovery 
(Special Provisions) Act No. 2 o f 1990 was enacted to facilitate the expeditious recovery
person.
101 Rt. Hon. De Mel, R., (Then Minister of Finance), Hansard, 25 November 1987, 898 - 899
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o f debts by banks. According to the provisions o f  the Debt Recovery (Special Provisions) 
Act No. 2 o f 1990102 a bank can institute action to recover an overdue debt by presenting a 
plaint to the District Court.103 On presenting a plaint, the bank must file an affidavit to the 
effect that the sum claimed is lawfully due to it and produce a copy o f  the legal instrument 
sued upon or relied on.104 If the court is satisfied o f  the contents o f  the affidavit, and the 
legal instrument sued upon is duly registered and not open to suspicion by erasure or an 
alteration on the face o f it, the court will enter a decree nisi for a sum not exceeding the 
debt due together with interest and costs. The decree nisi is thereafter served on the 
defendant. In the first instance the decree will be served by registered post. The “Advice o f  
Delivery” o f the registered letter in which the decree was sent, or an acknowledgement o f  
the receipt o f the decree nisi by the defendant, or a statement o f  the service endorsed on 
the duplicate o f  the decree nisi shall be sufficient proof that the decree nisi was effectively 
served on the defendant.105
Section 6 does not allow a defendant to appear or show cause in court against the 
decree nisi unless leave to do so has been first obtained from court. If such an application 
is made by the defendant, supported by an affidavit which deals specifically with the 
plaintiffs claim, together with a clear concise defence to the claim, and the facts that are 
relied upon to support the defence, court may grant leave to defend the claim after giving 
the defendant an opportunity to be heard. Leave may be granted only if  the amount stated 
in the decree nisi is paid into court or if  the court is satisfied there is a defence that is 
prima facie sustainable. Where court has granted leave to appear and show cause, the trial 
is conducted under the Civil Procedure Code. If the defendant fails to appear, or after
102 Amended by the Debt Recovery (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Act, No 9 of 1994
103 Section 3
104 Section 4
105 Section 5 A
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appearing is unable to show cause or his application to obtain leave to defend the claim is 
refused, the decree nisi will be made absolute.
Where a defendant appears in court and admits liability and agrees to pay the 
outstanding debt in instalments the Court must minute this fact and make the decree 
absolute. An order absolute is deemed to be a writ o f execution, duly issued to the Fiscal. 
The execution o f this writ will not be stayed, notwithstanding anything to the contrary.106
To qualify for access to the new debt recovery procedure the sum alleged to be in 
default must be more than Rs. 150,000/=. The effect o f this provision will be that lenders 
will be discouraged from granting loans below this amount and in effect discriminate 
against the small-scale borrowers. If this limitation is continued, the end result will be that 
the majority o f  honest small-scale borrowers will be denied access to credit because o f the 
threat posed to banks by a handful o f  defaulters. Surprisingly, a similar constraint is not 
seen in the Recovery o f Loans by Banks (Special Provisions) Act which applies to the 
recovery o f  bank loans secured by mortgages over movable and immovable property. This 
inconsistency o f treatment is difficult to follow. The new debt recovery laws have yet to 
make a positive impact on the existing crisis in the legal system faced by Sri Lankan 
lenders.107 Although the lenders have been given additional powers and the right to recover 
their debts, in practice the laws introduced for their benefit do not appear to be as effective 
as originally anticipated. For example, the Peoples’ Bank had filed a debt recovery suit 
under the new Act in December 1990 and the case was at the stage o f filing an answer in 
March 1992.108
106 Section 13(1)
107 The Justice Minister has announced plans to reform the country's archaic legal system to 
allow speedy settlement of commercial disputes. Jayasinghe, A., Sri Lanka To Reform 
Laws, Financial Times, 11.10.1996
108 Interview with Mr. Gunasekera, P., Chief Legal Officer, Peoples’ Bank, at the Bank Head 
Quarters, Colombo, on 14 May 1997.
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One reason is that the judicial attitude towards the new laws is one o f  
indifference. It has been reported that judges still treat cases filed under the regular 
procedure and under the new debt recovery laws alike. Where actions are filed under the 
new procedure, judges tend to grant leave to a defendant to appear and defend the case 
simply when a defendant files an affidavit seeking leave to appeal. The stringent 
requirements o f section 6 o f  the Debt Recovery Act are simply not taken into account.
Another reason is that the court staff is still unfamiliar with the procedural steps 
that have to be followed after the decree nisi is granted. Under the new debt recovery 
procedure a final decree is also treated as a writ o f  execution but courts tend to follow the 
execution procedure o f a regular action using the special forms provided in the Civil 
Procedure Code.
It is clear that the problems encountered by lenders cannot be resolved only by 
enacting effective laws. There is a vital need to provide suitable training to judges who 
will deal with commercial cases.109 In addition, the administrative staff in the courts and 
the fiscal department must be made aware o f  the new procedure, and required to comply 
with the procedure. It is equally important to encourage the members o f the legal 
profession to act in the spirit o f the enacted reforms.
5.6 WINDING UP IN  INDIA, SRI LANKA AND MALAYSIA
Strictly speaking, winding up is not, or should not be used, as a means o f debt 
recovery, as it is an insolvency procedure. Its objective is to ensure the pari passu  
treatment o f  all unsecured creditors. It has been said however, that the basis o f insolvency 
law is far more complex and that these laws are treated by the "trading community as an
Third Interim Report Of The Committee On Debt Recovery Legislation, Government 
Printing Department, Colombo, 1992, xi
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important instrument in the process o f debt recovery.”110 The threat o f insolvency 
proceedings is an effective weapon to persuade a defaulting debtor to pay its debts and 
thus it could be used as a sanction o f last resort.
The Insolvency Acts o f India, namely, the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 
1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 restrict the jurisdiction o f  the Indian 
Insolvency Courts to making an order o f  adjudication against insolvent "debtors".111 The 
term "debtor" does not include corporations therefore, when a company is insolvent the 
winding up and distribution o f assets is regulated by the Companies Act, 1956. The Indian 
Companies Act is based on the English Companies Act o f  1948 and the provisions relating 
to winding up are identical in all material aspects to the English Act.112 In Sri Lanka, the 
winding up o f companies is regulated by the Companies Act, 1982.113 As in India, the Sri 
Lankan Companies Act is also based on its English counterpart o f  1948 and the winding 
up provisions are almost identical. It must be noted however, that the amendments made 
to the English statute after 1948 have not been incorporated into the Companies Acts in 
both these countries. The Malaysian Companies Act, 1965 (Revised 1973) regulates the 
winding up o f insolvent companies.114 In terms o f  concept and statutory language once 
again the English Insolvency laws have influenced the Malaysian laws. Since in all three 
jurisdictions the English Companies Act o f 1948 has been followed when the respective 
companies statutes were enacted, it is best to discuss the winding up provisions applicable
HO Report o f the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558, HMSO, 
London, 1982, 62 (The Cork Report)
H I Veena, C., The Law of Insolvency, 2nd Ed., C. Jaminadas & Co., Bombay, 1997,1-2
112 Rustomji, K., Company Law, 3rd Ed., University Book Agency, Allahabad, 1991, Part 
VII
113 Wickremasinghe, K., Company Law In Sri Lanka, 2nd Ed., Aitken Spence Printing (Pvt.) 
Ltd., Colombo, 1992, Chapter R
11  ^ Pillai, P., Source Book of Singapore & Malaysian Company Law, 2nd Ed., Butterworths,
Singapore, 1986, Chapter XIII; Lee Mei Pheng, Banking Law, Butterworths (Asia), Hong 
Kong, 1995, 304-305
225
to these countries together, so that unnecessary repetition can be avoided.
In all three countries, the inability to pay debts is a ground for petitioning for a 
company to be wound up. Thus a lending bank has a statutory right to present a winding 
up petition to court if  its indebtedness has fallen due and not been repaid by a debtor 
company.115 Where such a petition has been presented to wind up a company on the 
ground that it is unable to pay its debts, the court must be satisfied that the debt is 
currently due for payment. For example, when a company arranges with a bank to operate 
on an over draft, there is an express or implied understanding that repayment is due on 
demand, but usually, such a facility would continue to operate indefinitely with it being 
periodically renewed. This type o f  debt does not come within the meaning o f a debt due 
for repayment. Similarly, debts arising out o f commercial transactions that are entered into 
on the basis o f credit will not be due for payment until the credit period expires.
The court will not make an order to wind up a company i f  the debt in question is 
being disputed. The debt owed to the company must be clear, valid in law, unimpeachable 
and indisputable.116 If the debt is being disputed, it is important to establish whether the 
dispute is bona fide or not, and for this, the conduct o f the parties, their motives, character 
o f  pleas and peculiarities o f  the case in question all become relevant. In Asa Teknik (M) 
Sdn Bhd v Cyga Sdn Bhdul the petitioner applied to have a company wound up claiming it 
was unable to pay its debts. The evidence showed that the debt was being strongly 
disputed and that the petitioner had earlier filed an action in the High Court to recover the 
sum in question. Subsequently, the petitioner applied for summary judgement but the 
application was dismissed by the Senior Registrar and the petitioner then filed a notice 
discontinuing the civil action and negotiated for a settlement. When no settlement was
115 India - Section 433, Sri Lanka - Section 162, & Malaysia - Section 218(1)
116 In Re Yashodan Chit Fund Ltd., (1980) 50 Comp. Cases 356
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reached a petition was filed for the company to be wound up. Striking out the winding up 
petition the court held that, on the evidence presented there was a bona fide dispute as to 
the amount owing and that the petitioner’s actions showed that they were acts calculated to 
circumvent the normal course o f  procedure and was an abuse o f  the process.
The circumstances in which a company is deemed unable to pay its debts are:
(1) If it has not complied with a statutory demand,118 or
(2) If execution o f a judgement or other process issued against the company is returned 
unsatisfied,119 or
(3) It is proved to the satisfaction o f  the court that the company is unable to pay its debts 
as they fall due and in determining whether a company is unable to pay its debts the 
court shall take into account the companies contingent and prospective liabilities.120
In India and Sri Lanka, if  a company is indebted in a sum o f  Rs.500/= and in 
Malaysia RM. 500/= and a statutory demand is served on the company, and it is not 
satisfied within three weeks, the company is deemed unable to pay its debts.121 Non 
compliance with a statutory demand is adequate evidence that a company is unable to pay 
its debts and a winding up petition can be presented on that ground. Default in payment
117 [1989] 2 MLJ 423
118 India - Section 434(a) ; Sri Lanka - Section 163(1) ; Malaysia - Section 218(2)a The
statutory demand procedure should not be used as a means of debt recovery. A statutory 
demand is one of the methods by which a winding up is triggered. And if the creditor has 
no intention of continuing with the winding up in the event of the demand not being 
complied with it is an abuse of the insolvency process, because such a demand could be 
the basis of a "legal threat". A creditor who uses the statutory demand procedure must be 
willing to incur the considerable expense and pursue winding up proceedings if the 
demand fails to promote payment which it often will.
119 India - Section434(b); Sri Lanka - Section 163(2) ; Malaysia-Section218(2)b
120 India - Section 434(c); Sri Lanka - Section 163(3); Malaysia - Section 218(2)c
121 Neglect to meet a demand of a creditor gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the
company is unable to pay its debts. See Securicor (M) Sdn Bhd v Universal Cars Sdn Bhd 
[1985] 1 MLJ 84
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alone is sufficient evidence o f inability to pay debts,122 but if  the default was the result o f  
the debtor company disputing the debt then, it cannot be said that the company is deemed 
insolvent.123
Where a statutory demand for an undisputed debt has not been complied with 
and/or execution o f a judgement or other process against the company is returned 
unsatisfied, it may be because the debtor company is unable to meet its current demands 
made upon it. These are generally known as instances o f  "commercial insolvency"124 but 
this does not necessarily mean that the company is insolvent, because it may have assets 
that have not been realised. If on the other hand, the company's assets after realisation are 
still inadequate to meet its liabilities then clearly the company is insolvent. In Hotel Royal 
Ltd. Bhd. v Tina Travel & Agencies Sdn Bhd (No.2)125 the debtor company was not able to 
settle the amount due on a judgement obtained in an earlier action and, consequently, the 
creditor company petitioned the company to be wound up under section 218(l)e o f  the 
Malaysian Companies Act. The debtor company applied to court to set aside the petition 
arguing that it had realisable assets that would cover the amount due. The High Court o f  
Malaysia held that section 218(l)e must be construed to mean "insolvency in the 
commercial sense," i.e. inability to meet current demands irrespective o f  whether the 
company is possessed o f assets which, if  realised would enable it to discharge its liabilities 
in full, and that the test o f  insolvency did not depend on the existence o f  the company’s 
realisable assets. It may be queried why it is possible to wind up a company that is 
insolvent in a commercial sense without having to establish that it is in fact insolvent in
122 Comhill Insuarance pic. v Improvement Services Ltd. [1986] 1 WLR 114, 118; Taylors 
Industrial Flooring Ltd v M  & H  Plant Hire (Manchester) Ltd. [1990] BCLC 216; Re 
Bill Hennessey Associates Ltd., [1992] BCC 386
123 New Era Furnishers (P) Ltd. v Indo Continental Hotels & Resorts Ltd. (1990) 68 Comp. 
Cases 208 (Raj)
124 Rustomji, K., Company Law, 3rd Ed., University Book Agency, Allahbad, 1991,1216
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the absolute sense. The reason is that creditors usually do not have easy access to the
company’s records to determine for themselves the state o f the debtor company's financial
position, and it is therefore difficult to establish whether a company is insolvent or not in
the absolute sense. McPherson J explained it as follows,
“The phrase‘unable to pay its debts’ is susceptible to two interpretations.
One meaning which may properly be attached to it is that a company is unable 
to pay its debts if  it is shown to be financially insolvent in the sense that its 
liabilities exceed its assets. But to require proof o f this in every case would 
impose upon an applicant the often near-impossible task o f  establishing the 
true financial position o f  the company and the weight o f  authority 
undoubtedly supports the view that the primary meaning o f the phrase is 
insolvency in the commercial sense - that is inability to meet current demands 
irrespective o f  whether the company is possessed o f assets which, if  realised, 
would enable it to discharge its liabilities in full.126 (emphasis added)
It may be asked how effective the winding up o f  a debtor company would be to a 
lender, as an effective method o f recovering its money. Winding up is a collective process 
and the fundamental principle governing it is that o f  pari passu  treatment o f  unsecured 
creditors. The use o f  winding up as a means o f recovery is therefore, not very beneficial to 
a banker in the position o f  an unsecured creditor, because after claims are allowed on the 
basis that they do not belong to the company (i.e. trust property; goods supplied under a 
retention o f title clause; assets subject to liens), and preferential creditors are paid, what 
generally remains for the unsecured creditors is pitifully small or nothing at all. It would 
be rarely, therefore, that banks would resort to winding up o f  a company where its primary 
intention is to recover its debts.
There may, however, be circumstances where winding up is the best or perhaps 
the only remedy available to a lender. If a bank has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
debtor company has diminished its assets by granting fraudulent preferences,127 or created
125 [1990] 1 MLJ 21
126 O’Donovan, J., (Ed) McPherson’s Law of Company Liquidations, 3rd Ed., Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 54
l 2  ^ India - Section 531; Sri Lanka - Section 254; Malaysia - Section 293
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floating charges in the run up to insolvency,128 winding up may be the only way under 
which the bank can hope to swell the assets available for distribution by having these 
transactions set aside. Unlike the statutory provisions in the United Kingdom, the Indian 
and Sri Lankan Companies Acts do not provide for the avoidance o f  transactions at an 
undervalue, extortionate credit transactions and transactions to defraud creditors which can 
be used to swell the assets o f the insolvent company.129 In Malaysia, the Act gives 
authority to a liquidator to recover property, business or undertaking that has been sold to 
or acquired by a company for an undervalue within two years before the commencement 
o f winding up and the liquidator may recover any amount by which the value o f the 
property exceeded the cash consideration o f the transaction.130 Winding up with this 
objective would be beneficial, provided that the bank has no skeletons in its own closet.
5.7 RECEIVERSHIP IN  INDIA, SRI LANKA AND MALAYSIA
In addition to recognising a privately appointed receiver under a debenture, the 
law in India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia also provides for a receiver and manager to be 
appointed by court.131 Such an officer represents neither the debenture holder nor the 
debtor company, he is an officer o f the court and will carry out his duties in accordance 
with the order appointing him. As Lord Romilly said in Ames v Birkenhead Docks 
Trustees'.
"There is no question but that this court will not permit a receiver appointed by its 
authority and who is therefore its officer, to be interfered with or dispossessed o f  the 
property he is directed to receive, by any one...."132
128 India - Section 534; Sri Lanka-Section 255; Malaysia-Section 294
129 See the United Kingdom Insolvency Act 1986, Sections 238,423 and 244 respectively
130 Section 295
131 India - Sections 137(1) & 424 of the Companies Act; Sri Lanka - Sections 98(1) &
382(l)of the Companies A ct; Malaysia - Section 186(1)
132 (1855) Beave. 332 at 353 (52 ER 630,638)
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A court appointed receiver has a fiduciary duty to all the creditors133 and must 
manage and operate the debtor’s business as though it were his own.134 In this part the 
discussion will be on court appointed receivers and their role in the recovery o f debts due 
to unsecured creditors. Privately appointed receivers and managers will not be considered 
because their primary task is to recover debts by enforcing the security taken by the 
secured creditor that appointed him.
In India, a creditor can apply to court under Order 40 Rule 1 o f the Civil 
Procedure Code to have a receiver appointed to a debtor company's property when ever it 
appears to be "just and convenient" to do so. A  receiver cannot be appointed merely 
because it is "just." It must also be convenient. In other words, the appointment will be 
made only if  it is practicable and the interests o f justice require it.135 The phrase just and 
convenient gives the court discretion to appoint receivers for a wide range o f  purposes.
The Civil Procedure Code in Sri Lanka also provides for the appointment o f a 
receiver by court if  it appears that a receiver is necessary to restore, preserve, manage or 
take better custody o f a debtor company's movable or immovable property.136 The Sri 
Lankan statutory provision is more restrictive than its Indian counterpart in that a court 
can appoint a receiver only for the purposes described above. A  simple amendment to 
section 671 on the lines o f  Order 40 o f  the Indian Civil Procedure Code will make court 
appointed receivership more effective and available to a wider range o f persons interested 
in a debtor company’s properties.
In Malaysia, court may appoint a receiver for the purpose o f  preserving the
133 Satyanarayan Banerjee v Kalyani Prasad (1945) AC 387
134 Bennette, F., Receivership, Carsewell, Toronto, 1985,118
135 Section 51 (d) of the Civil Procedure Code; Chaturvedi, R., Banerjee on Law of Execution,
4th Ed., The Law Book Co., Allahabad, 1994, 425-428; Pillai, P., and Nair, P., Law of
Receivers, 3rd Ed., Law Book Co., Allahabad, 1988, Chapter xxvii
136 Section 671
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debtors assets, or to assist in the enforcement o f  creditor’s rights.137 A  debtor’s property 
may have to be protected if  there is a dead lock or mismanagement in a company, or if  the 
creditors are concerned that their security is in jeopardy.138 Creditors may also apply for 
the appointment o f  a receiver by way o f equitable execution. Court will make such an 
appointment if  it is just and convenient to do so. 139
Equitable execution is a process where a court appoints a receiver to assist a 
judgement creditor to obtain payment o f a debt which he has failed to recover by ordinary 
execution proceedings.140 Prior to the court appointing a receiver, it must be satisfied that 
the debtor has equitable interest in the property, it is capable o f  assignment141 and it is not 
possible to carry out normal execution proceedings.142 A  judgement debtor may find 
executing the judgement impossible for a number o f  reasons, some legal others practical. 
Ordinary execution proceedings will not be possible if  a third party holds a lien over the 
debtor’s property. Similarly, if  the debt cannot be recovered through garnishee 
proceedings because the debt cannot be ascertained or it is not yet due and owing the court 
may appoint a receiver. As a more practical problem, legal execution will be difficult if  the 
debtor is evading execution proceedings, for example by avoiding the service o f  the writ 
o f attachment. Where it can be proved in court that the judgement debtor is attempting to 
remove the assets o f  the company or concealing other debts that are due to it by setting up
137 Abdulla, S., Corporate Receivership : The Law and Practice in Malaysia and Singapore, 
Butterworths (Asia), Malaysia, 1997; Kamar, S., Powers and Duties of Corporate 
Receivers and Managers, Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, Kuala Lumpur, 1996,2-3
138 RCH-Order 30
139 RCH-Order 51
140 The term “Equitable Execution” may be misleading. If a judgement creditor is unable to 
execute a judgement through the normal process, the court may grant him equitable relief 
by appointing a receiver.
141 Picarda, H., The Law Relating to Receivers, Managers and Administrators, 2nd Ed., 
1990, Butterworths, London, 309,319-320
142 Harris v Beauchamp Brothers [1984] 1 QB 801
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trusts, profit sharing schemes and entering into inter company transactions court will 
appoint a receiver by way o f equitable execution. In practice however, Malaysian courts 
rarely appoint receivers by way o f equitable execution.143
5.8 DELA YS IN  THE COURTS
The people o f India and Sri Lanka are fast losing their confidence in the courts 
and are disillusioned with the legal systems because o f  the undue delay and backlog o f  
cases in the courts. O f course in litigation, some amount o f  delay is inherent to the process 
but it becomes a problem when the delay is "undue."144 Compared with India and Sri 
Lanka, in Malaysia, the delays experienced in the courts are not excessive. Lenders do 
not consider the delays experienced in the courts a significant problem yet.145 The 
following discussion will therefore concentrate on court delays in India and Sri Lanka.
Both in India and Sri Lanka, on average, if  a case is heard by the Supreme Court 
by the time a decision is granted, parties would have spent about 12 years in litigation.146 
Unfortunately, detailed statistics are not available for both countries and it is impossible to 
state exact figures, but, the important point to note is that the delays are excessive and as a 
result the problems o f court delays and backlog o f  pending cases are acute.147
143 Ibid.
144 Delay occurs when in the given circumstances it becomes "unacceptable." What may be 
an excessive length between the commencement and the disposal of one case may not 
necessarily be excessive for another type of case, but delay becomes undue when a lapse 
of time occurs where in the circumstances is considerable and not essential to a just 
resolution of the case. Cranston, R., et al , Delays and Efficiency in Civil Litigation, 
Canberra Publishing and Printing Co., Fyshwick, 1985,4
145 Interview with Mr Ng Chih Kaye, Head, Special Credits, Credit Control Division, at May 
Bank Head Quarters, Kuala Lumpur, on 30th May 1997.
146 India - Baxi, U., Crisis of the Indian Legal System, Vikas, New Delhi, 1982, Chapter 3, 
Sri Lanka - Jayawardena, N., Debt Recovery Legislation Parts I-IH, Ceylon Daily News, 
18-20 August 1989
147 in both countries India and Sri Lanka, a number of committees have studied the problem 
of court delays. The most recent are, 124th Report o f the Law Commission of India on 
The High Court Arrears : A Fresh Look, Government of India, Delhi, 1988 and Report
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In fact, it would not be inaccurate to say that the court systems are almost 
collapsing due to the high number o f pending cases which have created a severe backlog 
in the courts. Justice Bhagawati o f India in his speech on Law Day on 26 November 1986 
observed:
“I am pained to observe that the judicial system in the country is almost on the 
verge o f  collapse. These are strong words I am using, but it is with 
considerable anguish that I say so. Our adjudicatory system is creaking under 
the weight o f arrears...
We may now refer to the question o f  the mounting arrears and long delays that 
take place in the disposal o f cases and the inability o f  the courts to cope with 
fresh institutions. This, I believe is the greatest threat posed to the rule o f law 
and the institution o f court....
A  bare glance at the statement o f various types o f  cases pending in different 
courts and o f the duration for which those cases have been pending is enough 
to show the enormity o f  the problem."148
5.8.1 Causes o f  D elay and Backlog o f  Cases
Most o f the reasons causing delays are common to India and Sri Lanka. The 
legislature, judges, lawyers, and the court officials involved in the judicial administration 
are all responsible for this crisis situation in the courts.149
Ill drafted legislation passed  by the legislature
It is well known that both in India and Sri Lanka laws are often hastily passed in 
parliament, and as a result they are some times ill drafted and full o f  errors. For example, 
the new debt recovery laws that were passed in the Sri Lankan Parliament in 1990 were 
fraught with drafting errors, and so was the Indian Recovery o f  Debts Due to Banks and
of the Sri Lanka Law’s Delay and Legal Culture Committee, Aitken Spence Printing (Pte) 
Ltd., Colombo, 1985
Quoted in the 125 th Report of The Law Commission o f India on The Supreme Court: A 
Fresh Look, Government of India, Delhi, 1988, 7
Siwach, J., "Delay in Justice in India" in Grover, V.,(Ed) Courts and Political Process in 
India, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1989, 328; Jayawardene, N., Debt 
Recovery Legislation Parts /-///, Sri Lanka Daily News of 18th-20th of August 1989
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Financial Institutions Act o f  1993. Ill-drafted legislation engenders litigation, thus 
increasing the number o f  cases that are filed.150 It is indeed optimistic to speculate that the 
legislature would stop passing laws in this hurried manner, nevertheless, it must be 
emphasised that properly drafted laws do reduce litigation.151
Practices o f  Judges and Lawyers
Judges and lawyers are also responsible for the present crisis. With regard to
judges, one contributory factor is that the number o f  judges is insufficient to deal with the
pending cases. In India, the situation this has created is so alarming that the Supreme
Court once observed:
"This Court has no time even to dispose o f  cases which have to be decided by 
it alone and by no other authority. Large numbers o f cases are pending from 
10 to 15 years. Even i f  no new case is filed in this Court hereafter, with the 
present strength o f  Judges, it may take more than 15 years to dispose o f all the 
pending cases."152 (Emphasis added)
But it is worth questioning whether simply appointing judges is an answer to this 
problem. It is difficult to generalise and conclude that if  judge strength is increased it 
would provide more judge time. If however, after proper investigations are carried out it 
can be concluded that a country has too few judges, then, additional appointments may be 
made.
The Law Commission o f India found that the two most important factors 
contributing for the backlog o f cases were inadequate judge strength, and the long delay in
On the other hand, if the statute is riddled with drafting errors people will avoid filing 
cases under that statute. For example, in Sri Lanka, the new debt recovery acts that were 
passed in 1990 for speedy debt recovery was not used by banks because some of the 
statutory provisions caused practical difficulties which were in fact errors. The necessary 
amendments were introduced in 1994.
Siwach writing on delays in the courts in India says, "If like a command given in the 
army, the text is simple and straight forward, then the amount of litigation would be less. 
Hence, efforts should be made to draft the laws properly." Siwach, J., "Delay in Justice in 
India" in Grover, V.,(Ed) Courts and Political Process in India, Deep and Deep 
Publications, New Delhi, 1989,328, 337
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filling vacancies in the High Court which results in the loss o f judge days.153 It is indeed 
surprising why vacancies cannot be filled quickly, particularly when the process o f  justice 
is already painfully slow. Political interference may be the answer.
Delay occurs not only when the number o f judges is deficient, but also when the 
judges are inefficient. It is a judge’s professional duty to do what he reasonably can do to 
equip himself to discharge his duties with a high degree o f  competence.154 If a judge is 
incompetent, inefficient or lacks the required skills to adjudicate,155 it will only be natural 
i f  in the court where he sits, there is a backlog o f cases.
It is equally important that, judges firmly control the manner in which cases are 
conducted. According to the former Indian Chief Justice Sikiri,
"[t]he counsel should be heard fully, but if  the point is barely arguable or the 
point or authority cited is irrelevant a judge should politely ask the counsel to 
proceed to the next point. Times have come when the time o f  the court must 
be rationed like a scarce essential commodity. The judges and counsels must 
keep in mind the thousands o f  litigants who are impatiently waiting for their 
cases to be heard."156
Another cause that irritates litigants is when judges grant adjournments on
152 p. TV". Kumar and Another v Municipal Corporation of Delhi [1987] 4 SCC 609, 610
153 124th Report of The Law Commission of India on The High Court Arrears Committee: A 
Fresh Look, Government of India, Delhi, 1988, 18
154 sir Bingham, T., "Judicial Ethics" in Cranston, R., (Ed), Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, 37
155 In the Sri Lankan case, Hotel Galaxy (Pvt) Ltd. v Mercantile Hotels Management Ltd. 
former Chief Justice Sharvananda said,
"It is regrettable that the District Judge did not address his mind to the legal question 
whether on the facts pleaded by the plaintiff, the defendants could, in law, be restrained 
by an injunction or enjoining order. As exparte enjoining order and orders for interim 
injunctions may work grave hardship and injustice to parties who have not been heard, 
grave responsibility rests on a judge to exercise the discretion vested in him, judicially, 
having due regard to the law before he grants an exparte application for the issue of an 
interim injunction or enjoins the defendant in terms of section 662 of the Civil Procedure 
Code. Such reliefs should be granted only after being satisfied that both the facts averred 
by the plaintiff and the law applicable thereto call urgently for them." (1987) 1 SLR 5, 
22
156 Quoted in Siwach, J., "Delay in Justice in India" in Grover, V.,(Ed) Courts and Political 
Process in India, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1989, 328, 341
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applications made by the debtor on trivial grounds. For example, in Sri Lanka, it is 
common for a lawyer to ask for an adjournment on "personal grounds". The reason being 
that the lawyer is unable to be present because he had to appear in another case elsewhere. 
An additional District Judge o f Sri Lanka once observed,
. . . "The prevailing procedure in the original civil courts o f our country appears
to be designed to encourage the delinquent debtor. This procedure as well as 
the existing machinery, gives him more than ample opportunity to adopt
dilatory tactics and postpone the evil day a hirer would apply for at least
two postponements. He would tender at least one medical certificate to have 
the trial postponed...."157
"Weak judges" who do not control cases firmly also bear the responsibility if  a 
backlog o f  cases builds up in the courts they preside over. An illustrative example o f this 
problem is seen in a debt recovery suit filed in Sri Lanka. The case was filed in May 1980, 
answer was filed in January 1981 and the trial was fixed for 1st December 1981. The trial 
was postponed nine times and the reasons for postponement was not recorded except on 
two occasions. The reasons recorded were that the “plaintiff was not ready” and “several 
old cases had been fixed for trial.”158 The tenth trial date was 22 February 1985, which 
was over three years from the original trial date. The advantages o f  summary procedure 
may be best felt at such times. Proper judicial training may also help judges who tend to 
be lenient when conducting cases.
Not only judges, but lawyers also carry responsibility for the existing delays in 
the courts. If a lawyer’s workload is high, it entails delays in the courts. Lawyers that are 
known to be successful are more in demand than others. Successful lawyers are
157 Additional Judge L. Abeysekera, "Debt Recovery, Some Observations" Paper Presented at 
the Seminar on Debt Recovery, on 27 September 1986 in Colombo, 1. However, Judge 
Abeysekera informed the author that this comment was made prior to the new debt 
recovery laws were enacted, and the position may have improved due to the new laws. 
Interview with Mr Abeysekera by telephone (Retired High Court Judge, now Chairman of 
the Sri Lanka Legal Aid Commission) on 30 October 1998.
158 Report of the Sri Lanka Law’s Delay and Legal Culture Committee, Aitken Spence
Printing (Pte) Ltd., Colombo, 1985,19
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predisposed to retaining cases, thus accumulating a personal backlog o f  cases which in 
turn creates a backlog in the courts. In India and Sri Lanka this situation arises among 
successful lawyers.
The time taken for trials to be conducted is too long. Lawyers are often ill 
prepared, and ill organised, and end up with unnecessarily lengthy arguments, which 
takes up valuable court time. Long arguments are like a "chronic disease" and may even 
be described as oral quibbling. As a part o f  radical reform to speed up court delays, the 
former Indian Chief Justice Krishna Iyer suggested the practice in the American Supreme 
Court which requires all arguments to be set out in writing. Amidst much opposition from 
the Supreme Court Bar Council, 159 the Supreme Court amended its rules so that written 
submissions could be filed.160
Not only do defence lawyers give spurious reasons to have trials postponed, even 
when the trial eventually commences they take up frivolous defences, and the time o f the 
court is consequently spent in going into these, one by one, which is a purposeless use o f  
judicial time.161 To deny service o f  summons or argue that the contract is unconscionable 
and should not be enforced is common practice. It is therefore the duty o f  the trial judge 
to determine if  these defences are genuine or not.
Economic considerations also influence professional practices.162 The legal
The Bar Council described the change to the rules as an unhealthy departure in the 
dispensation of justice. It argued that "the right of audience in a court of law is a 
substantial right and deprivation and curtailment of it was a negation of justice. See 
Times of India, 8 June 1975,7
1^0 in the United Kingdom, in response to the increasing case load in the Court of Appeal, it
considered whether it should follow the practice of the United States Supreme Court if in 
the future it is to resolve appeals without unacceptable delay. No reported decision on the 
matter has yet been taken. Lord Justice Leggatt, Future of the Oral Tradition in the Court 
ofAppeal (1995) 14CJQ 11
161 Cranston, R., Credit, Security And Debt Recovery: Laws Role in Reform in Asia and The 
Pacific in Norton, J., and Andenas, M., (Eds.) Emerging Financial Markets and Secured 
Transactions, Kluwer Law International, London, 244-245
162 Zuckerman, A., Reform in the Shadow of Lawyers' Interests, in Zuckerman, A., &
238
profession is no different. Some lawyers tend to prolong the proceedings longer than
necessary, just to earn more fees. This is very obvious in India163 and the position in Sri
Lanka the same.164 Dr Charles Hanson writing on the reform o f  the legal profession in the
United Kingdom observed that the "legal profession is a deeply entrenched vested
interest."165 One cannot always draw parallels but in this instance drawing a parallel to the
Indian and Sri Lankan lawyers may be justified.
Sir Owen Dixon once told his law students at the University o f  Melbourne,
“To be a good lawyer is difficult. To master the law is impossible. But I should 
have thought that the first rule o f conduct for counsel, the first and paramount 
ethical rule was to do his best to acquire such a knowledge o f  the law that he really 
knows what he is doing when he stands between his client and the court and 
advises for or against entering the temple o f  justice"166
What Sir Dixon expects o f  a lawyer is the ideal. Every client has the right to expect his 
lawyer to carry out his duties in an honest and responsible manner, and to conduct the case 
in such a manner that he gains the respect o f the judges before whom he is appearing. 
Unfortunately, in India and Sri Lanka, the overall standards o f  lawyering have deteriorated 
to such an extent that the profession is in disrepute and the people are disillusioned with 
their lawyers.
It is now clear that the practices and attitudes o f  individual judges and lawyers
Cranston, R., Reform of Civil Procedure : Essays on "Access to Justice", Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1995, 64
163 The Law Commission observed,
The profession cannot only have privileges and no obligations. It is time therefore to take 
a first step to prescribe the floor and ceiling in fees. The organised Bar must have a 
prescribed administration department where clients can go, pay the prescribed fee and 
seek assistance of a lawyer."
131st Report of the Law Commission of India on The Role o f the Legal Profession in the 
Administration of Justice, Government of India, Delhi, 1988,20
164 Jayawardena, N., Debt Recovery Legislation : Eliminating Inordinate Delays in Debt
Recovery, Part n, Published in the Ceylon Daily News of 19 August 1989.
165 Hanson, C., Reform of the Legal Profession : The Biggest Bang of All (1989) 9
Economic Affairs 23
166 Sir Thomas Bingham, Judicial Ethics, in Cranston, R., (Ed), Legal Ethics and
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are significant contributory factors to the problem o f delays and high backlog in India and 
Sri Lanka. Then, the next question that arises is what can possibly be done to overcome 
this unsatisfactory situation? "Strong Judges" are essential.167 Judges must be seen to 
control their cases firmly so that unnecessary and long arguments o f  counsel are curtailed, 
frivolous defences filed by the lawyers are disregarded j and cases should be adjourned 
only on valid grounds.168
Another related issue is that in both countries good lawyers are not joining the 
judiciary because o f the low salaries that are being paid to judges.169 Successful lawyers 
can earn much more than judges, therefore resources must be allocated to remunerate 
judges adequately so that good lawyers will consider a judicial career.
Those researching delays in the developed countries have shown that there is a 
link between formal litigation procedure and the practice o f  the lawyers, sometimes 
referred to the "local legal culture.” In fact, informal relationships between all the parties 
involved in litigation must not be ignored because they are the key to most o f  the 
problems.170 An obvious solution would then be to suggest remedies involving the proper 
training, discipline and professional ethics o f lawyers and judges. How effective this 
remedy would be in practice in countries like India and Sri Lanka in the present 
circumstances is uncertain. It is not suggested that professional training and legal ethics
Professional Responsibility, Clarendon press, Oxford, 1995, 37
167 Jn the United Kingdom, the Lord Chief Justice has directed judges sitting at first instance 
to control the trial time table by using their discretion to limit discovery, length of oral 
submissions, the time allowed for the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, 
the issues on which to be addressed, reading aloud from documents and authorities. 
Practice Direction of 24 January 1998
168 David De Silva v Ramanathan Chettiar (1964) 65 NLR 409, per Basnayake CJ at 411
169 77//j Report O f The Law Commission of India on Delay and Arrears in Trial Courts, 
Government of India, Delhi, 1978, 53-54
170 Scott, I., Case-flow Management in the Trial Courts, in A., Zuckerman & Cranston, R., 
Reform of Civil Procedure : Essays on "Access to Justice", Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1995, 4
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are less valued, but whether "self interested" lawyers can be effectively influenced by it is 
uncertain.
To consider a workable solution, the problem could be approached in two ways. 
First, sanctions can be introduced, which means that the litigation process will be 
identified with having characteristics o f  a commanding process. Second* a less dictatorial 
approach can be adopted whereby a consensus between judges and lawyers is arrived at 
with the common objective o f achieving the best possible result for both parties. To put it 
in Scott’s words, "we are all in this together so lets do the best we can." 171
Sanctions will always work where training fails. For India and Sri Lanka, the 
former approach is more suitable. Although this may appear to be rather draconian, it is 
only realistic that remedies appropriate to solve the existing crisis are suggested. As one 
author who carried out a study o f the legal system in a developing country in Asia 
observed:
“The way legal processes are handled in developing countries... has little to do 
with the way the formal legal system operates. Studying the formal system 
alone will provide little insight into the nature o f the actual legal system.”172
In both countries, the overall standard o f  lawyering has fallen because "self 
interest" reigns over "clients’ interests." The quality o f  judges has also dropped. The entire 
legal system has fallen into disrepute not only due to the backlog and court delays but also 
due to the corruption and high litigation charges clients have to pay. In this chaotic climate 
expecting consensus between judges and lawyers is unrealistic. It is for these reasons that 
a solution must be found with sanctions as its basis. The second method may be effective 
in different circumstances from those presently prevailing in India and Sri Lanka.
Procedural sanctions may consist o f orders for costs, charging o f  additional court
171 Ibid, 23
172 Gray, C., Legal Process & Economic Development: A Case Study of Indonesia, The 
World Bank, Washington D.C., 1989, 36, See the discussion on “Formal Models” at 7-13
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fees and fines. The sanctions must be fair and be proportionate when applied. It is also 
important that the sanctions are clearly set out so that it will not become the basis for 
contention in the future. For example in the United Kingdom , it has been reported that 
court delays have occurred because o f  the manner in which lawyers conduct their cases. 
To combat the problem Lord Chief Justice Taylor has issued a practice direction which 
states inter alia,
“Failure by practitioners to conduct cases economically will be visited by 
appropriate orders for costs, including wasted costs orders.” 173
Guidance may be taken from the rules laid down by the Master o f the Rolls in Ridehalgh v 
Horsefield as to how wasted cost orders should be dealt with.174 
Practices o f  Court Officials
Judges and lawyers are not the only people to be blamed for the delay and 
backlog o f  cases. Court officials are also responsible for tardy administration. It is a sad 
situation, nevertheless true that corruption is rife among court officials and the 
malfunctioning o f the court system is mainly due to "deliberate omissions." A  typical 
example o f this is when files that are in the record room "disappear" on the date o f  the 
trial. In both countries, there are grave deficiencies in the fiscal service. Service o f  
summons and writs, and the execution o f decrees are highly unsatisfactory. This situation 
has arisen due to a number o f reasons; corruption among process servers, lack o f staff, 
lethargic attitude o f  process servers towards their duties and lack o f  alternative modes o f  
service to compete with, are some examples.175
173 Practice Direction Issued by the Lord chief Justice on 24 January 1998; Hodge, H., An 
End to Court Delays? (1995) 94 Law Society Gazette 14
174 [1994] 3 All ER 848, 849
175 Although summons could be served by registered post, it was never used due to a number 
of deficiencies in the Civil Procedure Codes. In Sri Lanka however, the Civil Procedure 
Code was amended in 1990 allowing for summons to be sent by registered post in suits 
filed to recover liquid claims. See sections 705A & 705B. The Debt Recovery (Special 
Provisions)(Amendment) Act of 1994 allows service of decree nisi ordinarily to be served
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This depressing situation may be remedied if  process servers were remunerated 
differently. An attachment o f wages procedure may prove to be useful.176 In addition to 
their basic salary, if  a percentage to be decided upon could be added every time the 
process server succeeds in serving summons, writs etc. it could well be an incentive to 
work rather than the taking o f bribes from litigants. A  more extreme solution would be to 
set up a system whereby reputable firms and companies are licensed by court to provide a 
service to serve summons and notices, and also to execute decrees.177 It would be o f  
utmost importance that the persons employed by these firms are competent, responsible 
and o f  high integrity, for example, former defence personnel. Another aspect o f  this is 
where lawyers are permitted to employ "private process servers" who would hopefully be 
more effective because o f  the personal interest which would be taken to have service 
carried out. Private process servers must be accountable, either to the company or to the 
individual lawyer employing them, who in turn, must bear the responsibility o f any abuses 
o f the court process, say by filing false reports. If they were found guilty, the employers 
should be subject to heavy penalties. If there were a proven record o f malpractice by the 
process servers, the licence o f the firm employing them must be withdrawn, and where 
they are hired by lawyers, they should face disciplinary action by court.
Delays in courts may be caused by a number o f  reasons, some are peculiar to a 
particular case, and others are more general. In this discussion emphasis was given to the
by registered post. Section 4; In India - Order 5 Rule 19A
The Attachment of Earnings Act, 1971 of the United Kingdom can be used as a model 
for this purpose. Wilson, M., and Ford, J., Recovering Debt : The Effectiveness of 
Attachment of Earnings? (1992) 11 CJQ363
For example, in Sweden, enforcing of judgements are carried out by a specialist 
establishment judgements, called the “Enforcement Service” (kronofogdemyndigheten) 
which has no connection to with the courts. Judgements are delivered to the 
“Enforcement Service” which effectively enforces the judgements. Houghton, A., and 
Atkinson, N., Guide to Insolvency Law in Europe, 2nd Ed., CCH International, Bicester, 
1993, 301
243
general reasons and it can be concluded that the primary cause o f  delays in the legal 
systems in India and Sri Lanka are not the statutory procedures that govern litigation, but 
the persons that function within the system.
5.9 CONCLUSION
It was noted at the outset that the debt recovery crisis continues to have a wide 
spread negative impact on economic growth in most developing countries. This is the 
situation in India, and Sri Lanka.178 In Malaysia, whilst it may not be at a crisis, the 
recovery process is not as quick and efficient as it could be.179 In India and Sri Lanka the 
magnitude o f  the problem now threatens the very existence o f the lending institutions 
operating there. The causes o f the problem lie in the shortcomings in the laws governing 
debt recovery, and in the inadequacies o f the prevailing judicial system.
In India and Sri Lanka, in spite o f special legislation which provides for speedier 
debt recovery, the recovery procedure most widely used by lenders is still the ordinary or 
regular action under the Civil Procedure Code. In Malaysia, debt recovery cases must be 
filed under the Sub-Ordinate Court Rules and the High Court Rules, because there are no 
special laws to assist lenders to recover overdue debts. Both in India and Sri Lanka, 
summary procedure has not been used extensively due to a number o f limitations in the 
law. In Malaysia however, if  the lender is confident that the debt is indisputable, a 
summary action can be filed against the debtor.
The overall picture that emerges when studying the procedural laws governing
178 India - Shroff, C., India Country Report, Presented at the Asian Development Bank 
Symposium on Debt Recovery, Credit and Security. (Unpublished), Manila, 1993; Sri 
Lanka - Report of the Wimalaratne Committee on the Law and Practice of Debt 
Recovery, Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha, Ratmalana, 1985
179 Interview with Mr. M. Ismail, Senior Partner, Ismail & Co., on 30 May 1997; Chen Kah 
Leng, Country Report for Malaysia, Presented at the Asian Development Bank 
Symposium on Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished),
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ordinary debt recovery actions in India, is different to that in Sri Lanka. As the Indian Law
Commission in its 14th report stated:
" A  good deal o f the criticism against the procedural laws as the cause o f  delays 
when carefully analysed will show that justice is delayed not so much by any 
defects or technicalities in the prescribed procedure as by it's faulty application or 
by failure to apply it.”180
The situation is more complicated in Sri Lanka. The Common Law o f the country is
Roman Dutch Law but English Law applies to all maritime and commercial matters.181
Consequently, much confusion has arisen as to the applicable law in commercial
disputes.182 In 1985, the Wimalaratne Committee took the view that:
“[cjoncept, hitherto uncritically accepted and bom o f past experience and no 
longer relevant but yet continue to find expression in outmoded legal 
procedures, should undergo important and purposeful changes. The aim 
should be to transform these concepts in order to achieve the essential 
economic result and the necessary social purpose that recognised institutions, 
engaged in the business o f trading in money as purveyors o f  credit, are assured 
that the corresponding debt can be recovered speedily by recourse to court 
action in the case o f  need.”183
The new debt recovery procedures introduced in the two countries have not 
produced the anticipated results. The RDBF Act was enacted, primarily to provide justice 
without delay to banks and financial institutions by providing for the expeditious 
adjudication o f debt recovery suits and the recovery o f  debts due to them. At the time the 
Act came in to force, the government specified that ten debt recovery tribunals will be set 
up, but so far only five tribunals have been established, in New Delhi, Ahamedabad,
Manila, 1993
180 Report of the Law Commission on Reform of Judicial Administration, Vol. I,
Government of India, Delhi, 1958, 262-263
181 Sections 2 & 3 of the Civil Law Ordinance No. 5 of 1852
182 in Bank of Ceylon v Kulatilleke it was decided that the doctrine of conversion should be 
recognised as part of English Law relating to "Banks and Banking". But later in Daniel 
Silva v Johannis Appuhamy, the Supreme Court disapproved of this decision and held that 
the English doctrine of conversion does not apply to Ceylon. (1957) 59 NLR 189; (1966) 
67NLR457
183 Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Debt Recovery, Sarvodaya 
Vishva Lekha, Ratmalana, 1985,12
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Bangalore, Jaipur and Calcutta. It has been reported that the tribunals are not functioning 
effectively due to diverse legal actions filed against the recovery process. 184 A  notable 
case is the action filed by the Bar Association o f Delhi challenging the validity o f the 
Act.185 The High Court has ruled that the Act is unconstitutional as it erodes the 
independence o f the judiciary. It has also ruled that the Act is irrational, discriminatory, 
unreasonable, and arbitrary and is "hit" by Article 14 o f  the constitution which provides 
for equality before the law. As long as public interest litigation cases are filed challenging 
the validity o f the Act, and judges continue to make rulings that support these petitions, 
the RDBF Act will remain non-effective. Meanwhile, the backlog o f pending cases in the 
courts will continue to rise and justice will be denied to all the litigating parties. 186
It may be noted that in Pakistan, the special courts established to hear claims 
appear to be working well.187 Similarly, Bangladesh enacted a Financial Loan Courts Act 
which established special commercial courts where lenders could file debt recovery suits 
against defaulting borrowers. The progress made in these courts are highly favourable.188 
It is not being suggested that because it has worked well in one jurisdiction it must be so in 
another, but there may be important lessons to learn from the Pakistan and Bangladeshi 
experiences.
The Indian RDBF Act has its own flaws. This is mainly due to poor drafting of 
the statute which leaves a number o f issues inadequately dealt with and some issues not
184 Shah, S., India - Debt Recovery Tribunal (1996) 11 JIBL N.51; Narayanan, R., and 
Shah, V., Debt Recovery Tribunals (1995) 66 Journal of The Indian Institute of Bankers 
140,143
185 Delhi High Court Bar Association v Union of India [1995] AIR (Delhi) 323
186 At present there are 15 lakh of cases filed by the public sector banks and more than 1000 
cases filed by the financial institutions pending in various courts in India. Rs. 6000 crores 
are due to the banks and 400 crores to the financial institutions: Shah, S., India Debt 
Recovery Tribunal, (1996) 11 JIBLN52
187 Kabraji, K., “Country Report for Pakistan" Presented at the Asian Development Bank 
Symposium on Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished) Manila, 1993, 70-74
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being addressed at all. If amendments to the statute are introduced to address these defects, 
it would be a very effective piece o f legislation because the primary objective o f the 
statute and its key functions must be commended as a useful tool to solving a problem that 
is putting the entire legal system in India into disrepute and chaos.
. In Sri Lanka, the Debt Recovery (Special Provisions) Act No.2 o f 1990 was far 
from being a water tight piece o f legislation that could effectively deal with the existing 
practices in the courts and related administrative bodies like the Fiscal Department. 
Several shortcomings in the new legislation were obvious, and in 1991 the government 
appointed another commission to examine the laws relating to debt recovery and report on 
any amendments that may be considered necessary.189 In 1994, most o f  the amendments 
suggested by the Commission were implemented by enacting the Debt Recovery (Special 
Provisions)(Amendment) Act.
Banks and other financial institutions in India and Sri Lanka have rarely used 
winding up as a method o f debt recovery.190 In Sri Lanka, there are hardly any reported 
cases, which is an indication that courts have not had an opportunity to express their views 
on this matter. In India, courts have set themselves against making winding up orders if  
the ground for the petition is “inability to pay debts.” Indian judges frown upon using 
winding up as a pressure tactic or with an ulterior motive. In Kanchananganga Chemical 
Industries v M/S Mysore Chipboards Ltd., court ruled that non-compliance with a 
statutory demand is not adequate to show that the debtor is insolvent in the commercial 
sense.191 The court made such a ruling despite section 433(c) o f  the Act which states that
188 Government and Development, World Bank, Washington DC, 1992, 37
189 3rd Report of the Presidential Commission on Banking and Finance on Debt Recovery 
Legislation, Department of Government Printing, Colombo, 1992
190 Interview with Mr. D. Hettiarachchi, Deputy Registrar of Companies, at the office of the 
Registrar of Companies, Colombo, on 13 may 1997.
191 (1995) 3 All India Banking Law Judgments 421, Reported in Kalra, J., et al, All India
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non-compliance o f a statutory demand is a ground to determine inability to pay debts.
A completely different practice is seen in Malaysia. In a recent survey carried out 
on the insolvency laws o f six Asian jurisdictions, the insolvency laws o f  Malaysia were 
reported are very pro creditor. Threatening with insolvency proceedings as a pressure 
tactic was considered quite normal amongst bankers. As one leading insolvency lawyer 
said:
"Banks choose bankruptcy as a method o f debt collection because the threat o f  
insolvency is an effective tactic. Whilst not the fastest technique, it is a 
common and effective legal tactic in the recovery o f  debts. Banks see it as 
good management and there are no cultural reasons why this technique should 
not be used."192
The laws on court receivership in India and Malaysia are in line with those o f  
most common law countries.193 In Sri Lanka, the law is neither satisfactory nor effective, 
and needs to be amended so that it provides a wider discretionary power to court to make 
such orders. If the words "just and convenient" are substituted for the words "to be 
necessary for the restoration, preservation, or better custody or management o f any 
property, movable or immovable, the subject o f an action or sequestration" the law would 
be more effective and in keeping with the current practice and judicial thinking o f  other 
common law countries which have shown that, i f  necessary, court appointed receivers 
could play an effective role in the debt recovery process.
It is evident from the preceding discussion that the problems o f  debt recovery 
may be said to threaten the rule o f law in India and Sri Lanka. The legal systems have 
become inefficient and unpredictable. The courts are usually overworked, and dispute
Banking Law Digest (1987-1995), Punjab Law Agency, Chandigarh, 1996, 354
Tomasic, R., et al, Insolvency Law Administration and Culture In Six Asian Legal 
Systems (1995) 6 Australian Corporate Law Journal 249
Benette, F., Receivership, Carsewell, Toronto, 1985, O'Donovan, J., Company Receivers 
and Managers, Law Book Company, Sydney, 1981, & Lightman, G., & Moss, G., Law of 
Receivers of Companies, 2nd Ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1994
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resolution takes a long time. The courts lack proper facilities, and the persons involved in 
the administration o f justice require training. Corruption is rife amongst low wage earners 
employed in the courts and the fiscal departments.
It is o f  utmost importance that the existing court administration is overhauled so 
that cases are dealt with expeditiously and at a reasonable cost to the plaintiff. Proper law 
enforcement agencies should be also created to carry out effectively the decisions o f the 
courts. To streamline judicial administration, sanctions as well as direct and indirect 
incentive schemes must be introduced. Sanctions would go someway to ensuing when 
conformity to existing laws and practices are required. Incentives may be productive o f  
better results. Changes are important, but these alone would have little effect if  judges and 
lawyers do not co-operate and act according to the spirit o f  the changes that are made.
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6.1 TENSIONS BETWEEN MARKET REFORMS AND THE LAW
The laws o f  a country must reflect the policies it wishes to promote. When a 
country engages in political, social and economic change, there is a pressing need to 
modify and reform its legal system to reflect these changes arises.1 While this applies to 
almost every country, it is particularly significant in countries which are developing or 
changing to market economies. The existing laws in these countries may be 
inappropriate, or be inconsistent with the liberal economic policies which are being 
pursued. In some instances there may be uncertainty as to the application o f  laws and 
their enforcement, thereby destroying the incentive to comply with the laws. It may also
Legal reforms cannot be confined to the drafting and enactment of appropriate 
legislation alone. The changes made to the legislation must be supported by 
administrative and judicial reforms which will ensure that the legislative changes will 
be implemented and enforced. It is equally important that reforms to the legislation and 
institutional building are implemented together so that each reinforces the other. 
Efforts at reforming legislation will fail if the institutions required to implement the 
laws are ineffective. The World Bank and Legal Technical Assistance, The World 
Bank, Washington DC, 1995, 7 ; Weald, T., and Gunderson, J., Legislative Reform in 
Transition Economies : Western Transplants - a Short Cut to Social Market Status?
(1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 346, 361
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create situations that foster corruption, raise transaction costs and discourage trade and 
investment.2 In addition, these laws may not facilitate the grant o f  credit and debt 
recovery.
In India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, laws that facilitate free market economic 
policies are being actively promoted, by the introduction o f  new laws as well as the 
amendment o f  existing legislation. Nevertheless, a number o f  laws remain inconsistent 
with the economic policies that are being pursued. The following sections give some 
examples - laws hinder access to justice to foreign lenders thus treating foreign and local 
lenders unequally, laws restricts creditor rights and insolvency laws are antiquated.
6.1.1 Greater Access to Foreign Lenders
To attract foreign lenders, a country should have a stable political, economic 
and legal environment.3 Lenders must be confident that there are no political risks, such 
as sudden nationalisation or confiscation o f  undertakings. They must also be assured 
that there would be no restrictions on transfer o f  remittances o f  interest and capital. 
Inflation must be seen to be tightly controlled. Currency conversions must be possible, 
and there should be no foreign exchange controls. Lenders will also consider in their 
lending decisions, the stability o f  the legal system. They will look at whether the legal 
system allows lenders’ rights to be enforced and whether disputes that arise can be 
resolved expeditiously. In all legal and other proceedings, foreign and local parties 
must be treated equally. If foreigners are treated differently, private lenders will 
seriously consider this as a potential problem. The Recovery o f  Debts Due to Banks and 
Financial Institutions Act, 1993 in India provides a good example.
2 Governance: The World Bank's Experience, The World Bank, Washington DC, 1994, 
23
3 Demsai, D., Financing Projects in Emerging Markets (1994) 13 International
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The Recovery o f  Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act was 
enacted for the purpose o f  adjudicating expeditiously, disputes relating to debts owed to 
Indian banks and financial institutions. According to the definitions in the Act, a bank or 
financial institution to which the Act applies falls into one o f  two categories: (1) a bank 
or financial institution, incorporated under Indian law or (2) a foreign bank that carries 
on banking business in India and financial institutions the Reserve Bank o f  India has 
officially recognised under the Act.4 Foreign banks with no Indian presence are not 
designated under the Act.
The fact that some foreign banks are not covered by the Act may have 
potentially adverse consequences for lenders employing co-financing structures in 
India.5 I f a lending group consists o f exclusively foreign lenders, they must have 
recourse to the Indian Courts. If however, a lending group involves Indian and non 
Indian lenders which are not covered by the Debt Recovery Act, in the event o f  default 
some lenders would have recourse to the debt recovery tribunals while the others would 
have access only to the Indian Courts. The Act does not recognise that modem  
commercial bank lending can involve several lenders, both local and foreign. It appears 
to have been drafted on the assumption that the debt is due from a single borrower to a 
single lender. An amendment to the Act allowing all banks and financial institutions 
irrespective o f  their area o f  operation to have access to the debt recovery tribunals is
Financial Law Review, (Supplement-July) 8-9
4 A “bank” means, a banking company, a corresponding new bank, State Bank of India, a 
subsidiary bank or a regional rural bank, (section 2(d) ) A “banking company” is 
defined as having the same meaning assigned to it in clause (c) of section 5 of the 
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 which states, “ a banking company means any company 
which transacts the business o f banking in India”.(emphasis added) The Act defines a 
“financial institution” as a public financial institution incorporated under the provisions 
of the Companies Act, 1956 or such other institution the Central Government may, 
having regard to its business activity and the area o f operation in India, by notification, 
specify.(emphasis added) (section 2(h))
5 Shroff, C., Country Report for India, (Unpublished), Presented at the ADB Symposium
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necessary. There appears to be no significant hurdle to such an amendment, particularly 
when the Civil Procedure Code allows summary procedure to be used without such 
discrimination.
6.1.2 Protecting the Rights o f  Creditors
A  country aiming to achieve economic growth by promoting private 
investment must secure creditors’ rights. Unless creditors' rights are recognised and 
protected, lenders would be compelled to adopt restrictive lending policies. This may 
lead to high interest rates, and low volumes o f lending that directly affect the economic 
growth o f  a country.
Security improves the position o f  lenders in two circumstances.6 First, i f  a 
debtor becomes insolvent, a lender as a holder o f  valid real estate security7 will be in a 
position o f  pre-eminent advantage. As a holder o f  such security, a lender is entitled to 
enforce its rights o f  realisation o f that security independently, and thereby stand outside 
the insolvency process. I f security had not been taken, a lender would be regarded as an 
unsecured creditor, and would have to prove a claim in the insolvency proceedings, for a 
pro rata settlement o f its debt.8
Second, if  a borrower defaults payment, a lender who has taken security would 
be able to recoup his losses by enforcing the security. In some jurisdictions, however, 
secured creditors find it difficult to enforce their rights due to intervening laws. For
on Legal Issues in Debt Recovery, Credit and Security, Manila, 1993, 74
6 Everett, D., and McCracken, S., Banking and Financial Institutions Law, 3rd Ed., 
Serendip Publications, Sydney, 1988,305-306
7 It is assumed that all the required formalities have been fulfilled including proper 
registration.
8 In an insolvency situation, two opposing principles can be seen, namely; the equal 
treatment of classes of creditors and recognition of the rights of secured creditors. Pro 
creditor countries recognise both principles.
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example, in India, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act and 
effectively blocks secured creditors from enforcing their security in the event the debtor 
becomes “sick” or “potentially sick.”
According to section 22 o f  the Act, notwithstanding any law, i f  an inquiry were 
pending or a rehabilitation scheme were under consideration, proceedings for the 
winding up o f  the company or execution, distress or the like against any o f  the 
properties o f  the industrial company, or the appointment o f  a receiver is prohibited 
except with the consent o f  the Board, or, the Appellate Authority. Clearly, as a matter 
o f  law, section 22 blocks the exercise by creditors o f  their rights o f  security. The 
suspension imposed on secured creditors is not time bound. Consequently, creditors 
will be unable to exercise their rights until a rehabilitation scheme either succeeds or 
fails which in practice may take several years.
The Indian courts have also shown a great keenness to protect the rights o f  
debtor companies and their employees, and have shown little concern for creditors' 
rights.9 In Workers o f  M/S Rohtas Industries Ltd. v M /S Rohtas Industries Ltd., the 
Supreme Court in exercising its writ jurisdiction ruled against a bank enforcing its rights 
to pledged goods, and in favour o f  the claims o f  the company’s employees to back 
wages.
“So far as the pledge and the priority o f the financial institutions are concerned, 
we have no doubt that they have other sufficient securities and properties o f the 
company and, therefore, i f  this stock o f  finished products are sold to meet the 
basic requirements o f  the workers, their interests would not be in jeopardy.10
6.1.3 A Modern Insolvency Law
A modem insolvency law is essential in a market economy. It provides
9 Gram Panchayat v Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd [1990] AIR (SC) 1018; Navanit 
R. Kamani v R.R Kamani [1989] AIR (SC) 9
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enterprises that are insolvent with an orderly means o f exit from the market. Moreover, 
enterprises in financial difficulty but potentially viable w ill be given an opportunity to 
restructure. Most importantly for present purposes, banks and financial institutions may 
be able to recover their outstanding loans by threatening reorganisation or insolvency 
proceedings.. It is vital that both liquidation and reorganisation are determined by 
financial considerations, and not guided by political and social considerations. If the 
reorganisation o f  a debtor company appears to be financially viable, then it must be 
pursued in order to restore its profitability and to maintain its work force in 
employment. If, however, a reorganisation were not viable, the enterprise must be 
wound up. Although this is a preferable course o f  action to take, in many countries 
winding up o f companies are extremely unpopular and there is a distinct preference for 
rehabilitation. The primary concern is the loss o f  employment i f  companies are wound 
up. This is particularly true in the Asian countries.11
In India, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act was enacted 
for the purpose o f  reviving “sick” or “potentially sick” companies by the expeditious 
enforcement o f revival schemes devised by the Board o f  Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction (BIFR).12 If an industrial company became sick, it is mandatory that the 
directors o f  the company report this to the BIFR. If the BIFR decides that it is possible 
for a sick company to be revived it may give time to the sick company to reorganise 
itself and return to profitability or failing which recommend a rehabilitation programme 
to be carried out under its direction.13
10 (1987) 2 SCC 588, 590
11 Tomasic, and Little, P., Insolvency Law and Practice in Asia, FT Law & Tax Asia
Pacific, Hong Kong, 1997, 4
12 Baneijee, G., Law and Rehabilitation of Sick Industries, UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1988,
3
12 Section 18
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Since the Sick Industries Act was enacted, there has been an increase in the 
number o f  sick units as well as outstanding bank credit. As at end March 1987, there 
were 201,123 industrial companies reported sick by commercial banks, involving a total 
o f 4699 crores in bank credit.14 By the end o f  March 1995, the number o f  sick 
companies had increased to 270, 730 and the total bank funds locked up due to 
industrial sickness had increased to 12, 287 crores.15
The statistics indicate that promoting rescues by statutory means does not 
always succeed. The mandatory nature o f  such statutory provisions can push more 
businesses into further difficulties, particularly if  the rescue process were time 
consuming and cumbersome. Rescuing the businesses by way o f  injecting new bank 
funds may, in some cases, be more effective.16 It is not suggested that lenders’ rights 
must be protected, to the total exclusion o f  a borrower’s welfare. Countries like the 
United Kingdom, Australia and Canada follow liberal economic policies, but laws 
provide for the rescue o f  insolvent debtors. 17 An attempt is normally made to facilitate 
the rescue or rehabilitation o f  a company before subjecting it to a terminal insolvency 
procedure. In the U. K, the Bank o f England has introduced guidelines known as the 
“London Approach” to assist banks in their decisions relating to companies with
At the time the Sick Industries Act was enacted, the statistical data available was until 
the end of March 1987. Report and Trend of Banking in India, Reserve Bank of India, 
Delhi, 1989, 77-78
With the liberalising of the economy, the number of industrial companies increased 
significantly. The number of sick units may also have increased as a result. The 
important point to note however, is that the Sick Industries Act has not had a major 
impact on reducing or keeping the numbers steady as they appear to be on the increase. 
Report and Trend o f Banking in India, Reserve Bank o f India, Delhi, 1997, 46-47, 
128, Appendix Table 11.17
Wood, P., Remedies and Risk : International Comparisons in Cranston, R., (Ed.) 
Banks and Remedies, Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd., London, 1992, 2
The Administration Order Procedure and Company Voluntary Arrangements in the 
United Kingdom , Insolvency Act, 1986 Pts. I & II; Company Voluntary 
Arrangements in Australia, Corporations Law (as amended) Pt. 5.3A; Business 
Proposals in Canada, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Pt. Ill
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financial problems. One o f  the key features o f the “London Approach” is that banks are 
expected to remain supportive during a debtor’s financial difficulties, and to allow the 
company to use existing facilities without appointing receivers.18
The Sick Industries Act envisages the winding up o f  a sick company only after 
the BIFR has formed a final opinion that the company cannot be rehabilitated. 
According to the Act, a sick company should be wound up in the public interest after all 
measures to rehabilitate it have been futile.19 In practice, this provision makes it 
extremely difficult for the BIFR to prove that a company must be wound up in the 
“public interest.” Workers w ill continue to appeal against such decisions on the grounds 
that there are other methods to save it.
In 1996, the government appointed a working group to re-write the Companies 
Act, 1956 to facilitate improvement in the Indian corporate sector. It recommended, 
inter alia, that reference to the BIFR must be made voluntary, so that the debtor 
company and its creditors are encouraged to settle the debts privately.20 The overall 
recommendations are consistent with the present economic policies India is following 
and are commendable. Critics who defend employee rights say that the entire set o f  
recommendations is a “bundle o f conceptual confusions and misconceptions.”21
In Sri Lanka, social considerations similar to the ones in India prevent certain 
enterprises from closing down. The government’s policy on privatisation was presented 
to its people as “peoplisation.” Under the “peoplisation programme,” certain identified
Kent, P., "The London Approach” (1993) 33 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 110 
The London Approach has been quite effective, but recently some concerns have been 
reported by lenders. Barratt, J., Distressed Debt-The Sale o f Loan Assets [1998] 13 
JIBL 50, 56; Bird, C., The London Approach (1996) 12 Insol. Law & Practice 87-88
19 Section 20(1)
20 Dealing With Industrial Sickness : Misconceptions o f Working Group on Companies 
Act (1997) XXII Economic and Political Weekly 934
21 Ibid.
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public corporations and government owned business undertakings were converted into 
public companies22 and the government ceased to have control over such companies.23 
However, according to the Rehabilitation o f  Public Enterprises Act, 1996, i f  the 
President o f  the country were o f  the opinion that in any privatised public enterprise there 
is, or. is likely to be, a cessation or a  substantial reduction in the work o f  any part o f  an 
enterprise, and non employment or retrenchment o f  a substantial number o f  workers or 
the non paym ent o f  wages and statutory dues, the President may order the government 
to take over the administration and management o f  the company, including control o f all 
the immovable and movable property o f the company.24(Emphasis added) The 
enterprises that are taken over will be managed by a “Competent Authority” that is 
compelled by law to recommence the business activities o f  such an enterprise which had 
ceased to function, restructure it so as to ensure its commercial viability, and infuse the 
necessary resources to achieve the above objectives.25 The direct results o f  these 
statutory provisions are that the government prevents the closure o f  public enterprises 
that were privatised under the peoplisation programme, even if  they have proved to be 
not commercially viable. Protection o f  employee rights appears to have been given 
paramount importance.
The present government that is known to be leftist, has nevertheless resolved to 
continue with the privatisation programme, which was started prior to it taking office in
22 Conversion of Public Corporations or Government Owned Business Undertakings 
into Public Companies Act, No. 23 of 1987
23 During the early years of 1990 the peoplisation programme was vigorously promoted, 
but it later ran into difficulties. The private sector complained that the labour laws were 
not suited for privatised commercial activities. There are 46 labour laws in operation 
and the overall effect of these laws tend to create confusion and uncertainty to both 
employers and employees
24 Section 2. If however, the parliament refuses to approve the order of the President the 
management of the company will be handed back to the Chairman and the Board of 
Directors. Section 4 & 5
25 Section 3(4) b,c, & d
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1994.26 Conversely, it has also resolved to maintain the state enterprises that were 
privatised irrespective o f  their economic cost. Clinging to the social obligation o f  
protecting the rights o f  workers by keeping non-viable enterprises open is contrary to 
the basic concept o f  a market economy. It will also discourage financial institutions 
from advancing credit. If market forces have determined that a commercial enterprise is 
not viable, and attempts to rehabilitate it have failed, it must be closed down. The 
government must, however, ensure that workers would be provided with fair 
redundancy packages.
6.1.4 Lending and Security
Loan transactions may be secured or unsecured. Lenders will be prepared to 
grant unsecured loans i f  the creditworthiness o f  borrowers sufficiently assures that the 
loan will be repaid.27 Most lenders in developing countries however, do not lend 
without security. Lending institutions demand security as a pre-condition to the granting 
o f  credit irrespective o f  the extent o f  the risk involved. In some countries, lending 
institutions have been protected against loan defaults by law, by making security 
compulsory. For example, the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 1989 o f  
Malaysia require lending institutions to take security except for small loans.28
Bank Negara Malaysia has the power however; to publish an order in the official 
gazette and permit licensed institutions to grant credit without security to any person, as
Privatisation, Yes, Peace No, 22 July 1995, The Economist 66-67
At one time, international lending was unsecured because taking security was 
considered to be impractical, but now security is taken in respect of project financings 
by way of fixed and floating charges over shares, bank accounts, legal assignment of 
material contracts etc. At the other end of the scale, private moneylenders may grant 
unsecured loans as informal sanctions ensure repayment.
Section 60(1)
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long as it does not exceed the aggregate amount set out in the order.29 At present, 
licensed institutions are not permitted to grant credit facilities without security for loans 
exceeding RM 10, 000/= including previous credit granted without security.30
The effect o f  this restrictive legislation is that borrowers trying to secure small 
and medium loans for their business ventures without substantial fixed assets to offer as 
security are cut o ff from accessing institutional credit. As one “foreigner” is reported to 
have observed, “There are no real bankers in Malaysia. They can only give loans based 
on collateral.”31 This is indeed a sweeping statement. It is possible that it is not the lack 
o f willingness on the part o f banks to extend credit that restrict lenders, but the express 
provisions in section 60(1) o f  BAFIA.
The rationale o f  taking security is not disputed.32 I f a lender were o f the view  
that security is required because there would be an element o f  risk involved in lending 
to a particular borrower, the lender should take security to cover its risks. On the other 
hand, bankers must have the freedom to grant unsecured loans, if  they consider a 
borrower’s creditworthiness is such, that security would not be necessary. For example, 
in the case o f  borrowers managing small and medium scale businesses that are sound 
and viable and the risk o f  it becoming insolvent is low, security may not be necessary. 
Lenders must have the flexibility to appraise a borrower's creditworthiness and make an 
independent decision as to the requirement o f  security. If bankers were to grant 
unsecured loans, their credit appraisal must be carried out to an extremely high standard, 
where the risk element is assessed as accurately as possible.
29 Section 60(2)
30 Banking and Financial Institutions (Credit Facilities without Security) (Licensed 
Finance Companies and Licensed Merchant Banks) Order made on 26 September 1989
31 Devadason, R., Why are Exciting New Start-ups Finding it Hard to Get Bank Loans? 
16 September 1993 Malaysian Business 3
32 Wood, P., Comparative Law o f Security and Guarantees, Sweet and Maxwell, London,
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6.2 LAW  AND PRACTICE OF CREDIT ALLOCATION AND DEBT RECOVERY
So far in this chapter I have examined laws which are inconsistent with the 
process o f  moving towards an open market. But there are steps which have been taken 
to facilitate economic and financial liberalisation. In India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
privatisation programmes have been launched to promote private and entrepreneurial 
initiatives. As an important pre requisite to attracting foreign and even domestic 
investment, deregulation o f the financial sectors has also been undertaken. In this 
section I propose to highlight the various weaknesses in the liberalisation process 
identified in Chapter Two as well as summarise the state o f  the law and practice on 
credit allocation and debt recovery examined in Chapters Three to Five.
6.2.1 Credit Allocation and D ebt Recovery: The Reform Context
Despite the determination o f  the respective governments o f  India, Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia, these emerging markets are not fully liberalised yet. An important cause 
is that the governments have continued to control interest rates directly, and to direct 
credit. In India, the Reserve Bank continues to prescribe the maximum rate o f interest 
for deposits up to one year.33 Further, the interest rate policy for rural lending has not 
changed. Consequently, banks are required to grant loans to rural borrowers in the 
priority sectors at concessional interest rates. In order to cover the loss o f  income due to 
the charging o f  concessional interest rates to priority sector borrowers, banks have been 
directed to charge higher interest rates from non-priority sector borrowers.34
In Sri Lanka, under the New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme (NCRCS) the
1995,3
33 Rangarajan, C., Banking Sector Reforms: Rationale and Relevance [1997] Reserve
Bank of India Bulletin 41,43-44
34 in India, this practice is commonly known as cross-subsidisation
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government pays an interest subsidy to lending institutions so that they may grant loans 
to the agricultural sector borrowers at low interest rates. The Central Bank also provides 
a credit guarantee cover for loans granted under the NCRCS scheme.35
Bank Negara Malaysia continues to set a ceiling on interest rates for loans 
granted to small-scale , enterprises under the New Principal Guarantee Scheme (NPGS) 
o f  the Credit Guarantee Corporation.36Another limitation is that both in India and 
Malaysia, the Central Banks annually set credit targets that lending institutions must 
meet. At present, the Reserve Bank o f India requires banks to lend 40% o f  the funds 
available for lending to the priority sectors. In 1996, Bank Negara Malaysia had 
directed commercial banks to allocate RM 1 billion to small-scale entrepreneurs under 
the New Principal Guarantee Scheme. In addition, one half o f  the allocated quota o f  
funds had to be granted to the Bumiputera community. It also directed commercial 
banks to lend 30% o f  their loan funds to the Bumiputera community.37 The practice o f  
directing credit has now been phased out in Sri Lanka.
6.2.2 Credit Allocation and Loan Supervision
To develop an effective legal response to the problem o f  debt recovery, it is 
essential to shift the focus from court procedures to other areas. An efficient system for 
the creation and enforcement o f  security is therefore crucial. A  parallel effort must also 
be made to reduce the use o f security in lending transactions. In India and Sri Lanka, 
access to credit largely depends on the availability o f  collateral, irrespective o f  the
35 [1995] Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual Report 127
36 For 1996, the ceiling rate of interest was 2 percentage points above the basic lending
rate of the individual banking institutions. [1996] Annual Report of Bank Negara
Malaysia 194-195
37 A peculiar feature of Malaysia is that the government actively promotes the economic 
well being of the bumiputera community, (i.e. the indigenous Malay people) by 
introducing economic and financial policies that favour these people. [1996] Annual
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borrower’s credit rating, or any associated credit risk. Lenders are well aware that if  
there were default, security taken over immovable property cannot be easily realised, 
yet, they continue to insist on taking land security when loan applications are being 
considered. In Malaysia, lenders insist on security for small loans, only if  there is an 
element o f  risk that the borrower may default. It is said however, that some financial 
institutions, including large banks, require borrowers to issue post dated cheques to 
cover at least one or two years o f  the loan instalments.38 If the loan exceeds RM 10, 
000/= the law requires banks to take security.
If lenders were prepared to, grant unsecured loans because the creditworthiness 
o f a borrower assures repayment, and, take security from borrowers only to the extent it 
would cover the risk o f  non-payment o f  the loan; at least two important objectives could 
be achieved. First, borrowers that have been effectively denied credit due to their 
inability to furnish security will gain access to credit. Second, debt recovery related 
litigation would be effectively reduced.39 To reduce the risk o f  default, lenders may take 
a number o f  precautions that will improve their credit protection. In the case o f  
corporate borrowers, lenders must give equal importance to the five requirements 
generally known among bankers as the five “C”s. They are, character, capacity, capital, 
collateral and conditions. In addition, developing new credit assessment procedures, 
such as the “credit scoring system” in the United Kingdom, may benefit both lenders 
and potential borrowers. The banks will o f  course have to maintain up-to-date 
statistics.40 Credit appraisals must also include interviews, visits to the customer’s
Report of Bank Negara Malaysia 194-195
38 Interview with Mrs. Badariah Sahamid, Banking Law Lecturer, University of Malaya, 
Kuala Lumpur, on 2 June 1997.
39 Research showed that one of the main causes responsible for delays in debt recovery 
suits is foreclosure and sale of mortgage property.
in the U.K, “credit scoring” is known to be one of the most consistent, accurate and fair
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business premises and collecting information from professionals dealing with the 
customer such as valuers and accountants.
In all three countries, there is room for improvement in loan documentation. 
The practice o f  using standard forms for almost all o f  the loan agreements is not 
acceptable. If the loan transaction is simple and straight forward, a standard form is 
adequate as it helps to reduce transaction costs. In all other cases, loan agreements must 
be drafted, preferably by lawyers, to incorporate the individual terms and conditions o f  
the loan. Properly drafted loan agreements could provide lenders with credit protection 
or give them influence over borrowers, or control over a loan.41 Detailed covenants, 
clearly setting out reporting and monitoring obligations by borrowers, also enhance 
credit protection to lenders. It is also an effective method o f  monitoring a borrower's 
performance after a loan has been granted. Covenants that require a borrower to provide 
information regarding its financial status would provide lenders with early warning 
signals o f  any financial difficulties a borrower may be experiencing.42
The importance o f monitoring a borrower’s performance has been recognised 
by lenders in India and Malaysia. In India, banks have formulated a “Health Code” and 
“Service Area Approach” in their effort to supervise loans. The “Health Code” needs to 
be clarified further, but it has potential to be very effective. In Malaysia, banks monitor 
borrowers systematically and regularly and as a result, “warning signals” are picked up
forms of credit assessment. Credit scoring measures the statistical probability that 
credit will be satisfactorily repaid. Guide to Credit Scoring, Office of Fair Trading, 
London, 1993; Sweet, P., Received With Thanks : Special Report on Debt Management
(1995) 116 Accountancy 56-57
Day, J., and Taylor, P., Bankers’ Perspective on the Role o f Covenants in Debt 
Contracts [1996] 5 JIBL 201
Day, J., and Taylor, P., Loan Documentation in the Market for U.K Corporate D eb t: 
Current Practice and Future Prospects [1997] 1 JIBL 7, 8
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quite early.43 Sri Lankan lenders have not given serious attention to this aspect o f  
lending. Inadequate resources and bank staff to carry out monitoring are said to be the 
main constraints.44 This is a short-sighted view to take.
6.2.3 Enforcement o f  Security
In India, a lender may foreclose or sell immovable property subject to a 
mortgage only after obtaining a court order. If the parties are not Hindu, Muslim or 
Buddhist, or a member o f  any other race, sect, tribe or class specified in the official 
Gazette, and have executed an English mortgage, the mortgagee has the right to sell the 
property without intervention o f  court. This is indeed a strange statutory provision, but 
an important point that must not be ignored is that the law recognises extra judicial 
sales, at least in restricted circumstances. When the Transfer o f  Property Act was enacted 
in 1882, it was designed to prevent the exploitation o f  socially backward and low-income 
groups, rather than to deal with commercial and banking lending. The statutory provisions 
dealing with mortgages are not appropriate for modem commercial lending transactions, 
and to persist with these provisions a century or more later would obviously be 
inappropriate. Two decades ago, The Banking Laws Committee recommended that credit 
institutions must be given the power o f extrajudicial sale. In view o f  the liberal economic 
policies that are now being pursued by the Government, the implementation o f this 
recommendation would have far reaching benefits to the flow o f  credit in the country.
If power o f  extra-judicial sale were to be conferred on banks, section 69 o f  the 
Transfer o f  Property Act would have to be amended. The Sick Industries (Special 
Provisions) Act would also have to be amended, so that actions under section 22 would
43 Interview with Mr. Ng Chih Kaye, May Bank Head Quarters, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 
May 1997.
44 Interview with Mr. P., Gunasekera, Chief Legal Officer, Peoples’ Bank, Peoples’ Bank
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not interfere with the sale o f property subject to a mortgage. The Companies Act, 1956 
would also have to be amended to provide that, i f  a receiver is appointed, any 
provisional liquidator or subsequently appointed liquidator could not interfere with a 
sale.
Regarding movable property, banks may take security by way o f  hypothecation 
agreements. Sometimes hypothecations are in fact pledges (e.g. key loan arrangements) 
and in such an event the banks can sell the property without resorting to the court. On 
the other hand, security taken by way o f hypothecation over inventory and stock in trade 
may constitute an equitable charge. If there is default, the lender w ill not be able to take 
possession o f  the goods and to sell them without first obtaining a court order.45 For the 
same reasons as explained earlier, there is no significant reason why the right o f extra 
judicial sale should not be extended to hypothecated goods, provided borrowers are 
given suitable notice before lenders are entitled to take possession and sell property.
The Indian Companies Act recognises a floating charge as a form o f  security. A  
key feature o f  the floating charge is that it allows the chargee to appoint a receiver by 
obtaining a court order, or if  it is permitted to do so under the debenture creating the 
charge, without resort to the courts. Although the law recognises a private receiver and 
his powers to sell the charged property without a court order, Indian banks are reluctant 
to appoint private receivers and usually apply to court for an order under Order 40 Rule 
1 o f  the Civil Procedure Code. This practice is followed not because the law is unclear, 
or doubtful, but is largely due to practical difficulties faced by private receivers when
Head Quarters, Colombo, on 14 May 1997.
State Bank of India v S.B Shah Ali (1987) 2 Andra Law Times, 470; Report o f the 
Banking Laws Commission on Personal Property Security Law, Government of India, 
1977, 24-29
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property is being seized and sold.46 Some o f the difficulties perceived by lenders are the
lack o f  competent and experienced persons to act as receivers, employee abuse, violence
and harassment by labour, reluctance o f law enforcing agencies such as the police to
assist private receivers in controlling violent behaviour when taking possession o f
property. On the other hand, a court appointed receiver is respected by the borrower, its
employees and third parties, and the police authorities readily give their assistance when
required. Clearly, the problem lies not with the legislation but with its implementation.
In Sri Lanka, the right o f parate execution was vested with a limited number o f
state banks until 1990. The Recovery o f Loans by Banks (Special Provisions) Act has
extended this power to all commercial banks. In a country where litigation costs are
high and excessive delays are experienced in the courts it was anticipated that lenders
would consider the right o f parate a step forward in enforcing security.47 In practice,
banks have not used this power and continue to resort to the courts. The Commission on
Banking and Finance observed:
“[AJfter the introduction o f  the new laws the private commercial banks, 
with a single exception, have not resorted to the power o f  parate 
execution for reasons which vary from  bank to bank, but with the 
underlying realisation that it is after all not in the interests o f  the bank to 
resort to harsh legal measures in a highly competitive banking market.
The Commission hopes that this cautious attitude o f  the banks will 
continue to prevail in the interests o f a viable economic system where the 
banks acknowledgedly are the principle lenders. Indiscriminate use o f  
these measures by banks to hasten the process o f  debt recovery may lead 
to the creation o f  a thriving non-institutional, non supervised high interest 
lending sector with the banking system gradually sidelined.”48(Emphasis 
added)
The Commission’s fears that if  the banks were to resort to parate execution they would
Shroff, C., India Country Report, Presented at the Symposium on Legal Issues in Debt 
Recovery, Credit and Security, (Unpublished), Manila, 1993,47-48
Parathalingam, S., Parate Execution- Step Forward or Backward?, Paper Presented at 
the Seminar on Business Law, Colombo, 17 May 1997
Third Interim Report on Debt Recovery Legislation, Department of Government 
Printing, Colombo, 1993, 12
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be sidelined by non-bank lenders may be unfounded. If the security given were a 
floating charge, any non-bank lender would find it very difficult to match terms offered 
by banks. The reticence in the use o f  parate execution may be because Sri Lankan banks 
have hardly any experience with floating charges as security for which parate execution 
is  ideally suited. There are several practical difficulties faced by bank officers when 
taking possession o f  secured property. The problems are very similar to those 
experienced by private receivers in India. Section 352 o f  the Companies Act is also used 
by defendants to avoid bank seizures.49 As soon as a debtor gets to know that a 
resolution has been passed by the bank to sell the secured property, he gets a friendly 
creditor to file a winding up petition. This effectively stops the bank from taking further 
action.50
The practice o f  taking a floating charge as an effective form o f  security has not 
developed in Sri Lanka. Bankers have hardly taken floating charges, and if  such 
charges have been created, a receiver has never been appointed in the last thirty years.51 
The reasons for the lack o f use o f  floating charges seem to lie in a combination o f  
ignorance o f  its potential and a lack o f  expertise in its use. It is indeed ironical that the 
law provides lenders with effective remedies which the banking community is hesitant 
to use. It is possible that the bankers and lawyers are still following the Roman Dutch 
Law principle that a mortgaged property may be sold only after obtaining a court
Section 352 (1) states;
“Where a creditor has issued execution against the goods or lands of a company or has 
attached any debt due to the company, and the company is subsequently wound up, he 
shall not be entitled to retain the benefit of the execution or attachment against the 
liquidator in the winding up of the company unless he has completed the execution or 
attachment before the date of the commencement of the winding up.”
Example - Re Kandy Weaving Mills, Case No. 879/96 (In winding up)
Interview with Mr. Morawaka, Retired Registrar of Companies, at 200 Darley Road, 
Colombo, on 8 May 1997.
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order.52 The Sri Lankan courts have also looked upon parate execution with extreme 
disfavour. 53
In Malaysia, property may be secured by a statutory charge or lien. The 
National Land Code sets out two procedures i f  chargees wish to sell secured land.54 If 
land , were held under registry title, a court order is required to sell the property. 
Conversely, i f  land were held under a land office title, an application must be made to 
the Land Administrator. Compared with India and Sri Lanka, enforcing a court order is 
not too difficult. There are inherent problems such as inadequate bailiffs and resistance 
shown by borrowers but they are not considered to be o f  grave concern.
Floating charges are recognised in Malaysia and they are frequently taken as 
security by lenders. Compared with India and Sri Lanka, lenders do not hesitate to 
appoint receivers if  default occurs. The decision to appoint a receiver is taken quickly 
and the take-over is usually smooth.55 Until recently, a receiver appointed under a 
debenture had the power to sell land subject to a charge created under the National Land 
Code without a court order if  the debenture appointing him had conferred upon the 
chargee a right to sell the property by private treaty.56 The decision by the Federal Court 
in Kimlin Housing Development Sdn. Bhd. v Bumiputra M alaysia Berhad changed that
52 Scott, T., & Scott, S., (Eds.) Wille’s Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa, 3rd 
Ed., Juta & Co., Ltd., Cape Town, 1987, 203; Lee R. W., An Introduction To Roman 
Dutch Law, 5th Ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953, 200
53 In Almeida v De Zoysa Thambiah J stated,
“The Roman Dutch law authorities never allowed Parate Executie by which a person 
could take the law into his own hands. This principle has been consistently applied to 
all transactions” (1966) 68 NLR 517, 519
54 Sections 253-269
55 Interview with Chan Yim Fun, Executive Director Price Waterhouse, Malaysia, Kuala 
Lumpur, on 29 May 1997. Chan Yim Fun acts as a receiver.
56 United Malayan Banking Corporation Berhad v Official Receiver and Liquidator of 
Soon Hup Sdn. Bhd. (in Liquidation) [1986] 1 MLJ 75 The case was criticised for 
undermining the purpose of the National Land Code. Puthucheary J., & Nadkami, N., 
UMBC v Soon Hup : Deathknell For Chargor Protection? [1987] 2 MLJ cxlvii
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view when it ruled that the rights and remedies o f  parties under a statutory charge are set 
out in the Code, that they are exhaustive and exclusive, and any attempt at contracting 
out o f  those rights unless expressly provided fo r  in the Code would be void .57 (emphasis 
added) Clearly this is the position in Malaysia until the National Land Code states 
otherwise. A ll that can be said is that it is up to the legislature to amend the National 
Land Code to allow for the sale o f charged land by private treaty, either by the chargee 
or by a receiver and manager. A  precedent is contained in section 58 o f the Real 
Property Act 1900, o f  New South Wales, Australia. It may also be useful to amend the 
Companies Act along the lines o f  section 420 o f the Australian Corporations Law 
where the powers o f  a receiver are clearly set out.58 Legislation in the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand have also provided general powers a receiver may exercise, in 
addition to the specific powers conferred upon him by a debenture holder. 59
6.2.4 D ebt Recovery Through The Courts
Speedy debt recovery has been a matter that has been considered in India60 and 
Sri Lanka61 for more than half a century. It has now been established that in these two 
countries justice is delayed, not because o f  significant defects in the debt recovery laws, 
but because o f  faulty implementation or the failure to implement it. In India, the
57 Restriction on Receivers Powers : Special Briefing (1997) 10 Insolvency Intelligence
78
For further precedents, see Insolvency Act, 1986 of the U.K, Schedule 1; Receiverships 
Act, 1993 of New Zealand
59 Insolvency Act, 1986 of the U.K, Schedule 1; Receiverships Act, 1993 of New 
Zealand, Sections 14, 15, & 31
60 The Indian Law Commission considered this matter periodically. 14th Report On 
Reform of Judicial Administration, 1958, Vol.l, Chapter 11; 77th Report On Delay and 
Arrears in Trial Courts, 1978, 79th Report on Delays and Arrears in High Courts and 
Other Appellate Courts, 1979
61 Report o f the Ceylon Banking Commission, Sessional Paper XXII, Government Press, 
Colombo, 1934, Chapter IX; Report of the Wimalaratne Committee On the Law and 
Practice o f Debt Recovery, Ministry of Justice, 1985
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Recovery o f Debts Due To Banks and Financial Institutions Act provides for the 
establishment o f  special debt recovery tribunals with powers to adjudicate debt recovery 
cases in a summary way. According to the latest information available, in 1995, only 
five out o f  ten tribunals the government planned to set up were established. They are in 
Ahmedabad, Delhi, Bangalore, Jaipur, and Calcutta62 In the tribunals in Ahamedabad 
and Jaipur, the presiding officers have been appointed, but they have not been provided 
with staff members, or initial facilities to commence work. In the remaining three 
tribunals, public interest litigation has almost stalled the smooth functioning o f the 
tribunals. In Delhi, the Act was successfully challenged by the Delhi High Court Bar 
Council before the High Court. At present, the matter is before the Supreme Court. 
Special leave to appeal from the Order o f the Delhi High Court has been granted by the 
Supreme Court. Meanwhile the order o f the High Court has been stayed.63 
Consequently the Delhi Debt Recovery Tribunal is now functioning. In Calcutta, the 
High Court has issued numerous interim stay orders against the banks and the tribunal is 
functioning without adjudicating these cases.64
A number o f  problems relating to the jurisdiction o f  the tribunals have also been 
reported. The Bangalore tribunal has jurisdiction over the state o f  Andhra Pradesh but in 
a public interest litigation case the High Court o f  Andhra Pradesh has issued an interim 
order to the effect that debt recovery suits involving Rs.10 lakhs or more that have not 
already been transferred to the Bangalore tribunal should be continued in the civil 
courts. Similar orders have been issued by the High Courts o f  Punjab and Haryana 
preventing the transfer o f  cases to the Jaipur tribunal.
62 Narayanan, R., and Shah, V., Debt Recovery Tribunals (1995) 66 Journal of The 
Indian Institute of Bankers 140, 141-144
63 (1995)3 SCALE 53
64 Ibid.
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The anticipated results from the establishment o f debt recovery tribunals have 
not been achieved. High Court judges appear to have set themselves against cases being 
adjudicated by special tribunals. The legal profession is also vary o f  the tribunals. 
Sudhir Shah an attorney from Bombay states,
. “......members o f  the legal profession must ensure that the dignity o f
judicial institutions are not diluted. If public confidence is eroded by 
formation o f  such tribunals in the guise o f  speedy remedies, the 
foundation o f  the system o f justice delivery will weaken. Courts are 
constitutional institutions unlike Tribunals, which are statutory at most.
The nature o f work that the courts do must not be diluted and must not 
in any case be less important than that transferred to Tribunals.”65
The government o f  India must make a conscious effort to implement the provisions o f  
the Debt Recovery Act. It is equally important that the Indian courts take into account 
the overall objective o f  the Act when petitions are filed. Unless the courts support the 
tribunals, the probability o f  achieving speedy debt recovery will be extremely low.
In Sri Lanka, the Debt Recovery (Special Provisions) Act was enacted to 
provide lenders with a speedy debt recovery procedure. Despite this legislation, bankers 
still prefer to file debt recovery suits in the civil courts under the Civil Procedure Code. 
Since the new debt recovery laws were enacted in 1990, banks and financial institutions 
have filed fewer than 400 cases. The Peoples’ Bank, the largest state bank in the 
country, has filed the majority o f these cases, and very few cases have been filed by the 
private banks.66 A  number o f  reasons contribute to the under-utilisation o f  this Act. 
Section 13 o f  the Debt Recovery (Special Provisions) Act states that it is the duty o f a 
fiscal to execute a writ o f execution in the same manner prescribed in the Civil 
Procedure Code. Section 218 sets out the circumstances in which a writ o f  seizure may 
not be executed, and dishonest borrowers appear to be making use o f  these to avoid
65 Shah, S., Banking Regulation : Debt Recovery Tribunal [1996] 3 JIBL N51, 52
66 Interview with Mr. P. Gunasekera, Chief Legal Officer of the People’s Bank, Peoples 
Bank Head Office, Colombo, on 14 May 1997.
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seizure. For example, defendants often rent the mortgaged property to third parties as 
soon as an order absolute is made. Banks are then required to obtain an order from the 
court to eject the tenants before the writ o f execution can be enforced. The lack o f  
knowledge among judges and their lack o f  co-operation in debt recovery suits also deter 
banks from using the debt recovery laws. Apparently, some lawyers practising outside, 
the larger cities are not even aware o f the new legislation.67 The debt recovery laws 
provide lenders with an effective mechanism to recover debts, but their implementation 
has proved to be extremely difficult. There are no easy solutions to these problems, 
particularly the practical difficulties encountered by bank and fiscal officers when 
seizing property. The more difficult but effective remedy in the long term is to instil in 
borrowers the belief that credit is not a right, and that default would inevitably result in 
adverse consequences. Borrowers must be informed that, in the event o f  default, future 
access to credit would be suspended. Adverse publicity, through publishing names o f  
defaulters or those taken to court, and the sharing o f  such information with prospective 
lenders and other business organisations, could also be used as a warning against 
default.
In Malaysia, lenders file debt recovery actions in the Subordinate and High 
Court, depending on the value o f the claim. Summary procedure is effectively used, and 
lenders do not consider debt recovery through the courts difficult. There appears to be 
no significant flaw in the law, although its administration could be more effective. 
Although the court procedure could be completed within a reasonable time, the 
execution o f  judgements may be delayed, due to the lack o f  bailiffs or resistance by 
borrowers.68
67 Ibid.
68 Interview with Mr. Ismail, Senior Partner, Mohamed Ismail & Co, Kuala Lumpur, on 
30 May 1997.
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Bankruptcies and winding up o f companies are not popular in India and Sri 
Lanka. If a debtor is unable to pay its debts, threatening insolvency as a pressure tactic 
is not considered an acceptable method o f  recovering debt. There is a distinct cultural 
and judicial preference for the rehabilitation o f  debtors. In India, petitions to wind up 
companies on the ground o f inability to pay debts are.not favoured by judges.. In Re 
Navjivan Trading Finance Ltd., the Court held that winding up is a last resort, and 
cannot be insisted upon merely because the company is unable to pay it debts, if  it 
appears that the company could be rescued.69 Winding up o f  debtor companies is hardly 
reported in Sri Lanka. The records at the Registrar o f  Companies show that in the recent 
past not a single company had been wound up by court.70 Due to the lack o f  use o f  this 
procedure, court officials are not familiar with the compulsory winding up process and 
official liquidators, i f  appointed, are indifferent to the time restrictions imposed by law. 
For example, the Companies Act states that, i f  a liquidation were not completed, an 
official liquidator must file half-yearly accounts with the court, as well as with the 
Registrar o f Companies. These statutory provisions are usually ignored. The judges, 
court officials and staff at the Registrar o f Companies are not knowledgeable about such 
requirements. Consequently, these omissions are undetected.71
In Malaysia, the position is very different. Winding up o f  debtor companies is 
frequently seen because there are no cultural values that restrict the use o f  insolvency 
laws. Lenders consider the threat o f insolvency a very effective method to recover 
overdue debts. They also find the winding up procedure easier to deal with, because 
unlike court trials the entire procedure is administered by filing o f  papers and handled
69 (1978) 48 Company Cases (Guj) 402
7® Interview with Mr. Hettiarachchi. D., Deputy Registrar, Registrar of Companies,
Colombo, on 13 May 1997.
71 Ibid.
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by lawyers. In practice, banks would not file winding up petitions, in order to safeguard 
their reputation and to avert the prejudice o f  other customers. Banks normally encourage 
an unsecured creditor to file the petition.72 Malaysian insolvency laws are primarily pro 
creditor. In the 1980’s, there were repeated calls for the introduction o f  a rescue 
procedure similar to the United States Chapter 11 procedure but this was resisted by the 
lenders.73 Bankers are, however, becoming increasingly aware o f  their responsibility 
towards borrowers in financial difficulties, and are acting as unofficial business 
advisers, particularly, to small and medium scale industries. Bankers are also seeking 
professional help on how to re-organise companies in financial difficulties.74
6.3 CONCLUSIONS
The problems o f  debt recovery may be said to threaten the rule o f  law in India 
and Sri Lanka. The legal systems have become inefficient and the resolution o f  disputes 
takes many years, sometimes over two decades. Respect for the law and legal 
institutions is, as a result, on the wane. So far, the legal response to poor debt recovery 
has not achieved positive results. The reforms that were introduced were primarily 
focused on the symptoms o f  debt default rather than its causes. Most o f  the reforms 
were concerned with expediting debt recovery in the existing courts or through special 
tribunals. Given the high level o f inefficiency in the judicial systems and the 
bureaucracy o f government administration, the chances o f  these reforms being 
successful were limited.
Interview with Mr. Ng Chih Kaye, May Bank Head Quarters, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 
May 1997
Kamarul, B., Chapter on Malaysia, in Tomasic, R., and Little, P., Insolvency Law and 
Practice in Asia, FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific, Hong Kong, 1997, 172
Interview with Mr. Lim San Peen, Executive Director, Price Waterhouse, Kuala 
Lumpur, on 29 May 1997
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This thesis has focussed on the broader context o f  debt recovery. Debt default 
could be reduced if  lenders pay equal attention to the various stages o f  a lending 
transaction. Credit appraisal must be improved and the use o f  collateral security 
minimised. If there were an element o f risk, and security were required, lenders should 
be willing to take a more, varied range o f securities, and to exercise their rights o f  extra 
judicial enforcement when provided for by law. Loan agreements need to be carefully 
drafted and documentation for security prepared, preferably by lawyers. Loan 
supervision must be increased considerably, particularly where repayment schedules are 
not taken seriously by borrowers. The obligations o f  borrowers must be established 
before a loan is granted.
When a loan goes bad, it is too late to look at the causes o f  default, and lenders 
are then faced with the task o f recovering the loan and the interest. Amending the 
existing legislation on its own would not be adequate to provide a lasting solution to the 
debt recovery crises. Institutional development is equally important, so that the existing 
laws are more effective in practice. Changes to improve the administration o f  the courts 
and fiscal offices, government registries for land and motor vehicles and the registrar o f  
companies are essential. Banks, particularly the state banks, must improve their 
management and administrative procedures, because mistakes in credit allocation and 
debt recovery can be attributable to these deficiencies within banks.75
Whilst law reform and the strengthening o f  judicial administration and 
enforcement institutions are essential, it is equally important to provide training for 
bankers, judges and lawyers. Bank staff must have proper training in loan 
administration and dealing with the problems o f  borrowers. If the innovative credit
75 De Juan, A., From Good Bankers to Bad Bankers : Ineffective Supervision and 
Management Deterioration As Major Elements in Banking Crises (Unpublished) 
Washington DC, 1987
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disbursement programmes based on the concept o f  “bare foot banking” are to be 
successful, bank officers must take a leading role. It is therefore important for bank 
staff to be aware o f  the new credit culture that is being promoted in their respective 
countries. Judges must be more committed to expediting the judicial process by striking 
out spurious defences and ordering trials to be. conducted without unnecessary delays. 
Lawyers must also be conscious o f  their responsibilities to their clients and avoid acting 
in their self-interest. In short higher ethical standards should be expected from lawyers. 
As General Counsel o f  the European Bank For Reconstruction and Development 
observed:
“[t]here is little point in having well drafted laws...unless such laws are
properly enforced by trained lawyers and judiciary....”76
The core o f  the debt recovery problem in India and Sri Lanka is external 
political influence that undermines the quality o f  credit decisions and the ability to 
supervise and collect loans when they are due. In Malaysia, the burden o f  political debts 
nearly triggered the collapse o f  several banks in the mid 1980’s, but the governments 
intervened and averted it. The situation has since been improved. It is crucial that the 
laws and the judicial systems are improved to a high standard, so that they are 
considered a serious threat by defaulters. However, unless strong measures are taken to 
reduce political influence in credit allocation and debt recovery, the other reforms can 
only be partially effective.
Taylor, J., New Laws, New Lawyers and the EBRD (1996) 24 International Business 
Lawyer 98, 99
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INTERVIEWS
1. Dr. Uthum Herath, Senior Economist, Central Bank o f Sri Lanka Head
Quarters, Colombo, on 4 June 1997
2. Mr. A. Cooray, Attorney at Law, on 28 June 1997 at Colombo, Sri Lanka,
3. Mr. D. Hettiarachchi, Deputy Registrar o f Companies, at the office o f the
Registrar o f Companies, Colombo, on 13 May 1997
4. Mr. Gopal Sundram, Head o f the Legal Department, Bank Negara Malaysia,
Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997
5. Mr. Ismail, Senior Partner, Mohamed Ismail & Co, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May
1997
6. Mr. L. Abeysekera, Chairman Sri Lanka Legal Aid Commission, formerly
High Court Judge, on 30 October 1998 (by telephone).
7. Mr. Lim San Peen, Executive Director, Price Waterhouse, Malaysia, Kuala
Lumpur, on 29 May 1997
8. Mr. M. Fernando, Deputy General Manager Credit Department, Peoples’ Bank
Headquarters, Colombo, on 14 May 1997
9. Mr. Mahayuddin Ismail, Senior General Manager - Retail Operations, Bank
Islam, at Bank Islam Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur, on 30 May 1997
10. Mr. Morawaka, Retired Registrar o f Companies, at 200 Darley Road,
Colombo, on 8 May 1997
11. Mr. Ng Chih Kaye, Head Credit Division, May Bank Head Quarters, Kuala
Lumpur, on 30 May 1997
12. Mr. P. Gunasekera, Chief Legal Officer, Peoples’ Bank, at the Bank Head
Quarters, Colombo, on 14 May 1997
13. Mrs Chan Yim Fun, Executive Director, PriceWaterhouse-Malaysia, Kuala
Lumpur, on 29 May 1997
14. Mrs. Badariah Sahamid, Banking Law Lecturer, University o f Malaya, Kuala 
Lumpur, on 2 June 1997
The interviews were conducted with the above persons with their consent and
understanding that the information gathered would be used in this thesis. The author
holds the original notes taken at these interviews.
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